cesaa

contemporary european studies association of australia

Review

IN THIS ISSUE

ARTICLES

REGULAR FEATURES

PRESIDENT'S NEWS

Welcome to our CESAA Review readers and allow me to introduce myself. My name is Bruno Mascitelli and I am the new President of CESAA for the next 12 months. CESAA as you know is the Australian association for European studies in Australia and seeks to discuss, promote and lobby to promote European Studies throughout all educational institutions. Our aim is to raise the profile of Europe and facilitate its understanding in the wider Australian community.

I am very pleased to be able to state that there have been significant changes in our committee representation as of our last Annual General Meeting in March 2004. The new office-holders are listed below and we can only promise that we wish to be a broader and all encompassing committee looking for new supporters and allies to further our cause.

I hope our readers enjoy this issue of CESAA review which is as a result of the tireless efforts of Rita Wilson and Karen Hussey. Congratulations to our editors and best wishes to our readers.

Bruno Mascitelli
President, CESAA

CESAA Committee Members 2004-2005

President: Bruno Mascitelli
Bruno is a lecturer at Swinburne University of Technology in European Studies. Areas of major research include Italian business and commerce and he is currently completing his PhD on the Italian political crisis of 1992-94. Bruno is also a committee member of the Australian Italian Research Association and plays a key role on the Italian Chamber of Commerce in Melbourne.

Vice President: Dr. Carol Strong
Carol Strong completed her Doctorate in May 2004 in the department of Political Science at the University of Melbourne under the supervision of Professor Leslie Holmes. Her primary research has been in the area of legitimacy and leadership during periods of radical transformation and change, with a specific focus on the leadership of Helmut Kohl (former chancellor of Germany), Vacláv Havel (former president of the Czech Republic) and Boris Yeltsin (former president of Russia) exhibited between 1989 and 1991 respectively. She is currently working as a Research Fellow at Deakin University in the Centre for Citizenship and Human Rights.

Secretary: Anthony Bidgood
Anthony is from Cornwall and has lectured in various Modern European History courses at Monash University since 1997. He is currently completing a dissertation on German communist opposition to the Nazi regime between August 1939 and June 1941. Future research projects will focus on how class reformation in post-WWII Germany was

affected by gender relations and the cultural expectations of the defeated Germans towards their conquerors.

Treasurer: Larry Sheehan
Larry is a PhD candidate focussing on US-Europe relations. He has an MA in International Relations from UCLA and formerly practised international law in the US. Before coming to Australia Larry held lecturing positions in the US (international relations and law) and Russia (comparative law including French, German & UK law systems).

Membership Secretary: Dora Horvath
Dora graduated from the Budapest University of Economic Sciences with a B(Hons)Ec in 1998 and a MA Degree in International Relation/Foreign Affairs (Major) and Marketing Communication (Minor) in 2000. Dora is a PhD candidate at the Department of Political Science and the Contemporary Europe Research Centre at the University of Melbourne where her PhD explores issues of citizenship in the EU in a comparative context, focusing specifically on the community and identity building aspects of EU citizenship.

Co-Editor CESAA Review: Karen Hussey
Karen graduated from the University of Melbourne with double major in Economics and Politics, before completing an M.Econ.Sc (European Economics and Public Affairs) from the Dublin European Institute, University College Dublin. She is currently a PhD candidate in the Department of Political Science at the University of Melbourne. Karen's thesis is a comparative analysis of the EU and Australia's engagement in Global Environmental Governance. Her research interests include: EU and Australian environmental policy, trade-environment linkages, EU agricultural policy and management, EU-Australia relations.

Co-Editor CESAA Review: Rita Wilson
Rita lectures in the Italian and Translation studies programs in the School of Languages, Cultures and Linguistics, Monash University as well as in Italian language and literature, Department of French, Italian and Spanish Studies, at the University of Melbourne. Her research interests include: comparative literature; translation theory; women's writing; semiotics; and contemporary Italian literature.

MISSING THE EU STORY

Majella Anning
ABC Chief Europe Correspondent to Brussels, 1991 - 1997

In journalism, timing can be everything.

It is one of life's ironies that just as the European Union is about to undergo its biggest expansion in history, when differences between the EU and the US on Iraq and other global issues are increasing, when the euro is strengthening against the US dollar, when the stories coming out Brussels could not be more interesting or vital, that the Australian media has moved out.

In December, the ABC news bureau in Brussels, established nearly 30 years ago, closed its doors for good and the remaining ABC correspondents were recalled to Australia.

It comes as a surprise to some, but not to those who have covered the EU, that Brussels is the world's biggest international media centre. There are more than 1,200 correspondents from around the world officially accredited to cover the European Union and NATO. But now, sadly, there will not be one Australian amongst them.

The timing could not have been worse. On May 1, the EU welcomes in 10 new countries to make it a 25-member Union with a population of 470 million, giving it even more collective economic and political clout. Journalists from around the world are moving into Brussels in greater numbers to report on the "new" Europe, but overworked Australian correspondents are now based in London struggling to understand what is happening "over there".

As experienced EU-watchers will tell you, if you want an accurate view of what is happening in the EU, the last place you want to be based is Britain. Recent Europe-wide surveys have shown that the average British citizen understands less about the EU than citizens in all other countries of the EU. And the British media reflects this trend.

For any journalist wanting the "inside track" on the EU, Brussels is where you meet senior EU policy-makers both formally and informally, where you mix with authoritative journalists from all over Europe, where you pick up the trends before they happen.

What would the Australian public think if the BBC reported on Australia from Jakarta? Would we think it acceptable to have not even one Australian reporter in Washington to report on the US administration? Of course not.

While a quick survey of Australian newspapers, radio and television shows there is now less news being reported out of Brussels, Australian business would clearly like to hear more. The EU is Australia's largest trading partner and the largest source of foreign investment into Australia. It plays a pivotal role in the World Trade Organisation and

other global institutions. And when Australian ministers go to Brussels to negotiate trade deals, Australian business needs to hear about what happened – from both sides.

In addition, with more countries including China moving part of their official reserves from dollars into euros, economic decisions taken at EU level matter more and more, especially to a middle-sized economy such as Australia's which is so open to the global market.

From the point of view of global security, the EU is increasingly making its influence felt on issues which directly and indirectly affect Australia. Divisions over the Iraq war underlined that point. In country after country around the world, differences in approach between the EU and the US are manifesting themselves. Australians could find themselves in the middle again sometime in the future.

The Australian media in general must reflect on how it is reporting global trends. We have learnt the hard way that we can never again hope to remain aloof from world events. We must now be more engaged than ever. That means having correspondents in Brussels as well as Washington to tell us what is really going on.

SECURITY CO-OPERATION BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND EAST ASIA: WHAT HAS CHANGED FROM ASEM I AND II TO ASEM III IN SEOUL TO ASEM IV IN COPENHAGEN

Paul Lim
School of Social Sciences, Universiti Sains Malaysia

INTRODUCTION

When we speak of security in the post-Cold War era, we are not only talking of hard security but also soft security. In the Cold War epoch, peace was kept by the fear of a nuclear holocaust with the balance of nuclear arms parity which prevented one or the other superpower from having the upper hand. The collapse of the "evil empire" removed the spectre of doomsday but nuclear arms proliferation remains a problem with the breakdown of the nuclear arsenal of the now ally, Russia, in connivance with international crime traffickers. This is more elusive and harder to track down. In the post-Cold War era, international criminal activities are on the rise whether it be nuclear arms, drug trafficking, trafficking of women and children into prostitution, and money laundering now seen as new "soft" security threats. Democratic Russia, democratic Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), democratic Central and Eastern Europe have opened up an unwelcome illegal and illicit market with or without the participation of governments or government agents after profit. The Russian and Albanian mafias trafficking of women from Central and Eastern Europe into prostitution in Asian countries and the trafficking of Asians into Western Europe as illegal immigrants claiming refugee status are well known. There is good reason for Asia-Europe co-operation, however, as co-operation in such soft security issues did not come easily as this paper will illustrate.

The focus of this paper is on what changed in the security discussions in Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) I and II, and what changed following the discussions at ASEM III in 2000 and even further to ASEM IV in 2002? What is concretely possible and what is not considering the security interests of Europe and Asia? Here one is on the ground of what institutions can and cannot do. What can the ASEM governments achieve in practice? It will be shown that soft security is the area of security co-operation in the ASEM framework leaving out hard security. The key issue is how security is handled in ASEM.

SECURITY AND ASEM SUMMITS I AND II

ASEM I

Briefly we examine security in previous ASEM summits. In the first ASEM of 1996, the Chairman's statement spoke of the Heads reviewing political and security situations in both regions and underlined the importance of support for international initiatives to solve outstanding problems. The Meeting agreed on the importance of enhancing the already existing dialogues between Asia and Europe on general security issues and in

particular on confidence-building. The European Union (EU) and the Asian nations have also engaged in discussions on political matters at such fora as the ASEAN-EU Ministerial Meetings (AEMMs), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)[1] and the ASEAN Post Ministerial Conferences (PMCs). The 1996 Meeting agreed on the importance of strengthening global initiatives on arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and reaffirmed that Asian and European countries will enhance co-operation in these fields.

However, it is to be noted that one concrete request made by ASEAN to the EU Member States was their signature to ASEAN's Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ) Treaty of December 1995. This request was turned down and ASEAN never pursued it further with the EU and its Member States.

ASEM II

In ASEM II in London, the Chairman's Statement again referred to security discussions, to the ARF, to the international efforts at arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation, biological and toxin weapons and a whole list of soft security issues. It stated that leaders discussed regional and international issues of common interest such as the situations in Cambodia, the Korean peninsula, in Bosnia and Kosovo, and enlargement of the EU. They expressed their opposition to all forms of racism and xenophobia, and agreed to intensify their efforts to contribute to peace, stability and prosperity through co-operation between Asia and Europe.

In ASEM II, we see largely a repetition of the hard security issues, if not a spelling out of them. What had occurred between ASEM I and II? Just talking? You have words like "re-affirming", "endorsing", "cooperating", "committing" and "supporting" but what concrete results emerged? One has the impression that ASEM security co-operation is pure talk. The EU Member States in ASEM had been reluctant to put their names down to ASEAN's SEANWFZ, something concrete. The one security forum where concrete attempts are made is the ARF in terms of Confidence Building Measures (CBMs), as the ARF and moving towards Preventive Diplomacy (PD).

Human rights, if perceived as part of soft security, was not in the ASEM II Chairman's Statement. Observers say that there was no need to repeat in the Chairman's Statement

---

[1] The ARF is the most important project of ASEAN meeting for the first time in July 1994. It now brings 21 of the region's Foreign Ministers together annually to discuss regional security issues. It is only a forum and not an organisation like the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). ASEAN's position has always been to discuss security issues at levels comfortable to its participants especially its Asian partners. The ARF Chairman's Statement of 26 July 1999 noted that Senior Officials and ARF Ministers have become more comfortable with each other through frequent interactions at the various fora. Such enhanced comfort levels have enabled ARF participants to exchange views frankly on issues of common concern, thereby encouraging greater transparency and mutual understanding. Some participants have noted that the ARF meetings have evolved considerably in recent sessions to the point where they are "no longer a place where set speeches are delivered," but where genuine and frank debate takes place. This has been attributed to a number of changes, including the new membership of India and the full and prepared participation of China in the deliberations. (Source: "The Role of the EU in South-East Asia: A Political, Economic and Strategic Review", Working Paper, Directorate General for Research, European Parliament, External Economic Relations Series, REXT 102 EN, March 1999, page 78). Within the ARF framework, there are on-going discussions with China on Codes of Conduct for the South Chinese Sea disputes and the first contact with the OSCE.

human rights which were already in the ASEM I Statement. At the press conference, Mr. Blair stated that fundamental rights had been discussed, and confirmed that Portugal had raised the issue of East Timor.[2] Human rights along with civil society were described by Agence Europe (6-7 April 1998) as being on short allowance while Mr. Blair assured the press that human rights were discussed. The impression one gets of ASEM II was the avoidance of anything conflictual.[3] The Singapore Prime Minister stated that human rights were not a burning issue of this meeting centred on the current crisis. With the crisis, important rights are to be able to have a roof over one's head and eat according to the Malaysian Prime Minister and the Chinese Foreign Minister (Agence Europe, 6 April 1998).

The Asian side has always been reluctant to discuss human rights. They always felt that the Europeans would take the moral high ground and lecture them on the subject against the background that among the European participants were their ex-colonial masters. Secondly, discussing human rights would constitute interference in their internal affairs or open the door to interference in their internal affairs. This explains their reluctance to have a political dialogue with Europe as human rights was perceived as the European agenda for a political dialogue.

The European Commission Perspective

For ASEM III in Seoul, the European Commission produced a document entitled: "Perspectives and Priorities for the ASEM Process (Asia-Europe Meeting) into the New Decade" COM 2000 (241), 18 April 2000. In the Executive Summary it listed security as one of its five specific priorities. It spoke of "an enhanced exchange of views on regional and global security issues". The ASEM process is seen as "promoting and facilitating an exchange of views and enhanced mutual understanding on matters relating to regional and global security". What is behind "enhanced" and "facilitating"? Further, it spoke of the European Union sharing its regional experiences in fields such as analysis, planning and training in relation to conflict prevention, crisis management and peace-keeping, reconciliation process, humanitarian assistance and other aspects of "soft" security co-operation like the building of (soft) institutions. Exchanges on "new security issues" including international crime and terrorism, information and other piracy and cyber warfare will also be important along with fostering support to stem proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery and encouraging universal

---

[2] Full text of press conference available on ASEM II website.

[3] At the international press conference following the ASEM Foreign Ministers' Meeting, the Singapore Foreign Minister outlined five principles which Kompass, the Indonesian newspaper, described as totally non-confrontational to conduct political dialogue. These five principles are 1) reciprocal respect of the members, 2) political dialogue held in a positive spirit to understand each other and learn from each other, 3) that members shall not accuse each other, 4) to avoid efforts to accomodate pressures from lobbyies in each country and 5) to avoid pressures from the agenda of international news media. According to the Indonesian Foreign Minister, Mr. Ali Alatas, political dialogue focuses and tries to develop matters which are agreed together with the aim to increase mutual understanding and friendship and to increase co-operation. Wise selections in conformity to the wish of the heads of state/governments. Do not discuss problems which are not relevant and which do not contribute to settlements because it has already been negotiated in another forum. Is he referring here to the problem of East Timor? The London meeting seems to conform with the five principles propounded by the Singapore Foreign Minister and the EU seems to accept these principles. So, the human rights, social, environmental and development lobbyies at least should not be listened to. (Source: ASEM Watch 11) According to the FEER, 27 February 1997, page 22, a European diplomat reacting to this quipped, "All that's left to talk about is the colour of the wall paper".

compliance with the Nuclear NPT, the CTBT, the CWC and the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) could supplement the agenda."

The rationale given is politically, and from the security standpoint, the world is becoming a smaller place - crises in one region have potential repercussions far afield. Therefore, it is incumbent upon us to further develop (what is behind this word?) political dialogue and co-operation on issues of mutual interest reinforced by global threats (terrorism, organised crime and proliferation). These concerns can be more effectively addressed by acting in concert. The exchange, at ASEM level, of regional experiences in dealing with security issues could contribute to stability in the respective regions.

It is clear from these quotes that the Commission was looking for more in ASEM III on security co-operation, but did it get what it wanted in ASEM III? Apparently the Commission was frustrated or disappointed that the security discussion in ASEM I and II was reduced to nice words like "addressing", "endorsing", "promoting", "cooperating", "enhancing".

SECURITY AND ASEM III

The Chair's Statement

In the ASEM III's Chairman Statement, the importance of the ARF was acknowledged and it welcomed the admission of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) in July 2000 as a significant step, further strengthening the ARF and advancing the cause of regional peace and security.

The new thaw in inter-Korean relations found expression in the Chairman's Statement: in welcoming the historic first inter-Korean Summit held in June 2000 in Pyongyang, acknowledging its great significance in laying the foundation for the peace process on the Korean peninsula. In recognition of its importance, a separate declaration has been issued on the recent developments on the Korean peninsula."

The impression one has is that without a discussion regarding Korea in the field of political and security dialogue, there was nothing substantial to talk about in ASEM III. One could say that the five-paragraph "Seoul Declaration for Peace on the Korean Peninsula" was the concrete output of the political and security dialogue of ASEM III.[4]

However, the Chairman's Statement also referred to the restoring of stability in East Timor and to the role of the United Nations Transitional Administration (UNTAET) there where there was a problem of language between the Portuguese and the Indonesians. The Portuguese phrasing was too strong for the Indonesians and they were told to settle the matter between themselves, which they did, with the agreed paragraph.

---

[4] The FT, 21-22 October 2000, stated "The Seoul Declaration for Peace was the only substantial achievement so far in a summit that appears to be admitting that it needs to change its format to become more effective at future biennal meetings."

ASEM III was not only about Asian security but European security as well, referring to the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), South Eastern Europe and the Stability Pact. Nothing was said of Japan's contribution to the reconstruction of the Balkans, not even a word of appreciation. There was a discussion as to whether the references to current events should be in the Chairman's Statement as some conceived the Statement as standing on its own and not being time dependent.

There was considerable repetition of the security concerns of the past ASEM I and II and some new concerns raised. The new ones were anti-personnel land mines (APL), small arms and light weapons. According to Agence Europe (23-24 October 2000, pp.3), this paragraph referring to security concerns of ASEM I and II was made possible due to Chinese concessions especially on prevention of conflicts and safeguarding the treaties on disarmament. Again we see words like "agreed", "determination", "re-affirm", "promote", "address". What is behind all these words? There was also a problem over APLs. A few European countries felt that the present phrasing was not strong enough as there is an existing international convention. Others did not wish to go beyond it to jeopardise the present convention. However, more importantly there was sensitivity of some of the Asian participants on this subject as they themselves are producers of such mines. It was decided to leave the phrasing as it was.

On soft security, leaders expressed their commitment to addressing global issues of common concern. How is this to be translated in reality? These were managing migratory and transnational crime which included money laundering; smuggling and exploitation of migrants and trafficking in persons, in particular of women and children for the purpose of sexual exploitation; international terrorism and piracy; racism and xenophobia; the fight against illegal drugs etc.. In this respect, leaders expressed their firm support for the adoption of the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and its protocols by the end of the year 2000. From the Chairman's Statement of ASEM II, some of what is said is not new in the field of soft security.

If human rights are part of soft security, the Chairman's Statement had just one short paragraph on it:

"Leaders committed themselves to promote and protect all human rights, including the right to development, and fundamental freedoms, bearing in mind their universal, indivisible and interdependent character as expressed at the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna."

This was better than its absence in ASEM II's Chairman's Statement. To have this paragraph acceptable to some Asian governments, the reference to Vienna was written in. It appears that the only way to get certain Asian countries to agree to a textual mention of human rights was to refer to a UN instrument that they had signed up to. A European diplomat was quoted as saying that although the text was not what had been hoped for, at least this normally difficult subject was covered (Agence Europe, 23-24 October 2000, pp. 3). According to one source, having this paragraph means that it will be easier to discuss human rights in future. By this is meant that if a country does not want to discuss

human rights, it could be rebutted by reference to this paragraph of the Chairman's Statement. This is seen as progress albeit on paper. It was an advance.

Jonathan Faull, spokesman Commission President Mr. Prodi, stated that for the first time the question of human rights was tackled in a way that was not "over dramatic" (Agence Europe, 23-24 October 2000, pp. 3). Chris Patten stated, "The question of human rights is debated much more freely now than at the beginning of our relations." (Agence Europe, 20 October 2000, pp. 6) Sensitive issues were not avoided. Discussions took place on human rights, individual and social, rule of law, Asian values including Burma, although not all were in the Chairman's Statement.

What is the reality? An Asian Ambassador stated that Asia would like to share Europe's perspectives on a range of issues including human rights but neither side should be prescriptive. What would it be in Copenhagen? Would it be prescriptive due to the agreement on human rights in Seoul?

However, it is clear that human rights in ASEM III were overshadowed by other soft security issues and by the issue of the Korean peninsula.

The Chairman's Statement concluded with new initiatives in the field of security including:
- Anti-corruption Initiative
- Anti-money Laundering Initiative
- Initiative to Combat Trafficking in Women and Children
- Symposium on Law Enforcement Organs' Co-operation in Combating Transnational Crimes
- Initiative on HIV/AIDS

According to Reiterer, the ASEM adviser in the European Commission, leaders for the first time committed themselves to combating the smuggling and exploitation of migrants, people-trafficking and the fight against illegal drugs. Managing migratory flows, combating the illicit trafficking in weapons and promoting the welfare of women and children were also listed as priority areas (Reiterer, 2000, pp.2). How will this be translated into action? These topics are not new but nothing was concretised between ASEM II and III.

However, one sees that among the new initiatives, hard security did not appear. To be able to have these soft security issues agreed upon was a milestone. On the European Union side, there was recognition that it had limited means to play any hard security role in Asia. That was in the hands of the Americans. Its concern was European security. If there is going to be any hard security role, that was in the domain of the EU Member States - notably the UK and France - not the European Union, hence, at the bilateral level. Hard security issues in the framework of the UN were not an issue.

It is clear that ASEM III's Chairman Statement, if it reflects what was discussed, points to a more substantial discussion on security than ASEM I and II, especially in the not-so-

new area of soft security, with paragraphs on Korea, East Timor, the Middle East and Kosovo and a line on the EU's ESDP. To this extent, the Commission got what it wanted in terms of "enhanced exchange of views on security issues". Another view given was that everybody wanted their topic discussed so that the Chairman's Statement became overly long and lost focus. According to a participant in Seoul, there were other sensitive topics discussed which did not appear in the Chairman's Statement such as the South China Sea, sovereignty, India and Pakistan, RRF, child soldiers and peace-keeping. Can sensitive issues be discussed openly behind words like "enhance", "confidence-building", "addressing", "encouraging", "engaging", "further developing" etc.? We shall see what is meant by discussion.

However, the Chairman's Statement did not reflect all that the Commission wished for in its Working Document examined above. Nothing was mentioned about conflict prevention, reconciliation process, humanitarian assistance. Nothing was said about seminars for officials back to back with Senior Officials' meetings, special "retreat" sessions at Foreign Minister level, exchanges of analysts and planners or informal discussions bringing together academics and officials. Nothing about the European experience in crisis management and the building of (soft) institutions being shared and discussed with Asian partners.

THE ASIA-EUROPE CO-OPERATION FRAMEWORK (AECF) 2000

The other important document which came out of ASEM III was AECF. This is the first time the AECF entered the public domain. The ASEM I version of AECF, updated in 1998 was secret. It was described by President Kim Dae-jung, in his final remarks to ASEM III, as a basic document Asia-Europe co-operation and the development of ASEM. It is the central medium of intercontinental collaboration. The fulfilment of its principles and objectives will smoothen the progress of the common prosperity of the two regions. President Kim is overly optimistic on how AECF 2000 provisions might bring prosperity.

In the AECF, hard and soft security are described in the following way:

ASEM efforts should also address global issues of common concern such as :
•   strengthening efforts in the global and regional context towards arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation of WMD;
•   combating illicit trafficking in and accumulation of small arms and light weapons;
•   managing migratory flows in a globalized world;
•   combating transnational crime, including money laundering, the smuggling and exploitation of migrants, the trafficking of persons in particular women and children, international terrorism and piracy, and fighting against illegal drugs;
•   combating racism and xenophobia.

Paragraph 12 of the AECF posed a problem. In the political field, it speaks of focusing on issues of common interest, proceeding step-by-step in a process of consensus-building, enhancing mutual awareness and understanding, drawing strength from our diversity "while not excluding any issue beforehand but exercising wisdom and judiciousness in

selecting the topics for discussion". It continued with the classical words of mutual respect, equality, promotion of fundamental rights and, in accordance with the rules of international law and obligations, non-intervention, whether direct or indirect, in each other's internal affairs.

In this paragraph, to insert the phrase, "not excluding any issue", the compromise made was adding "using judiciousness in selecting topics for discussion" without which certain Asian countries would not have agreed. This is progress on paper as in future discussions on any issue is possible and any objection could be referred back to this paragraph. However, with judicious choice and non interference in internal affairs. Agence Europe (23-24 October 2000, pp. 4) noted this to continue in efforts toward mutual understanding, without "avoiding any subject" and on the basis of "mutual respect, equality and the promotion of human, rights". This report does not seem to know what was behind such phrasing.

The same sensitivity of some Asian countries on including human rights is in paragraph five which appears uncontroversial but was a problem. The paragraph speaks of Asia and Europe as an area of peace and shared development with common interests and aspirations such as upholding the <u>purposes and principles of the UN Charter, respect for democracy, the rule of law, equality, justice and human rights</u>, concern for the environment and other global issues, eradication of poverty ….. The lines underlined were a problem for some Asian countries which argued against bringing in human rights for fear of internal interference.

<u>The Seoul Declaration for Peace on the Korean Peninsula</u>

The Seoul Declaration for Peace on the Korean Peninsula was the central issue in the field of security co-operation. President Kim got what he wanted, namely that what happens on the Korean peninsula is also the concern of the whole world and the steps taken by him and his Northern counterpart representing their republics should have the support of ASEM and the whole world.[5] The member nations also agreed to exert additional efforts to improve relations with North Korea on an individual and multilateral basis.

The content of this Declaration is not repeated here except the disputed paragraph four, the "leaders renewed their support for the process of rapprochement and co-operation under way between the Republic of Korea (ROK) and DPRK, and encouraged both sides to continue building on the success of the Summit for the sake of peace and security in

---

5 President Kim was quoted in an interview with Yonhap Press on 17 October 2000 saying that ASEM will be an opportunity to display broad global support for Korean peace and reconciliation and greatly contribute to dismantling the Cold War on the Korean peninsula. In an interview with a Commission official before Seoul ASEM III, it was stated that, on the Seoul Declaration, the European participants refused to view this as "a unilateral pledging session". In this briefing, it was also stated that Japan placed outmost strategic priority on the proposed re-establishment of the rail link between the Koreas that would eventually be connected to a complete overland route stretching from the Middle East oil fields to Asia and avoiding crowded and insecure sea lanes. Japan does have a stake in the Korean re-unification process considering that its oil supply by sea is subjected to the hazards of piracy.

the region. In this context, they welcomed the recent positive developments in relations between the DPRK and the United States."[6]

The FT, 21-22 October 2000, reported that the EU had initially called for a reference to WMD but the term was dropped after China warned that it could anger North Korea as it moved towards opening to the rest of the world[7]. A Korean reporter, Shin Yong-bae, reported on 17 October 2000 well before ASEM that China was reacting unfavourably to a phrase in the declaration, which referred to the need to reduce threats of WMD. Yonhap of 16 October 2000 quoted officials as saying that "the declaration may have to go all the way to the full SOM meeting because of some 'technical' and 'sensitive' matters regarding North Korea, such as clauses on WMD".

The compromise to resolve China's objection was the phrasing of paragraph 4 that ends with "for the sake of peace and security in the region". However, this paragraph required North Korea to take active responsibility and initiatives. This is seen in ".... co-operation under way between the ROK and DPRK, and encouraged both sides to continue building on the success of the Summit ...." This was at the insistence of the EU. But it is said that the declaration does not appeal strongly to the DPRK to continue the recently started policy of engagement. (Reiterer, M. 2000 pp.3). One would expect China to have taken a position not to pin down North Korea on WMD, but it is also clear that the South Koreans did not want to endanger their recently established dialogue with North Korea by highlighting the issue. The compromise was the veiled "for the sake of peace and security in the region" but whether the North Koreans understood or ignored this message is an open question. In an ASEM atmosphere which wanted to portray Europe-Asia co-operation, compromise was the tone.

One has the impression that without this Seoul Declaration, there was little to speak of a security discussion or for that matter of ASEM III. An ASEM participant said to the writer that in his personal view without the Seoul Declaration and the Nobel Prize award to President Kim there would have not been much of ASEM III. He ventured to say that, if ASEM leaders turned up in Seoul, it was due to Korean reconciliation and the Nobel Prize. One could say that ASEM III was very much a Korean affair to support Korean interests and for a domestic audience.[8] The meeting of the two Korean leaders and the Nobel Prize award boosted ASEM III and overshadowed all else. It was certainly a good public relations coup for the Koreans.

---

[6] According to Yonhap, 15 October 2000, the Seoul Declaration was actually seven paragraphs. Yonhap stated that the draft included calling "for ASEM member states to enhance political and economic co-operation with North Korea, offer humanitarian assistance to the North and encourage Pyongyang to emerge as a responsible member of the global community." These words are not in the definitive version of the Seoul Declaration.

[7] Agence Europe, 20 October 2000, page 6, also included Japan with the EU. In another Agence Europe report of 23-24 October 2000, page 5, it is stated that the Japanese Prime Minister, Mr. Yoshiro Miri in his contacts with the Europeans, placed emphasis on the resumption of relations with Pyongyang being accompanied by pressure on nuclear weapons issues, notably.

8 In an interview with Yonhap dated 17 October 2000, President Kim stated, "We will show Korea to the world through them, and they will in turn will be salespeople for our country around the world. I am confident that in this sense, we will gain a lot from this conference. .... We can raise our credibility and receive more foreign investment, and our convention, tourism and transport industries can leap forward. Our culture will be introduced to the whole world, and it will lead to the promotion of our cultural products and tourism business."

The DPRK, while not being present at Seoul, was a beneficiary when the UK and Germany announced that "they were preparing to establish ties soon with North Korea." (Financial Times, 21-22 October 2000). They joined Sweden, Finland, Italy and Portugal. The spokesman for the Japanese Foreign Minister acknowledged the importance of North Korea emerging from its isolation but stipulated that Japan would need more time to resume diplomatic relations (Agence Europe, 23-24 October 2000, pp.5). The IHT of 21-22 October 2000 quoted President Chirac stating his opposition to the recognition of North Korea "until it resolves to grant minimum human rights and do away with WMD" which surprised Asian and European leaders. According to Agence Europe (21 October 2000, pp.4), Chirac stated "It so happens that North Korea is an undeniable dictatorship and that several Member States have chosen to break relations for this reason". Apparently, Ireland took the same position as France in not wanting to establish diplomatic relations with North Korea.

Romano Prodi was quoted as admitting that EU nations were split on the issue of North Korean recognition, but said that it was unavoidable since the EU has not reached the point of adopting a common foreign policy. "This is not a positive fact but it is usual. We have not arrived at a co-ordinated policy in this field." (Financial Times, 21-22 October 2000) Belgian Deputy Prime Minister, Mr. Louis Michel, expressed alarm about European discord on this subject, which had not been debated in Council. The Netherlands trusted that "good relations" might developed with Korea, though remaining "in line" with other European ministers (Agence Europe, 21 October 2000, pp.4). Louis Michel stated that Belgium intended to re-establish diplomatic ties with North Korea but regretted Tony Blair shattering the common front by announcing his decision without discussing the issue with his European partners (Agence Europe, 23-24 October 2000, pp.5). Tony Blair acknowledged the need to co-ordinate the European position (Agence Europe, 21 October 2000, pp.4)., while Gerhard Schroeder stated that the differences between the EU Member had been over-dramatised (Agence Europe, 23-24 October 2000, pp.4).

France's position as expressed by Chirac reflected the continuing concern of North Korea's WMD development and human rights but the prevailing view was probably that after North Korea was brought in from the cold it would be easier to discuss, encourage and make demands to abandon its WMD development. KEDO already opened the door to channels of communication with North Korea and establishing diplomatic relations with North Korea was another step which France was not ready to take.

In Beijing for the EU-China summit, President Chirac told the press that, with regard to the problem of co-ordination of actions on North Korea, there would be a dialogue on the matter at the General Affairs Council (in November). He recalled the Troika visit to North Korea in November before ASEM took place. On this same visit, Mr. Solana, the CFSP High Representative, regretted the lack of an EU common position on recognition of North Korea. "Greater co-ordination would have been preferable", he said, but added that recognition of Pyongyang was not covered by the CFSP (Agence Europe, 23-24

October 2000, pp.5). Schroeder did say that the German decision is a sovereign decision. (Agence Europe, 23-24 October 2000, pp. 4) So much for the CFSP.

Despite this hiccup, it can be said, quoting the FT of 23 October 2000, that the plans "to establish diplomatic relations with North Korea ahead of the US were seen as one sign of Europe's desire to forge an independent course".

The Commission for its part, in the person of Commissioner Patten, announced a series of planned measures to develop warmer relations with North Korea. In reference to the Seoul Declaration to include North Korea in the international community and boosting pacific unification of the two Koreas, the EU had already provided Euro 180 million in humanitarian aid and was willing to give more, to provide technical assistance and to pursue participation in KEDO. He announced three new lines of action: 1) aid of Euro 20 million to support structural reform of agriculture; 2) the opening of textile tariff quotas; 3) feasibility studies for information programmes on the functioning of the market economy and on forestation. This European aid would, however, be linked to enhanced transparency of the management of aid to North Korea and the welcome reserved for NGOs (Agence Europe, 21 October 2000, pp. 4). This may be another concrete outcome of ASEM III if not ASEM III, or perhaps it was simply the occasion for the Commission to announce to precisely-decided policies on North Korea At issue is whether North Korea will take the bait.

SECURITY AND ASEM IV, COPENHAGEN

Prior to Copenhagen 23-24th September 2002, September 11 2001 struck the US. This had an enormous effect on the deliberations of the Summit. Terrorism was on the political agenda. Human rights were off the agenda although Commissioner Patten in a speech at Chatham House spoke of striking a balance between security and civil liberties on 6 September 2002. Soft security issues such as money-laundering and trafficking were overtaken, though linked to international terrorism. Terrorism was the agenda, and a common concern. "Some Asian as well as European ASEM partners are confronted with national terrorist activities which proves the common interest partners have in solving the problem" (Reiterer M. 2000 pp.7). He continued, "Therefore, one of the problems which often arises in the ASEM context when political issues are on the agenda, the fear of neo-colonial lecturing on human rights, non-respect for what some regard as purely domestic issues would not come to the fore but rather the common will and effort to contribute to a solution to a common problem". Relations were now cosy in front of a common enemy.

The Chair's Statement

The Chairman's Statement was short on the political and security dialogue stating the resolve to fight international terrorism taking into account the multiple reasons leading to the emergence of terrorism, the pledge to work closely together to combat this threat. It stated towards this end the adoption of the two declarations which will be examined below: the Declaration and Co-operation Programme against International Terrorism. I

will not comment further on these points except to say that it needed an event like September 11 to talk serious the business of security and translate into action.

The ASEM Copenhagen Declaration on Co-operation against International Terrorism

Its Point One state "Terrorism not only endangers the lives of innocents, but also threatens the very foundations upon which our societies are built." When states feel threaten they act with their repressive apparatus no matter how liberal they are, all the more collectively in front of a common enemy. One can be sure that co-operation between intelligence and police forces is happening and need not require declarations. Responding to the terrorism of September 11, the ASEM political declarations on international terrorism will go beyond "reaffirming", "welcoming", "underlining" or "taking note of". These words between inverted commas are taken from Dr. Reiterer who suggested that such words were "hardly an achievement for a process aiming at real co-operation" (Reiterer M. 2000 pp.129). September 11 pushes the ASEM countries into action, not the paper products of an ASEM Summit. The Copenhagan Declaration speaks of international co-operation in anti-terrorism activities, including regional co-operation such as that of the EU and ASEAN, as well as bilateral co-operation which has greatly progressed. The Declaration confirms that it does not require a Declaration to initiate anti-terrorism activities. Point Two confirms this when it states, "We pledge to work together to combat this threat ……". But what concretely? Answer is found in Point Nine of the Declaration.

What is interesting to note in this Point Two is towards the end of the paragraph whereby the fight against terrorism will be carried out "in accordance with our respective domestic laws duly taking into account root causes of terrorism without acknowledging these as justifications for terrorist and/or criminal activities." This could have been a compromise. It is likely that "in accordance with our respective domestic laws" is an insistence of some Asian countries with security laws which permit detention without trial. For the EU Member States to go along with it is a 'roundabout' turn for they would have in past expressed or condemned such laws as inherently a violation of human rights. Hypocrisy?? When threatened by a common enemy they are ready to turn a blind eye. Perhaps they wish they could have such laws. But the bargain made in this sentence could be the inclusion of taking into account root causes of terrorism. The European Union has always stressed examining the root causes of terrorism pointing to poverty. The US tune has stressed military or police action to deal with terrorism, an approach which resonates with certain Asian countries.

Moving to Point Three, it is notable that international co-operation against terrorism is linked to the leading role of the UN. The Chair's Statement refers to the principles of the UN Charter. What is behind such a reference to the UN? The author's suspicion is that the unilateralist tendency of the USA has encouraged such a reference.

Moving to Point Nine, ASEM Copenhagen agrees to an informal Ad Hoc Consultative Mechanism among ASEM Coordinators and Senior Officials as well as regular contacts between relevant regional and national agencies of ASEM partners to facilitate co-

operation in the fight against terrorism and transnational organised crime. One may be quite confident that this will take place, now that a common enemy has emerged. This is the most concrete translation of words into reality. The ASEM Summit confirms and legitimises this decision. Continuing, the Declaration speaks of the long-term focus of eliminating cultural misconceptions as well as on identification and elimination of the root causes of terrorism without acknowledging these as justifications for terrorist and/or criminal activities. Identifying and eliminating root causes is a more thoughtful approach to dealing with terrorism than attempting to eliminate it by pure suppression.

The ASEM Copenhagen Co-operation Programme on Fighting International Terrorism

The Ad Hoc Consultative Mechanism is the first among short-term activities established in this programme. It is here too that an ASEM Seminar on Anti-Terrorism at Director-Generals' level is set-up. Three paragraphs refer to efforts within the UN. A number of medium-term activities are then set out. These include enhancing customs communication networks, combating financial crime and money laundering and improving air and maritime security while assuring the smooth flow of goods, capital and people. The economic imperative cannot be hampered. Capacity-building to fight terrorism, implementing UN resolutions and international conventions, implementing the recommendations of the Task Force on Money Laundering are the other medium-term activities. We have to see how these decisions or suggestions are implemented but probably the general public will not know. The long-term activities are human resources development, *inter alia* ASEM-DUO Fellowship Programme, Asia-Europe University Programme and the ASEM Lifelong Learning Initiative. Education enters into the field of security but one wonders whether such programmes are the answer to combat terrorism. ASEF has the mission of preventing prejudices and building mutual understanding. Sustainable economic development is the other focus through closer economic partnerships building on TFAP and IPAP. Implementing the results of the World Summit on Sustainable Development, of the International Conference on Financing for Development and of the WTO Doha Development also fall within the long-term activities to combat terrorism. The question is whether these activities attack the root causes of terrorism. Do these activities turn away the poor and despairing from terrorism?

The last item on the Copenhagen security agenda was the Political Declaration for Peace on the Korean Peninsula. Is the Korean peninsula going to be a regular feature of ASEM? President Kim Dae Jung had done a good job when he hosted ASEM Seoul. International Terrorism did not wipe out attention to Seoul but with hindsight the security dimension of ASEM only came to the fore in Seoul. This five point declaration took a positive tone although it made reference to the naval clash in the Yellow Sea in June 2002 and the need for this not to recur. The positive tone referred to the implementation of projects for inter-Korean co-operation, highlighting the construction work to start on 18 September 2002 to reconnect rail and road links severed for the last five decades. The Declaration stated that the holding of a second Inter-Korean Summit would be of great value in sustaining the momentum in the peace process on the Korean peninsula. KEDO was noted, along with the resumption of the dialogue between the DPRK and the US and ASEM partners' own

dialogues with the DPRK. It welcomed the recent visit of the Japanese Prime Minister to the DPRK.

It is now appropriate to consider the questions raised in the Introduction: What has changed? What will change with the security discussions at ASEM III and even further to ASEM IV in 2002? What is concretely possible and what is not? What are institutions able to do? What can the ASEM governments really do? In short, how was security handled by ASEM?

Concrete actions

Up to ASEM III there is much talk of enhanced, intensified, engaged dialogue or co-operation in security and other areas from one summit to another, with many commitments in Seoul expressed on paper, but what was happening concretely? Apparently there were initiatives in the pipe-line, and if these materialise then we can say that Seoul served a purpose. If nothing concrete ensues then enhanced and intensified co-operation and dialogue is hollow. One participant admitted that some of the new initiatives will see the light of the day while others will fall by the way-side.

One argument for putting such initiatives under the ASEM umbrella is that they would have a deadline of the next ASEM and therefore impose discipline to implement them.

ASEM IV changed everything with September 11 hanging overhead. A current event pushed resolve to cooperate expressed on paper, the Declarations, one of which expressed concrete steps. In front of common enemy states cooperate. There is no need for paper talk. Intelligence and police cooperation does not need paper talk. All those words, "reaffirming", "enhancing", "cooperating", "endorsing" etc.. has been bypassed.

ASEM III's and ASEM IV's achievements at the talking and paper level

With human rights off the agenda in ASEM IV, it seems that all the achievements of ASEM III has become insignificant. Remember that, for the EU participants, a paragraph on human rights in the Chairman's Statement is seen as an achievement along with the AECF reference to rule of law along with talking about sensitive issues and agreeing not to exclude any issue, using judiciousness in selecting topics for discussion (Reiterer, M. 2000 pp.2). Persuading the Asian leaders to discuss sensitive issues albeit at the talking level, in itself is progress. The EU Member States in ASEM IV seems to turn a blind eye to the draconian security laws of certain Asian countries which they used to condemn as violations of human rights in the compromise they made over "in accordance with our respective domestic laws". Only in return to include a line on root causes of terrorism.

Leaders committing themselves for the first time to combat the smuggling and exploitation of migrants, people-trafficking, the fight against illegal drugs, managing migratory flows, combating the illicit trafficking in weapons etc.. as an achievement. In

ASEM IV, such soft security issues seem also overtaken by September 11 although this is the area where ASEM could contribute most.

ASEM III's Seoul Declaration, the concrete achievement finds another edition in ASEM IV. It looks like it is going to be on the agenda of ASEM for sometime to come.

Moving on to hard security, the non-signing on to ASEAN's SEANWFZ by EU Member States is a regret. What is concretely possible will be slow to come. This is a matter of changing attitudes, of understanding, and, not least, of confidence-building.

The value of ASEM in terms of security

Do we need ASEM to get co-operation on an anti-money laundering initiative, or an anti-corruption initiative? It is obviously not the case. China is already co-operating with the EU bilaterally to end illegal migration. An Asian Ambassador said that initiatives such as countering money-laundering could come under the UN umbrella. When these initiatives are put under the ASEM umbrella, their execution affects the credibility of ASEM. Is ASEM strategically important from a security view point? The Asian governments see ASEM for its economic value not security. The political and security agenda has been pushed by the EU. Accepting both is the compromise. Reiterer stated that establishing the essential importance of the political pillar within the ASEM process was vital. The EU holds that countries that treat their citizens properly also tend to be the best international political and trade partners. In the long run, economic development cannot prosper without democracy (Reiterer, M. 2000 pp.1). If ever security was high on the ASEM agenda, it was with the Seoul Declaration although that was very much a Korean initiative. Clearly September 11 has changed the positions outlined. The Asian countries particularly the ASEAN ones would appreciate a political pillar especially if they got their way. As to this comment about democracy, human rights, part of the fabric of democracy, has been overshadowed and probably even put aside. What does the future holds thence?

However, to sustain Europe-Asia security co-operation requires each side to consider the other as a priority in external relations. It is normal that each continent be interested in their home ground and areas closer to home that affect them more directly than distant places. One wonders to what extent today's communications bring continents and peoples together! A special effort must be made to accord each other priority. As it stands, it looks like it is the EU that is more interested in Asian security than the other way around – an imbalance.

A final word on ASEM and the ARF. The ARF seems to be more important to Asian countries, particularly the ASEAN member states, as the forum for security discussions on Asian security. In the ARF's favour, all the world's major players are present. What particular ASEM perspective can there be on security? The ARF too seems to focus more on hard security. This leaves space for ASEM to take on soft security issues and perhaps its value is its soft security initiatives - although these may be that too of the UN and other fora.

AN EVOLVING SENSE OF LEGITIMACY FOR AN EXPANDING UNION[9]

Carol Strong
University of Melbourne

The definition provided by E.B. Haas in the 1950s for political integration was "the process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new center, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states" (Haas, 1996:195). It was an issue that was to be faced by Europeanists throughout the twentieth century. On 1 May 2004, the membership of the European Union increased from 15 to 25 with the formal accession of (Greek) Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. As this was the largest enlargement project yet, existing members of the European Union (EU) faced, yet again, the necessity to incorporate 'more unity and more diversity' into their ranks simultaneously.[10] In anticipation of this event, legislation was formulated, with the Maastricht Treaty the foremost example, whereby the framework for all post-1989 integration projects was outlined. The difference is that, this time, it became obvious that through these agreements, the European project itself would be transformed in direct relation to the obstacles faced.

For Euro enthusiasts, these developments were proof of the durability of the European ideal, especially as it highlighted an aptitude for cooperation between the various countries. By contrast, Euroskeptics warned that the Union could ultimately be "destroyed by its [very] success" (Barón, 1997:177); with one area of speculation the differences between Europeanisation and the criteria-response based EU-isation. Whether a positive or negative assessment was adopted of this process, it could not be ignored that where institutional development had once been conducted without the express knowledge of the public, the peoples throughout Europe became more informed, and thus involved after the 1989 revolutions. By virtue of the increased public scrutiny, the legitimacy of the overarching project came into question, as epitomised by the arguments of the 'democratic deficit' inherent in EU institution building. The enduring question has thus been how to overcome this deficiency, especially in light of the increasing levels of public scrutiny for this process witnessed in recent years.

This paper compares the multifaceted justifications for the various proposals and initiatives of European integration, including the Europe Agreements, the Maastricht Treaty and the Copenhagen Criteria. Through this, the evolutionary nature of the European approach to integration is revealed, beginning post-World War II, continuing

---

[9] I would like to thank Ms. Leanne McCormack for her critical remarks and advice during the preparation of this paper.

[10] For more information on this official slogan, see "More Unity and More Diversity: The European Union's Biggest Enlargement", The Bulletin of the European Communities, published by the Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, November 2003.

through the first accession project in 1973, and culminating with the most recent enlargement. A subsidiary focus is a consideration of the different types of legitimation fostered by this process, whereby the increasing levels of public interest for, and scrutiny of the overarching development of European Union (EU) policies are contextualised. Utilising a literature review of selected current literature on integration, both the hopes and fears of an expanding Union are outlined. The discussion concludes with a commentary on the nature of this evolution, and the possibilities it reveals for the future consolidation of the European ideal.

CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND TO THE 2004 ENLARGEMENT

During the mid-to-late 1980s, when it appeared that the division of the Cold War period would be an enduring feature of European politics, future enlargement projects outside the confines of Western Europe appeared improbable. After all, prior to the collapse of Soviet-style communism in 1989-1991, virtually all 'eligible European countries' had already joined the European Community (EC), with the remaining countries on the continent either making a conscious choice to abstain from membership, or excluded from consideration because of their (albeit involuntary) involvement within the former Soviet Bloc, or alternatively persisting problems within their internal political environment (Croft et al, 1999:55). In hindsight, however, this was to be only false security, with the fall of the Berlin Wall becoming only the outward sign that the previously inviolable eastward border of Western Europe had dissolved. The related attitudinal change was consolidated with the collective decision by central and eastern European (CEE) leaders to embark on individual processes of democratisation and capitalism (hosting the creation of transitional market economies), meant to consolidate comparable living standards in their own countries to those in the West.

With the sustained push for membership by the CEE national leaders, west European politicians began, once again, to consider how best to approach the enlargement of European institutions and membership. Of the most pressing issues addressed were questions over "where the eastern bounds of Europe ought to be set and who should be considered potential members of the EU" (Fuchs & Klingemann, 2002:27). In the face of a feared increase of illegal immigration westward, not to mention the risk of a high financial burden associated with re-development of the CEE region, the idea of a closer integration of European countries received a rejuvenated sense of legitimacy among west European elites. Witness, for example, that in contrast to the insistent claims to neutrality during the Cold War period, even the threat of changes to the East prompted (at least in part) the applications for membership from Austria in July 1989, Cyprus and Malta in July 1990, Sweden in July 1991 and Finland in March 1992, as well as from Switzerland in May 1992 and Norway in November 1992.[11] For many, it signalled that the sense of what was termed 'Euro sclerosis' in the early 1980s had been overcome.

---

[11] Admittedly, Norway ultimately decided against membership and the Swiss application was suspended.

While a closer unity between west European countries was accepted as beneficial, a consensus over the wider integration of Europe to include both CEE and additional Mediterranean countries was not as straightforward. It is for this reason that the institutional and legal structure of the EC assumed an air of duplicity. With the simultaneous advancement of unity and diversity, it represented not only a safeguard, but also a threat to the interests of the European member-states. At the personal level, for example, while favouring the EU in theory, the people of Europe were often resistant that it should "exercise control" over their daily lives (Newhouse, 1997:27). This then translated to the national level, where one of the basic (yet complex) tasks was how to respect the professed objective of the European Community, specifically that it be flexible enough to accept any country that considered itself as European into membership, but nevertheless protect the interests of the existing members as a consolidated group.[12]

For many analysts, this predicament could not be deemed so unusual. After all, even the decisions made at the end of World War II (beginning in 1951 with the decision to form the European Coal and Steel Community [ECSC], then leading to the ratification of the Treaty in Rome in 1957) set a precedent in that international institutions were created, but only with a "strictly limited" potential for integration (Strickwerde, 1997:51-70). The fact that there were nevertheless to be several rounds of integration – with the UK, Denmark and Ireland joining in 1973; Greece in 1981; Spain and Portugal in 1986; and Austria, Finland and Sweden in 1995 – led Croft et al (1999:56) to conclude that "the EU has been reacting to applications to join, negotiating accession with prospective members or absorbing new members through their transition periods".[13]

Croft et al further postulate that political debates over the various aspects and levels of enlargement had existed "almost since its inception", and were thereby continually on the political and economic agenda. Whereas most Europeans viewed the different rounds of integration as inevitable, even often straightforward, each enlargement project had its own challenges. For example, there may have been comparatively little debate over the acceptance of the respective applications from Austria, Finland and Sweden, but even these cases had their problems, specifically related to their professed neutrality and their reluctance to participate in the WEU military accord. After the collapse of communism, however, the debates became more controversial. Among the most pressing questions were the following. While many CEE countries were accepted as 'undeniably' European by descent, would the borders of Europe ever be extended past central Europe to Ukraine, Belarus or even Russia? Past this, what would happen to Turkey's application during future rounds, especially in light of the acceptance of Cyprus? Alternatively, how would

---

[12] These specific objectives were taken from "The Challenge of Enlargement: Commission Opinion on Austria's Application for Membership", The Bulletin of the European Communities, Supplement 4/92, published by the Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 1993:5. See also Cremona, 2003:5.

[13] Moravcsik (1998:8), for example, argues that from the 1950s onward, the membership of the EC/EU "continued to widen geographically and deepen substantively".

the future political negotiations with countries such as Romania and Bulgaria, or in the post-war atmosphere, Croatia, but more specifically Serbia, be conducted?

To return to the duplicity of the EU, regardless of the perception that the various enlargement projects were viewed as a "means to strengthen European security", they were nevertheless sources of anxiety for the political elite of the existing member-states (Dinar, 2004:265). In order to contextualise why the prospect of all future projects provoke more distinctive responses than previously, however, it must be remembered that the moves toward European Unity, as described above, were primarily pursued against the backdrop of the Cold War. The enforced division of the continent thus guaranteed not only the gradual integration of successive west European countries into the larger whole, but also the applications of Spain, Greece and Portugal, which all shared similarities with the CEE countries because of their economic growth levels. Although the acceptance of this group also prompted "fears of migratory flows and the import of lax legal Mediterranean culture" into the Union (Zielonka & Mair, 2002:1-18), it was believed that exhibited economic and structural weaknesses should be ignored in a bid to support these countries in their transition from authoritarian rule (Croft et al, 1999:58). Stated briefly, at the time, the projected (negative) assessments of the suitability of these countries for membership were minimised, since the political support of these new democracies was considered crucial to the fight against communism.

In part because of this type of attitude, the institutional framework of the EC was developed outside the realm of public debate, at least with regard to those issues deemed in the interest of a sustained balance of power in Europe. For example, the paucity of public debate enabled supranational policy "to quietly permeate innumerable corners of life", with it now accounting for "over half the legislation passed in the Member States and [affecting] virtually every area of public policy", even without explicit public participation (Kallmer, 2004:5-8). Even so, Eric Hobsbawm reminds us that it is "misleading to speak of the 'democratic deficit' of the European Union", as it is precisely the fact that it was "explicitly constructed on a non-democratic (i.e., non-electoral) basis" that it has been so successful (Hobsbawm, 1997:268).

Critics nevertheless often pinpoint the democratic deficiencies of the EU when discussing the legitimacy of its development.[14] As outlined by Kallmer, after all, most effective political systems "aim not for cooperation but for healthy and perpetual conflict among institutions", with the inherent debate and analysis meant to ensure the rights of citizens. In this, "the EU has always been rightly criticised for its lack of transparency and its dubious democratic credentials" (Kallmer, 2004:4-6). It was a situation that was about to change in response to the external influences witnessed in Central Europe and Russia. With the attitudinal changes in the political and economic spheres following the collapse

---

[14] Hobsbawm (1997:268), for example, describes the EC as having been "constructed from the top down, and outside the scope of the democratic politics of its member states". To compare against similar arguments, see also Fuchs & Klingemann, 2002:19.

of communism, the legitimacy of the European project itself came under an increased level of public scrutiny. In addition to the collective fears concerning the increasing diversity of the EU with each enlargement, there were concerns regarding the impending consolidation of a deeper membership structure in Europe.

Events were set in formal motion by the meeting of the European Council in Maastricht in December 1991. Manifested by the resultant Treaty of European Union (TEU), member states of the EC "crossed the threshold of European integration" by committing themselves to "the shared exercise of the essential attributes of national sovereignty." Included in this was the name change from European Community to European Union (EU), and the establishment of the three pillars of jurisdiction; the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the Single Market (incorporating a single currency) and Justice and Home Affairs (Sidjanski, 2000:217; See also Barón, 1997:80; and Dinar, 2004:258).

The most immediate implication of the framework agreement was in relation to the single market, with its history of progressive and successful integration. Upon ratification of the TEU the European Commission and Council of Ministers gained the right to "continuously assess" the economic policy of each member state, so as to monitor its progress and ensure that it maintained "a budget deficit of less than three per cent the GDP, [a] total government debt no more than sixty per cent of GDP and an inflation rate close to the EC's best" in line with EMU criteria. As if this were not enough, provisions to impose fines for any shortfalls of these benchmarks were set for the year 2000. In light of these developments, it is not surprising that the officially sanctioned reassurances, specifically that the European supranational structure would only intervene in the event that these "objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the member states", were not enough to deter public debate (Zogbaum, 1993:45-47). The politically loaded issue of foreign policy was deferred for later elaboration, and the third pillar delegated in some measure back to individual member states for action.

PUBLIC SCRUTINY LEADS TO POST-MAASTRICHT QUESTIONS OF LEGITIMACY

Having achieved new levels of integration, the EU was simultaneously confronted with the necessity of generating public support; an element previously overshadowed by the strategic imperatives of the Cold war. When so scrutinised, the question is how the project has been legitimated, especially in the post-1989 atmosphere. In partial answer to this, there are several ways in which a government can legitimate its policies. One of the first steps is to open the legislation up to popular scrutiny - at least in theory - which in this case was witnessed in the respective decisions of the Danish and British governments to publish the text of the Maastricht Treaty *en masse* in an attempt to garner stronger public support for the project (Barón, 1997:35). Another example is the recent decision by Tony Blair to flout personal political tradition and call a national referendum on the EU draft constitution. From an official standpoint, there are obvious dangers associated with the use of this tactic, especially in light of the "heightened [level of] public scrutiny" now commonplace in Europe (Moravcsik, 1998:20). It cannot be assumed, for one, that a

more informed public will automatically endorse a government's preferred line, as epitomised by the respective decisions by Norway rejecting the terms of EU membership not only in 1973, but also in 1995.

When using this tactic for legitimation purposes, the elite involved must walk a "difficult political tightrope", whereby the nature of the issue at hand is indeed revealed, but the debate is kept attractive enough to sustain public support (Croft et al, 1999:57-61). This process is outlined by Kallmer, who while reinforcing the need to open the process of EU institution building up to the scrutiny of the people, and thereby "clarify what its institutions are meant to do", nevertheless highlights that this is not always simple in practice. The recent failure to ratify the draft constitution further reinforces this point, public criticism labelling it "too long, too vague, too uncertain, and too inaccessible" in its current form, to guarantee widespread support (Kallmer, 2004:11). This example supports the idea that legislation is only effective if accepted, and thereby, reinforced by the people.

In order to garner this support, two additional legitimating factors come into focus: the interplay between external events and the responsive actions of national leaders. It has already been shown, for example, that the external influence of the collapse of communism was enough to provide impetus for closer cooperation between the existing member states. Similarly, the example of the disintegration of, and subsequent war in the former Yugoslavia was employed, not only as justification to integration CEE countries, but also as a means of strengthening EU institutional procedures through collective security initiatives. What is critical to understand at this juncture, however, is that while such arguments can act as change catalysts, they are insufficient to guarantee success in the longer term. Not to denigrate the influential nature of external legitimation, Klaussen and Tilly (1997:4) emphasise the critical factor of leadership, as reflected in their conclusion that "European integration has been a contingent outcome of autonomous processes, occasionally nourished, and periodically checked", by national elites and leaders. If the most recent Enlargement project is analysed from this perspective, the hypothesis under consideration is that while the process of European integration and EU institution building may have gained impetus from such events as the fall of the Berlin Wall, it was the interaction and support of national leaders that consolidated change.

The influence of leaders willing to support the supranational line in Europe should not be underestimated in the moves toward European unity throughout the twentieth century. Who, for example, would contest the impact of such pan-Europeanists as Robert Schumann, Jean Monnet and Jacques Delors to the advancement of an integrated Europe leading into the year 2000? The project was moreover promoted by the actions of national leaders, such as Helmut Kohl (the former German chancellor) and François Mitterrand (the former French president). Witness, for example, the joint call by these two men in April 1990 for an increased political union between the states meant to complement the economic cooperation already present (Croft et al, 1999:92). Even

acknowledging the clear political agendas involved,[15] after all, the genuine commitment displayed by both men through the years cannot be ignored, as epitomised by the image of these two men "walking hand-in-hand through the mass graveyards of Verdun" (Barber, 1996:11) in an attempt to facilitate a post-war reconciliation between their countries.

To narrow the focus momentarily, the role assumed by the former chancellor should be considered further. After all, in addition to being the longest serving German chancellor to date, Kohl is remembered as one of the "founding fathers" of the EURO, the "Father of Unification", as well as the "Symbol of the New Germany" (See Applebaum, 2000:21; and Bonafante, 2001). It should not be forgotten, for example, that Kohl was careful to temper *all* demands for German unification with calls for the concurrent, wider integration of the European Union. His commitment came as a result of his teenage experiences of German national defeat, guilt and destruction, whereby he made a personal resolution that the atrocities associated with the two World Wars should never be allowed to happen on European soil again. Conceptualising himself as one of a "small interim generation of Germans" remembering the war but not directly involved, Kohl perceived it as an obligation to ensure a future peace and harmony in Europe as a whole.[16]

Kohl's success, however, was on account of the fact that he was able to formulate programs able to calm the fears of the people. In an attempt to take control of the escalating events in late 1989, Kohl presented such programs as his *Ten-Point-Plan*, in which he proposed ten steps towards the consolidation of German unification. In addition, Kohl made a number of politically motivated promises to the East German people that 'blooming landscapes' of western prosperity would be observed in the former GDR provinces within the span of five years. By contrast, the West German people were reassured that "unification could be financed without any tax increases" to burden society (Conradt, 1993:156). In hindsight, the objective of employing different arguments for the two different constituencies was to achieve a consensus on unification between the two. While both sets of promises were proven unrealistic, not to mention that analysts such as Weidenfeld termed these efforts as "improvisation as statecraft" (Weidenfeld, 1998:21), Kohl nevertheless seemed to have an answer to whatever problem emerged. He

---

[15] For example, one of the professed reasons for Mitterrand's support at this time was the desire to counteract the political influence (and economic power) of a unified Germany through its incorporation into the wider European context. Conversely, if Kohl's accounts were to be accepted, it was as if the fall of the Berlin Wall had single-handedly created an environment in which "the vision of Germany's and Europe's freedom and unity" had been moved into the realm of possibility (Kohl, 1990).

[16] To refer to an example of this type of argument, see to Kohl's interview to *Die Welt* on 3 March 1990 (reprinted in *Deutschland 1990*, vol. 3, pp. 1132-1139). See also Leinemann, Jürgen, Helmut Kohl: Die Inszenierung einer Karriere, Aufbau Taschenbuch Verlag, 1998, p. 28-33; and Mertes, Michael, "Helmut Kohl's Legacy for Germany", The Washington Quarterly, 25/4 [Autumn 2002], p. 75.

consequently seized the historic opportunity provided and consolidated the process of German unification.

The problem is that the decision made to adopt 'shock therapy' tactics, while politically expedient, prompted a drop in the industrial production of the former east to a third of its former level within a year, which when contextualised, was "more catastrophic than the five-year Great Depression of 1928-33" (Flockton, 1998:63-67; see also Smith, E., 1998:160-161). In part because of the perpetuated economic disparity, the process of unification was not able to cultivate "a fusion of the two Germanys", or even the emergence of a "real feeling of togetherness". As a result, the optimistic endorsement of the existence of "two states but one nation" prior to the fall of the Berlin Wall changed to an insistence that "one state, but…two societies" had emerged (Steininger, 1998:27-28). The feeling that ultimately developed was that East and West Germans had "never felt more apart than when they were united" (Jarausch, 1994:203). While experience shows that time will often soften negative perceptions, provided the situation improves, the emergence of legitimacy problems highlights that while initial policies can be primarily in response to emerging political events, the longer-term strategies must be more than this to be successful. In light of this, many analysts thus postulated that the process of German unification could aide in the understanding the complexity of a wider European integration project, not only with regard for what to do, but also what *not* to do in certain circumstances.

When related back to the wider European context, just as the incorporation of the East German Länder had created anxiety for many West Germans, the move toward a closer integration between the two regions of Europe created the (admittedly often-unrealistic) fear of the cumulative effect of an increased diversity within the EU. According to Beate Neuss, the agreement on the creation of a common European currency was reached primarily in an attempt to ensure a responsive European-wide economy that would allow the central European countries to benefit from a consolidated "stable core to which they [could] hold fast than by a more loosely organised Europe" (Neuss, 1992:143). The question was exactly how this was to be done. Those advocating a federalist approach proposed a "more advanced [form] of integration within a smaller and more convergent European core"; those against favoured a wider, more generalised cooperation between east and west (Zielonka & Mair, 2002:5).

Subsidiary questions were related to how the balance of political influence between smaller and larger member-states would be distributed. With the accession of Sweden, but more specifically Austria and Finland, for example, it was feared that it would become more difficult for smaller countries to veto legislation without a wider support base through countries with different political agendas. In a similar sense, the accession of Poland meant that the unified vote of the previous core of larger European member-states, particularly France and Germany, would also be made more difficult, again because of divergent interests. There was also the issue of where European subsidies

would be re-directed with the addition of ten countries, whose economies were all below the EU GDP average.

If analysed as a whole, the "uneven treatment of current and prospective EU members" witnessed was symptomatic of a reluctance to accept "the unknown 'other' as a partner in [the] well-established [EU] project". At the heart of the debate was the fear of the expanding membership; after all, with this round it would extend to upwards of 25. As a result, there was concern that through the increased diversity, there was the "risk of paralysis and immobility in the decision-making system" of the Union (See Zielonka & Mair, 2002:3-8; and Jeffery & Paterson, 2003:63). It was, however, predictably the economic challenges to the formulation of new political policies that were the most problematic, with many West Europeans lamenting the probable high costs of a process of wider European integration, and many central Europeans fearing that they would remain on the periphery of major EU policy decisions.

Political debate in Brussels was subsequently concentrated on the issue of how to incorporate the applicant countries into the European framework without jeopardising the overall balance of power, whether politically or economically. The dilemma faced was, thus, how to find a compromise between the consolidation of a fortress Europe where only certain countries were admitted to membership, and allowing the entire group to widen EU membership without establishing stricter entry criteria. In an attempt to protect the interests of the existing member-states against such complications, a progression of initiatives – beginning with the Europe Agreements with candidate countries (from 1990 onwards), TEU and the subsequent Amsterdam and Nice accords – were proposed in order to prepare a more practical framework in which the future accession projects could take place.

To summarise, the overarching EU legislature had to develop in relation to the external changes it encountered, if it was to remain viable. Using the Treaty of Rome as a starting point – specifically Article 237, which stipulated that any European nation had the right to apply for membership – additional dictates were introduced with each enlargement (Croft et al, 199961-62). The Maastricht Treaty then represented a further step in the definition of the accession process, with the associated objective to revitalise the European ideal. While described by Zogbaum as a "straightforward, rather old-fashioned political deal" between France and Germany (Zogbaum, 1993), the effects of this agreement were more comprehensive, in that this Treaty proposed political, economic *and* legal guidelines for all potential applicant countries preparing for accession into the EU. This type of evolutionary change then continued until the most recent accession, wherein all future applications must demonstrate that candidate countries are able to adhere to the Copenhagen criteria, outlined below, once granted membership. According to these criteria, applicant countries must prove the they possess the following:

- Stable democratic institutions, upholding the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities;
- A functioning and robust market economy, able to compete in the single market;
- The ability to implement and adhere to the requirements of the *acquis communitaire* of the EU.

If reduced to the essentials, these points were designed to guarantee that any country set for accession would be able to cope with the challenges of EU membership. The fact that the "most prominent feature of enlargement governance…[was] the employment of conditionality" in all negotiations was not enough to hinder its implementation into practice (Dimitrova, 2002:175). On the surface, after all, the rationale behind this set of conditions appears logical and in the clear interest of the existing member states. This type of attitude was moreover generally accepted, as it was representative of the prevailing attitude that since the EU, as a whole, had not initiated the proposed applications, the existing member-states should have the right to safeguard regional assets through regulation (Smith, K., 2003).

Having said this, however, while the EU has taken great care to develop objective measures by which to judge candidate states, pan-European officials must be careful to safeguard these principles. It is crucial that the EU, in its pursuit of the integration project, continues to foster a sense of innovation, which in turn allows it to be responsive to the needs of its now unprecedented European constituency. In this sense, the legitimation of the European ideal has been shown to be an evolving concept changing in relation to the surrounding political and economic environment. This is set to continue, as the inherent differences (in virtually every sphere) between west European and the most recent applicant countries project a substantive challenge to the ongoing development of the EU through their incorporation. The conclusion drawn by Muttimer (1996:285) is that the integration tactics and theories, as outlined in the paper, should thus be "treated as informative and illustrative suggestions" for the course of Europeanisation, not legalistic edicts. It is a sentiment echoed through Moravcsik's (1998:21) argument that with the end of the Cold War, it is no longer "appropriate to seek the uniform, centralising institutions of the past", that governments must now a find "balance between centralisation and flexibility". A continued respect for this principle is thus proposed as the most important safeguard to the continued vitality of the European Union.

CONCLUSION

This paper has outlined three ways in which the consolidation of the European Political and Monetary Unions were legitimated, as well as the further integration of countries into this overarching structure. It has been shown that these projects gained impetus from external events (such as the fall of the Berlin Wall and the outbreak of war in the former Yugoslavia), the support of national leaders (as epitomised by the cooperation of Kohl and Mitterrand) and the advancement of lucid programs meant to calm the fears of the people involved. The institutional responses to the various rounds of integration have moreover been shown as evolutionary, in that they have developed in response to the

different challenges inherent to each accession group. The question to consider in closing is whether this type of approach is applicable to the consolidation of longer-term goals, or whether ever increasing integration will ultimately vindicate those Euroskeptics certain that the EU will be undone by its very success.

In partial answer to this, Barón's (1997:176) reminder that "the change in every enlargement has not been purely mechanical but dialectical, in the sense of producing transformations unexpected at the time the process was begun" is worth remembering. When viewed in hindsight, after all, the addition of diversity at various points, instead of initiating prolonged instability, has brought innovation and vitality to the European ideal. This is further supported by Zielonka and Mair, who argue that over and above the obstacles created, diversity, "albeit cited as pluralism", is commonly accepted as "indispensable to democracy", especially as it not only facilitates cooperation, but also "adaptation, bargaining and accommodation". That the previous integration projects were ultimately coopted, with "communitarian solutions…gradually [becoming] the norm", thereby highlights that a diversification of experiences can only enhance unification projects. If this perspective is adopted, rather than proving detrimental, the addition of diversity may well provide the stagnated democratic process of the European Union with "a much-needed impulse" toward the creation of progressive, pluralist thinking (Zielonka & Mair, 2002:6-8, 16).

To conclude, while an exhaustive examination of the ways in which the EU project has been legitimated is clearly beyond the bounds of this paper, one central point is clear, specifically that the evolution of integration policy is one of the more positive features of the European ideal. This is important because external events will guarantee that this practice continues. In response to the most recent round of integration, after all, the structure of the European Union cannot remain unchanged, if it is to remain viable. There are admittedly problematic issues to be addressed before future enlargement projects should proceed. For one, many of the young (pan-Europeanist) politicians are exiting Union politics in preference of national politics. The concern here is that while professing a continued commitment to the European project, there is always the danger that supranational ideals will ultimately be overwhelmed by national concerns. Additionally, it has been shown that if mass public support is to be perpetuated, the legalistic tone of EU documents and initiatives will have to be made accessible to public scrutiny. The challenge is thus to reword documents without compromising their primary objectives.

Even so, Euroskeptics should not begin to celebrate, because history supports the idea that change is beneficial to politics, especially at the European level. Regardless of the fact that much of the related change has been reactionary, by nature, the cooperation fostered between diverse member states and their populations has only ensured vitality and strength within the European Union. There is no reason to believe that the most recent project will be any different.

REFERENCES

Applebaum, Anne "Are Great Men Also Stupid?", **New Statesman**, 129/4470 [24 January 2000], p. 21.

Barber, Lionel, "A Passionate European: Helmut Kohl Seeks a Unified Europe", **Europe**, no. 356 [May 1996], pp. 8-12.

Barón, Enrique, **Europe at the Dawn of the Millennium**, Macmillan, London/St. Martin's Press, New York, 1997.

Bonfante, Jordan, "Analysis: Euro's Founding Fathers", **United Press International**, 28 December 2001, p. 1008362u7563.

Conradt, David P., **The German Polity**, Fifth Edition, Longman, New York-London, 1993.

Cremona, Marise, "Introduction", in Marise Cremona (ed.), **The Enlargement of the European Union**, Academy of European Law, European University Institute, in association with Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003, pp. 1-8. .

Croft (Stuart), Redmond (John), Rees (G. Wyn) and Webber (Mark), **The Enlargement of Europe**, Manchester University Press, Manchester- New York, 1999.

Dimitrova, Antoaneta, "Enlargement, Institution Building and the EU's Administrative Capacity Requirement", **West European Politics,** 25/4 [October 2002], pp. 171-190.

Dinar, Desmond, **Europe Recast: A History of the European Union**, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder-London, 2004.

Flockton, Christopher, "The German Economy since 1989/1990: Problems and Prospects", in Klaus Larres (ed.), **Germany since Unification: The Domestic and External Consequences**, Macmillan Press, London/St. Martin's Press, New York, 1998, pp. 63-87.

Fuchs (Dieter) & Klingemann (Hans-Dieter), "Eastward Enlargement of the European Union and the Identity of Europe", **West European Politics**, 25/2, April 2002, pp. 19-54.

Haas, E.B., "The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social and Economic Forces 1950-1957 (Stanford, Cal., 1968 edition), pp. 16-19, reprinted in Michael O'Neill (ed.), **The Politics of European Integration**, Routledge, London-New York, 1996, pp. 195-197.

Hobsbawm, E.J., "An Afterword: European Union at the End of the Century", in Jytte Klausen & Louise Tilly (eds), **European Integration in Social and Historical Perspective**, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, inc., New York-Oxford, 1997, pp. 267-276.

Jarausch, Konrad, **The Rush to German Unity**, Oxford University Press, New York-Oxford, 1994.

Jeffery (Charlie) & Paterson (William), "German and European Integration: A Shifting of Tectonic Plates", **West European Politics**, 24/5, October 2003: 59-75.

Kallmer, Jonathan, "The Draft European Constitution", **Contemporary Review**, 284/1656, January 2004, pp. 1-11.

Klausen (Jytte) & Tilly (Louise), "European Integration in a Social and Historical Perspective", in Jytte Klausen & Louise Tilly (eds.), **European In Social and Historical Perspective: 1850 to the Present**, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., New York-Oxford, 1997, pp. 3-22.

Kohl, Helmut, "Harvard Commencement Speech", 7 June 1990, refer to www.hno.harvard.edu/hno.subpages/speeches/kohl.html (accessed on 21 June 2000).

Leinemann, Jürgen, **Helmut Kohl: Die Inszenierung einer Karriere**, Aufbau, Taschenbuch Verlag, 1998.

Mertes, Michael, "Helmut Kohl's Legacy for Germany", **The Washington Quarterly**, 25/4 [Autumn 2002], pp. 67-82.

Moravcsik, Andrew, "Europe's Integration at Century's End", in Andrew Moravcsik (ed.), **Centralization or Fragmentation?: Europe Facing the Challenges of Deepening, Diversity, and Democracy**, A Council on Foreign Relations Book, New York, 1998, pp.1-58.

Muttimer, D., "1992 and the Political Integration of Europe: Neofunctionalism Reconsidered", **Journal of European Integration**, vol. 13:1989, pp. 78-82, 99-101", reprinted in Michael O'Neill (ed.), **The Politics of European Integration**, Routledge, London-New York, 1996, pp. 283-287.

Neuss, Beate, "The European Community: How to Counterbalance the Germans", in Dieter Grosser (ed.), **German Unification: The Unexpected Challenge**, Berg, Oxford-Providence, 1992, pp. 136-149.

Newhouse, John, **Europe Adrift**, Pantheon Books, New York, 1997.

Sidjanski, Dusan, **The Federal Future of Europe: From the European Community to the European Union**, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbour, 2000.

Smith, Eric Owen, "The German Model and European Integration", in Klaus Larres (ed.), **Germany since Unification: The Domestic and External Consequences**, Macmillan Press, London, in association with St. Martin's Press, New York, 1998, pp. 151-173.

Smith, Karen "The Evolution and Application of EU Membership Conditionality", in Marise Cremona, **The Enlargement of the European Union**, Academy of European Law, European University Institute, in association with Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003, pp. 105-140.

Steininger, Rolf, "The German Question, 1945-95", in Klaus Larres (ed.), **Germany since Unification: The Domestic and External Consequences**, Macmillan Press, London, in association with St. Martin's Press, New York, 1998, pp. 9-32.

Strickwerda, Carl, "Reinterpreting the History of European Integration: Business, Labor, and Social Citizenship in Twentieth Century Europe", in Jytte Klausen & Louise Tilly (eds.), **European Integration in Social and Historical Perspective: 1850 to the Present**, Rowman & Littlefireld Publishers, Inc., New York-Oxford, 1997, pp. 51-70.

Unspecified, **The Bulletin of the European Communities**, Supplement 4/92, *The Challenge of Enlargement: Commission Opinion on Austria's Application for Membership*, published by the Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 1993.

Unspecified, **The Bulletin of the European Communities**, Supplement 4/92, *More Unity and More Diversity: The European Union's Biggest Enlargement*, published by the Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 2003.

Weidenfeld, Werner, **Geschichte der Deutschen Einheit**, Volume Four, *Aussenpolitik für die deutsche Einheit: Die Entscheidungsjahre, 1989/90*, Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, Stuttgart, 1998.

Zielonka (Jan) & Mair (Peter), "Introduction: Diversity and Adaptation in the Enlarged European Union", **West European Politics**, 25/2 [April 2002], pp. 1-18.

Zogbaum, Heidi, "The Meaning of Maastricht", **Quadrant**, June 1993, pp. 45-50.

REFRAMING THE QUESTION OF CITIZENSHIP IN THE EUROPEAN UNION.

Chris Hobson
University of Melbourne

"Europe cannot proceed to a greater degree of political integration without the underlying structure of a unifying European identity" (cited in Banús 2002, 159). While the Tindemans report may have been overstating their case at the end of 1975, few could argue with the salience of such a statement today. That lack of identification between the European Union (EU) and its constituents might impede future development is, however, only half the problem. The other concern has been highlighted by *The Economist* (10/5/2003, 46): "it still seems unlikely that the European public will take much interest in the goings-on in Brussels. This somnolent attitude is an irritation both to Euro-enthusiasts and to Euro-sceptics, who find it baffling that people take so little interest in the making of the laws that govern their lives". Not only does public apathy and lack of belonging limit the potential for further integration, it also significantly undermines the Union as it currently stands.

While a European identity in the national mould is probably excessive, there needs to be greater identification between individuals and the Union. As *The Economist* noted, the EU now plays a major role in the lives of its citizens, so the divide between the two is indeed troubling. To date, the solution that has received the most amount of time and action has been instituting some form of EU citizenship. The focus of this piece will be to investigate various ways of understanding this unique decoupling of citizenship from the state. A process that was already set in motion by universal human rights discourses (Soysal 1996, 2001) has been taken one step further with the EU creating the first true transnational form of citizenship. We will begin our discussion with the two traditional faces of citizenship – rights and identity. It will be argued that looking at these twin aspects has been vital in illuminating the difficulties involved in creating EU citizenship. Such approaches, however, fail to offer any viable solutions to the current impasse. An alternative understanding of citizenship will then be presented that makes use of an interesting, though underdeveloped, concept put forward by R.J. Barry Jones (2001) who breaks citizenship down into three complimentary categories: formal, instrumental and affective. Using this framework, we will conclude by showing how identification between the people and the Union can be increased.

Before continuing, a few words should be said on the eternally contested notion of 'citizenship'. Heater (1990, 163) tells us of the numerous meanings the term entails: "a defined legal or social status, a means of political identity, a focus of loyalty, a requirement of duties, an expectation of rights and a yardstick of good social behaviour". The legal aspect is probably the most central to any definition of citizenship, where rights are endowed and duties entreated. This definitely muddies the water in regards to the European case: the rights are there but the duties are lacking. Citizenship, however, is more than a purely legal concept – identity through membership is also fundamental to broader understandings. In some ways 'citizenship' becomes interchangeable with 'belonging'. As Miller (1999) notes, in the national context citizenship rarely occupies a

marginal or remote position (such as the EU version currently does). Rather, citizenship is normally a core part of a person's identity. These two elements – rights and identity – form the basis for most understandings of citizenship. Jo Shaw (1997, 12) highlights how these aspects become complicated when applied to the *sui generis* Union, there are the problems of "identity in a transnational polity, and the achievement of the rights associated with social citizenship in the specific [single] market context offered by the European Union at its present stage of development." Most accounts of citizenship in the Union centre around one or both of these tensions. We will now give a brief overview of EU citizenship from these two perspectives – how the Union has attempted to win the minds (rights) and hearts (identity) of individuals.

Most of the literature on EU citizenship in the past decade has had a distinctly legal slant, focusing on the provisions introduced at Maastricht (TEU 1992). Perhaps it is because of the huge gap between reality and potential that this has been a heavily analysed topic. The opening lines of Article 8 usher in a new era of transnational citizenship by announcing that, "every person holding the nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union" (TEU 1992). Immediately one of the greatest contradictions in EU citizenship can be seen: it is decided completely upon national membership. Rather than encompassing all those who fall within the boundaries of the Union, it is the laws of the different member states that dictate who is eligible. Thus any discussion of it being an example of a postnational citizenship is somewhat premature since it is a complimentary form of membership wholly dependent on its more powerful and prominent national sibling. By excluding the more than nine million third country nationals that currently reside within the Union, many commentators feel that this project is inherently flawed (see Kostakopoulou 1998). Unfortunately, this is an issue that cannot be entered into detail here, but suffice to say, linking European citizenship firmly with national membership places some significant constraints upon its inclusiveness and fairness.

Continuing with Article 8, it goes on to state that: "citizens of the Union shall enjoy the rights conferred by this Treaty and shall be subject to the duties imposed thereby" (TEU 1992). The issue raised from this extract is one briefly touched upon earlier – the imbalance of rights and duties that exists within Union citizenship. What should be expected from this level of association is indeed unclear. The paucity of duties leads Wihtol de Wenden (2002) to suggest that EU citizenship is more akin to membership of a club. Even if this is overstating the matter, it is hard to see how this requirement of duties can be particularly strong considering the size of the Union. Unsurprisingly, proponents of a republican style citizenship are therefore sceptical of the whole project. Their doubts are partially confirmed by the fact that no dialogue took place in reaching these rights, rather they were bequeathed from above. No one even remembered to check whether people actually wanted Union citizenship in the first place! The way it was formed misses one of the major points of the whole enterprise, since "citizenship consists of more than passive acceptance of a pre-constituted package of rights" (Bellamy 2001, 41). Bellamy (2001, 41) highlights how debating over different conceptions of rights is crucial to constituting a polity, reminding us that citizenship is "the right to have rights". So for Union citizenship to have any worth, it must actually involve the citizens on a far greater level than it has to date.

The centrepiece of EU citizenship is then set out in Article 8a:

> every citizen of the Union shall have the right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, subject to various limitations and conditions laid down in the Treaty and by the measures adopted to give it effect (TEU 1992).

What is being given, in essence, is market based citizenship. Any hopes that this will lead to a shared identity forged through greater levels of interaction are misguided, however, since this right is not as expansive as it may initially seem. Most importantly, as Hall (1999, 44) points out: "inter-state citizens wishing to exercise their constitutional citizenship mobility rights must not be too poor". Mobility and residential rights are not equal as economically inactive citizens are treated differently by being subjected to an additional set of limitations. The EU version thereby fails one of the most important tests of citizenship – that of equality. Moreover, as a result of it being limited largely to the mobile and the affluent, the primary right given by EU citizenship is rendered useless to most of its recipients. It only really becomes of importance when living in another member state or a third country (Bauböck 1997). At present only 1.6% of EU citizens live permanently in an EU country other than their own (*The Economist* 31/5/2003, 51). As such, the defining element of European citizenship provides little real benefit to the vast majority of people who live and work in their own country. Thus the most significant right given at Maastricht suffers from being both exclusionary and of limited value.

The other right of interest to our discussion is that given under Article 8b, where citizens are allowed to vote and stand as a candidate in municipal elections and elections for the European parliament in the member state in which he/she resides (TEU 1992). While Shore and Black (1994) are correct in seeing this as having potential to help form a European consciousness if used extensively, the chances of this occurring in the immediate future are highly unlikely. The primary problem is that voting rights have been granted to distinctly second order elections. The apathy with which most citizens greet municipal and European elections means this right suffers from a similar flaw to the one given in Article 8a –it is irrelevant to most people. Furthermore, granting voting rights at a local level to inter-state member citizens poses some tricky questions.[17] Why should they be given voting privileges and other third country nationals be excluded? And if participation at the municipal level is acceptable, why not also at the national one? These interesting issues cannot be looked at here, but it must be recognised that granting only municipal voting rights to inter-state member citizens is definitely problematic. As for being able to vote and stand for the European parliament, the concerns here are less philosophical and more practical – what is troubling is the lack of interest shown by people. Admittedly the parliament's powers are still limited, but they are not insignificant and continue to grow. Nevertheless, what combines both these electoral privileges are a lack of meaning for most Europeans.

In this brief exposition of EU citizenship as introduced at Maastricht, a number of things can be seen. The rights given, while radical in potential, are vitally constrained. Mobility rights fail on counts of equality and relevance, while voting privileges are too limited and

---

[17] An 'inter-state citizen' is "a Union citizen who is not a national of the member state in which s/he seeks to move or reside". This term is taken from Hall (1999, 40).

secondary to be of worth at present. In essence, what undermines the whole project is that the rights given are of little value to the vast majority of the Union's constituents. How can the EU expect loyalty or affection from its citizens when all it provides is a small bundle of irrelevant rights? So the question then turns to giving more substantial ones. The chances of this happening, however, are extremely slim. Warleigh (2001) is correct in suggesting that member states, in viewing citizenship in zero-sum terms, are extremely wary of allowing the EU variant to grow in content and value. This can be seen in the unnecessary caveat added by the Treaty of Amsterdam: "citizenship of the Union shall complement and not replace national citizenship" (TA 1997). A further example that highlights the mindset of most member states was the declaration by the Danish delegation at the meeting of the European Council at Edinburgh in 1992: "nothing in the Treaty on European Union implies or forsees an undertaking to create a citizenship of the Union in the sense of citizenship of a nation-state" (cited in De Lange 1995, 109). Member states' fear of a competitor will block any chances of citizenship expanding significantly from above. Substantial rights could only emerge if a European consciousness develops that demands a fuller EU citizenship. Whether this can emanate from some form of shared identity is where we shall now turn.

Along with legal accounts, issues related to the idea of a pan-European identity have also been heavily debated. Two main questions have commonly been posed. First, is there a shared European history or culture that can be the basis for a common identity? And second, if this is not the case, is it possible to create some type of European identity from scratch? Both of these queries stem from a historical understanding of how identification between citizens and the nation-state was formed. To this effect, one of the founding fathers of what is now the EU, Jean Monnet, famously said, "if we were beginning the European community all over again, we should begin with culture" (cited in Banús 2002, 158). The implication of this statement is that for the EU to gain the loyalty of its constituents, Monnet believes it must do so in the same fashion as nation-states previously have done.

Before looking at the feasibility of creating a European identity, first we must ask, is it even desirable? The Janus-faced nature of citizenship means the benefits of inclusion always comes at the cost of exclusion. This leads one author to suggest that the European case "looks more similar to a cartel of national states defending their ethnic homogeneity" (von Beyme 2001, 74). While this is overstating things, it helps to illustrate that if a European identity were to replicate the nation variant, there is a very real danger of creating a cultural 'fortress Europe'. Increases in xenophobia and euro-chauvinism could be two major side effects of a strong common identity (Bauböck 1997, 17). The biggest threat would come from Islam being setup as the 'other' of a white, Christian Europe. Overtones of this could be seen recently in the handling of Turkey's membership application, most notably in the narrow-minded remarks of Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, the man put in charge of drafting the EU's constitution. On this matter, though, the EU is somewhat fortunate since Turkey's shortcomings in the spheres of economics and human rights means tricky questions relating to the cultural makeup of the Union can be avoided for the moment. They will, however, have to be dealt with at some stage. By attempting to forge a European identity, the potential of it being setup in opposition to

some form of 'other' is extremely worrying and so recognition of this drawback must underlie any identity based approaches.

Whether a shared history or culture already exists that could be the basis for a European identity has been something both the EU and scholars have had trouble with. The difficulties are obvious: the historical experiences of the member states are extremely varied and often conflicting. This is well noted by Anthony Smith (1992, 70) in 'National identity and the idea of European unity', probably the best exploration of this topic:

> So what is common to all Europeans?…Europeans differ among themselves as much as from non-Europeans in respect of language (Basques, Finns, Hungarians), territory (Russians, Greeks, Armenians), law (Roman, Germanic), religion (Catholic, Orthodox, Protestant) and economic and political system (democracy, communism, unitary state, federalism, etc.) – *as well as* in terms of ethnicity and culture.

The EU does not succeed in solving the problem with the paradoxical idea of 'unity through diversity'. A more nuanced version of this is the umbrella concept of a 'family of cultures' that suggests all European countries have partially shared historical and cultural traditions: "what we have instead is a 'family' of elements which overlap and figure in a number of (but not all) examples" (Smith 1992, 70). This creative solution, however, ends up more like a European version of six degrees of separation in the way the histories and cultures of the member states are brought together using tenuous and limited linkages. Despite some commonalties existing between countries within Europe, the amount of history and culture shared by the whole continent is insufficient for forming any sort of pan-European identity. Without this crucial resource, the chances of replicating the sort of identification that currently exists at the national level are not very high.

It has been well recognised that there is not enough of a shared culture and history on which to base a European identity on. As a result, the focus has been more on trying to build cultural capital by replicating symbols of national identity at the Union level. The most obvious example of this came from the recommendations of the Adoninno committee in the early 1980s which led to the creation of an EU day, flag and hymn, among other things. While these measures are understandable – "sad and gray" is how Wihtol de Weden (2002, 79) describes a European citizenship without symbols – there are numerous flaws in this painfully obvious attempt at creating a shared identity. The first and most distinct shortcoming is the artificiality of the whole project. The hope that simply providing a checklist of cultural artifacts will generate any real loyalties to the EU is both misguided in its optimism and contemptuous in its underestimation of the public's awareness. It also ignores the importance of other factors crucial to forming national allegiances. Central here is the lack of a common language – arguably the most vital element in communicating cultural identity. This also severely curtails the potential for a pan-European media to emerge. Another key component missing is civic teaching, education plays a huge role in embedding national sentiments and feelings. Banús (2002, 168) notes that since education systems are still national, it is hardly surprising the primary association for people remains at that level. Any chances of member states handing over power in this area, the EU instead providing a common curricula, are most unlikely because states are well aware of the immense power learning holds.

Attempts to form a European identity have so far been hampered by trying to copy the recipe provided for by the experience of nation-states. Eder (2001, 223) points to the contradictory nature of this highly artificial process:

the affirmative discourse on European identity searches for a substance that is collectively shared … however, such as strategy of identity-building turns the logic of identity construction on its head: it tries to determine in advance what the result of a process of social construction is.

The EU is essentially providing a shallow replica of a national identity – the symbols are there but devoid of the emotion, shared meanings and historical connections that make national membership such a potent and unifying force. Trying to create a European identity in the national mould is doomed for failure. There are a number of reasons for this. First, the construction of national identities in Europe took place during a period that is significantly different from current conditions. In this postmodern age the public are not as susceptible to blatant identity-creating schemes as they may have been in the past. Second, the EU lacks a shared language and civic education vital in forming national identities. Third, considering the continuing expansion of the EU, it is hard to conceive what exactly a European identity should entail. The huge diversity of countries makes common ground limited – this can be seen in the depressingly bland currency created, the uninspiring title of 'euro' matched by a poverty of shared symbols found on its notes and coins. Finally and perhaps most significantly, by copying the national version it effectively sets itself up as a competitor and thus enters a battle it is bound to lose. As Smith notes (1992, 62), national identifications are "vivid, accessible, well established, long popularized, and still widely believed, in broad outline at least. In each of these respects, 'Europe' is deficient both as idea and as process". The EU just does not have the cultural resources to compete with the strong and resilient constructs that are national identities.

Where does this leave a common European identity? As touched upon, it is debatable whether this is a good idea in the first place given the dangers of exclusion. Even if this concern is overlooked, aspirations of finding some sort of identity in a shared history and culture rely upon tenuous links that are ultimately unsustainable, while trying to create a pan-European identity similar to the national version has resulted in a hollow and meaningless replica more likely to arouse contempt than loyalty. Tassin (1992, 188) sums up nicely the unsuitability of current approaches: "a common space of European peoples should be protected both from the chimera of an original common identity to be reconstituted from the planned union, and from the phantasm of a unitary will to be forced out of nothing".

It appears that we have now reached an impasse. Attempts at strengthening the bonds between the Union and its citizens fail on both sides of our rights/identity dichotomy. The rights given in EU citizenship are limited and largely irrelevant. Chances of finding or creating a pan-European identity are slim at best. Both approaches suffer from member states trying to maintain their central role. So where can we go from here? To reiterate a key point, considering the huge role the EU now plays in the lives of its constituents, it is vital individuals identify more with and take greater interest in the Union. Yet attempts to solve this dilemma through either rights or identity based paradigms suffer from crucial

birth defects. Perhaps part of the problem is in how the issue is framed. As Giesen and Eder (2002) note, EU citizenship exists on two different levels: one transnational, the other postnational. If this is the case, why does the Union and so much of the academic literature expect EU citizenship to conform to the national mould?

With this in mind, let us attack the issue from a different angle, thus leaving behind the ill-fitting rights/identity breakdown of citizenship. Considering the blinkered vision of many within EU studies, it is not surprising that one of the most interesting approaches to this topic has come from an outsider, R.J. Barry Jones (2001), better known for his work on globalisation.[18] He proposes distinguishing between three parts of citizenship: formal, instrumental and affective. The first category corresponds closely to our earlier discussion on rights based citizenship. On this point Jones (2001, 145) suggests formal citizenship provides only part of the picture as it says "nothing much of the functional significance of the relevant polity for individual citizens, or its ultimate durability, because it fails to address the wider purposes for which the polity exists, or is supposed to exist". This shortcoming is rectified by his second category of instrumental citizenship. In essence, this is the way citizenship fulfills the needs of its members. Provision of security or welfare benefits are examples of policies that give substance and worth to citizenship. Finally, affective citizenship emerges directly in response to instrumental citizenship – as goods and services of value are provided to the polity so a sense of loyalty appears. "Affective citizenship, with populations viewing the polity of which they are members with affection and loyalty, is thus likely to develop where valued forms of instrumental citizenship have been developed and sustained for any length of time" (Jones 2001, 145).

Using Jones' approach provides us with some great insights into the flaws of current attempts at building a sense of belonging towards the Union. The EU has tried to loosen the grip member states currently hold on all three elements of citizenship by introducing some formal rights. These have not led to instrumental citizenship (except maybe for a small privileged elite) because the rights given are not of substantial value or benefit to the vast majority of the polity. As a result, affective citizenship has not developed. The EU has to some extent, tried to circumnavigate this problem by imposing a form of affective citizenship from above. It is impossible, however, for this to work without the key mediating factor – instrumental citizenship. Here we can see the shortcomings of many standard interpretations of European citizenship. Rights based approaches deal exclusively with formal citizenship, while identity based ones look purely at affective citizenship, both miss the core element of instrumental citizenship that ties the parts together.

We can then see that the EU has a functional deficit to compliment its democratic one. People are failing to identify with the EU because it is not appearing to provide any public goods of value. Jones (2001, 147) explains:

for a polity to create viable institutional citizenship two things must happen: first, appropriate public goods must be defined and supplied; and, second, the putative 'citizens' must be persuaded that these are valid public goods, are best supplied by the

---

[18] One the problems of EU scholarship being excluded from broader political theory debates, see Rumford and Murray (2003).

polity in question, and have a reasonable chance of being supplied in practice by that polity.

When these requirements are placed in the European context we can quickly see problems arise from the predominance of member states. As Closa (2001) notes, nation-states enjoy a presumption of 'goodness' and are regarded as the primary distributors of public goods. The Union as a new entity holds the burden of proof. Until it can prove its value to a majority of citizens, it cannot expect to receive any significant levels of loyalty. The problem is that member states hold a considerable monopoly on providing public goods, thereby denying many possibilities for instrumental citizenship to develop at a transnational level. It is not that the EU provides no public goods, the trouble is that those they do provide are either not credited or go unnoticed. In many cases, member states unfairly claim credit when acting as distributors of goods provided by the EU. The flipside of this are the member state politicians and media skillful at using the Union as a scapegoat by assigning it with responsibility for public bads. The result is a misdistribution of praise and blame that heavily favours the incumbents. Furthermore, many of the goods the EU provides are ones most citizens are not directly concerned with. As *The Economist* (10/5/2003, 46) shrewdly points out: "the EU may account for more than half of all legislation across the Union, but it tends to deal with the boring stuff. The issues that get people marching in the street – pension, welfare benefits, education – are still largely run at a national level". Finally, one of the EU's most significant achievements – providing peace and stability in Europe – becomes more and more taken for granted as memories of World War Two fade into the past.

To date the EU has largely failed in presenting itself as a legitimate source of public goods. In *Eurobarometer 58* (Autumn 2002) only half the respondents believed their country had benefited from EU membership, with only marginally more feeling membership was a good thing. This survey also shows that the introduction of the euro, while a success in many respects, has been a disaster in terms of generating levels of instrumental citizenship. Within the twelve countries to adopt the new currency, 77% of respondents felt that "prices have been generally rounded up in all areas" (Eurobarometer 58 2002, 21). In a similar poll, 84% believed the conversion of prices to the euro had been to the detriment of consumers (Flash 139 2002, 16). How can the EU possibly expect people to feel loyalty or affection towards it when the most significant impact it has on their daily lives, namely in the form of the new currency, results in everything being more expensive? All the EU flags, pens, hats and other paraphernalia will not make a dent on the resentment caused by the EU providing public bads rather than public goods. This is not to say the EU is necessarily to blame for price rises, merely to illustrate that the task it faces in gaining loyalty is made harder by the EU being perceived to be at fault.

Once again we need to ask what this all means for building identification between the people and the Union. Unlike legal and cultural frameworks, by using this concept of instrumental citizenship it is possible to identify what can be done to resolve the problem in a more meaningful way than simply producing greater amounts of EU propaganda. The solution is rather simple in theory – the EU has to prove itself as a provider of valuable public goods. As instrumental citizenship grows at the EU level it will lead to

greater amounts of the affective citizenship so desperately required. Unfortunately, this is much more difficult in reality since the member states jealously guard their monopoly as providers of public goods. But as the EU expands its competencies and starts to play a bigger role in areas such as the environment, welfare benefits, pensions and education, the current situation can slowly change if the Union can prove it is helping individuals in these fields. Social policy is definitely an area the EU has potential to build instrumental citizenship in if it can be seen to protect some welfare benefits from the neo-liberal policies that continue to influence many member states. The realm of economics is another obvious area the EU can focus on – but here it needs to be directed more towards the vast majority of people instead of the affluent, mobile, skilled minority who are currently the primary beneficiaries (and therefore supporters) of the EU. Jones (2001, 149) cites a study by Gabel which shows a strong correlation between economic advantage/disadvantage from the European market and support/opposition for the EU and integration. This supports the contention that loyalty and identification from the public will come only when the EU is seen to be providing valuable public goods.

Current understandings of EU citizenship centred on the traditional rights/identity dichotomy have largely reached their usefulness. Rights based approaches, in finding the flaws of the Maastricht treaty have successfully highlighted the limitations of formal citizenship at the European level. Member states, with a zero-sum understanding of the concept, will strongly resist giving significant privileges to EU citizenship. Meanwhile, identity based paradigms show that attempts at building a common European identity fail on both counts of desirability and feasibility. Not only is there the risk of creating an Islamic 'other', a lack of shared history, culture, language and meaningful symbols makes a common identity a practical impossibility. If, however, we move beyond these rights/identity based understandings and instead use the framework provided by Jones, we not only see the problem in a different light, we also discover a solution to the current impasse. Based on the important and expanding role the Union plays in the lives of its citizens, it is necessary that a greater level (or indeed any level) of affective citizenship form. This can only come from a growth in instrumental citizenship where the Union is seen to provide valuable public goods. At present public goods emerging from the EU suffer from either not being considered valuable or by member states misplacing credit and blame. These problems are worsened by the EU being seen to actually contribute to public bads, the example of the euro was earlier noted. The solution thus presents itself: the EU must discover ways of building levels of instrumental citizenship, social and economic policy were two areas suggested where this could potentially be done. Jones (2001, 160) is right in assessing that: "without a rich, and widely appreciated, structure of instrumental citizenship at the level of the EU, it remains to be seen whether any significant levels of European citizenship will develop amongst the population of the EU". It is only through a proper understanding of this will the EU be able to move towards "an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe" (TEU 1992).

REFERENCES

Banús, E. (2002), 'Cultural Policy in the EU and the European Identity' in Farrell, M., Fella, S. & Newman, M. (eds), *European Integration in the 21st Century*, London: Sage Publications.
Bauböck, R. (1997), 'Citizenship and National Identities in the European Union', *Jean Monnet Working Papers*, 1997/4, <http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/97/97-04-.html>, accessed February 2003.

Bellamy, R. (2001), 'The "Right to Have Rights": Citizenship Practice and the Political Constitution of the EU' in Bellamy, R. & Warleigh, A. (eds), *Citizenship and Governance in the EU*, London: Continuum.

Bellamy, R. & Warleigh, A. (1998), 'From an Ethics of Integration to an Ethics of Participation: Citizenship and the Future of the European Union', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 23, No. 3.

Checkel, J. T. (1999), 'Social construction and integration', *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol. 6, No. 4.

Christiansen, T., Jørgensen, K. E. & Wiener, A. (1999), 'The social construction of Europe', *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol. 6, No. 4.

Closa, C. (2001), 'Requirements of a European Public Sphere' in Eder, K. & Giesen, B. (eds), *European Citizenship Between National Legacies and Postnational Projects*, Oxford: Oxford UP.

de Lange, R. (1995), 'Paradoxes of European Citizenship' in Fitzpatrick, P. (ed), *Nationalism, Racism and the Rule of Law*, Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing.

Eder, K. (2001), 'Integration through Culture?' in Eder, K. & Giesen, B. (eds), *European Citizenship Between National Legacies and Postnational Projects*, Oxford: Oxford UP.

Giesen, B. & Eder, K. (2001), 'Introduction: European Citizenship' in Eder, K. & Giesen, B. (eds), *European Citizenship Between National Legacies and Postnational Projects*, Oxford: Oxford UP.

'Eurobarometer 58 Highlights: Autumn 2002' (2002), <http://europa.eu.int/en/comm/dg10/infcom/epo/polls.html>, accessed May 2003.

'Flash 139: Euro Attitues in the Euro Zone, November 2002' (2002), <http://europa.eu.int/en/comm/dg10/infcom/epo/polls.html>, accessed May 2003.

Hall, S. (1999), 'European Citizenship – Unfinished Business' in Holmes, L. & Murray, P. (eds), *Citizenship and Identity in Europe*, Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing.

Heater, D. (1990), *The Civil Ideal in World History, Politics and Education*, London: Longman.

Jones, R. J. B. (2001), 'The Political Economy of European Citizenship' in Bellamy, R. & Warleigh, A. (eds), *Citizenship and Governance in the EU*, London: Continuum.

Kastoryano, R. (2002), 'Citizenship: Beyond Blood and Soil' in Leveau, R., Mohsen-Finan, K. & Wihtol de Wenden, C. (eds), *New European Identity and Citizenship*, Aldershot: Ashgate.

Kostakopoulou, T. (1998), 'European Union citizenship as a model of citizenship beyond the national state' in Weale, A. & Nentwich, M. (eds), *Political Theory and the European Union*, London: Routledge.

Kostakopoulou, T. (2001), 'Invisible Citizens? Long-term Resident Third-country Nationals in the EU and their Struggle for Recognition' in Bellamy, R. & Warleigh, A. (eds), *Citizenship and Governance in the EU*, London: Continuum.

La Torre, M. (1995), 'Citizenship: A European Wager', *Ratio Juris*, Vol. 8, No. 1.

Lepsius, M. R. (2001), 'The European Union' in Eder, K. & Giesen, B. (eds), *European Citizenship Between National Legacies and Postnational Projects*, Oxford: Oxford UP.

Marcussen, M., Risse, T., Engelmann-Martin, D., Knopf, H. J. & Roscher, K. (1999), 'Constructing Europe? The evolution of French, British and German nation state identities', *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol. 6, No. 4.

Meehan, E. (1996), 'The Debate on Citizenship and European Union' in Murray, P. & Rich, P. (eds), *Visions of European Identity*, Boulder: Westview Press.

Miller, D. (1999), 'Bounded Citizenship' in K. Hutchings & R. Dannreuther (eds.), *Cosmopolitan Citizenship*, London: MacMillan.

Neumann, I. B. (1998), 'European Identity, EU Expansions, and the Integration/Exclusion Nexus', *Alternatives*, Vol. 23.

Rumford, C. & Murray, P. (2003), 'Globalization and the limitations of European integration studies: interdisciplinary considerations', *Contemporary European Politics*, Vol. 11, No. 1.

Schlesinger, P. (1994), 'Europe's contradictory communicative space', *Daedalus*, Vol. 123, No. 2.

Shaw, J. 'Citizenship of the Union: Towards Post-national Membership?' (1997), *Jean Monnet Working Papers*, 1997/4, <http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/97/97-06-.html>, accessed February 2003.

Shore, C. & Black, A. (1994), 'Citizens Europe and the Construction of European Identity' in Goddard, V., Llobera, J. & Shore, C. (eds), *The Anthropology of Europe*, Oxford: Berg.

Smith, A. (1992), 'National Identity and the Idea of European Unity', *International Affairs*, Vol. 68, No. 1.

Smith, R. A. (1993), 'The European Community and the Challenge of New Migrants', *World Review*, Vol. 32, No. 2.

Soysal, Y. (1996), 'Changing Citizenship in Europe' in Cesarand, D. & Fulbrook, M. (eds), *Citizenship, Nationality and Migration in Europe*, London: Routledge.

Soysal, Y. (2001), 'Changing Boundaries of Participation in European Public Spheres' in Eder, K. & Giesen, B. (eds), *European Citizenship Between National Legacies and Postnational Projects*, Oxford: Oxford UP.

Tassin, E. (1992), 'Europe: A Political Community?' in Mouffe, C. (ed), *Dimensions of Radical Democracy*, London: Verso.

The Economist, 10/05/2003 & 31/05/2003.

Treaty of Amsterdam (TA) (1997), <http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/treaties/>, accessed June 2003.

Treaty of the European Union (TEU 1992), <http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/treaties/>, accessed June 2003.

von Beyme, K. (2001), 'Citizenship and the European Union' in Eder, K. & Giesen, B. (eds), *European Citizenship Between National Legacies and Postnational Projects*, Oxford: Oxford UP.

Vranken, M. (1999), 'Citizenship and the Law of the European Union' in Holmes, L. & Murray, P. (eds), *Citizenship and Identity in Europe*, Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing.

Warleigh, A. (2001), 'Purposeful Opportunists? EU Institutions and the Struggle over European Citizenship' in Bellamy, R. & Warleigh, A. (eds), *Citizenship and Governance in the EU*, London: Continuum.

Wiener, A. (1997), 'Assessing the Constructive Potential of Union Citizenship – A Socio-Historical Perspective', *European Integration online Papers*, Vol. 1, No. 17, <http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/1997-017.htm>, accessed April 2003.

Wihtol de Wenden, C. (2002), 'European Citizenship and Migration' in Leveau, R., Mohsen-Finan, K. & Wihtol de Wenden, C. (eds), *New European Identity and Citizenship*, Aldershot: Ashgate.

SHOULD TURKEY BE ALLOWED TO JOIN THE EUROPEAN UNION?

Emily Anderson
University of Melbourne

In 1989, Turkish Prime Minister Turgut Ózal proclaimed that 'Turkey is an integral part of Europe and the two cannot be considered without each other' (Ózal 1989, p.9). However, Turkey's bid for membership of the European Union has been continually, and controversially, frustrated. European Commission reports state that Turkey fails to meet the Copenhagen accession criteria under its present economic and political conditions (Fontaine 1998, p.45). The EU contends that Turkey's membership aspirations cannot be realised while it continues to lack stable democratic institutions, the rule of law, respect for human rights and minorities, and a functioning market economy (Parkinson 2002, p.17). Yet many commentators – from both within and outside Turkey – argue that there are underlying, 'unmentionable' (McLaren 2000, p.118) reasons why Turkey continues to be left waiting at the gates of Brussels. These include Turkey's ongoing hostilities with EU member state Greece over the occupation of Cyprus, and fears about the EU's ability to digest a state of Turkey's size, population and geographical location. Most controversially, some claim that Turkey's membership bid has been derailed by religious prejudice: the EU is a 'Christian Club' to which 'Muslims need not apply'(Riddell 2002, p.13).

In the past, Turkey has been unrealistic in expecting to attain membership while falling short of basic EU standards. However, the EU has mishandled its relations with Turkey by failing to provide clear signals. It is evident that sections of the EU that oppose Turkey's admission do so for a variety of different reasons. This essay will argue that Turkey's application for membership is forcing the EU to address fundamental questions about its nature, scope and cultural identity. In order for accession to occur, Turkey must demonstrate that it has successfully implemented political reform, and the EU must prove that it is a diverse and tolerant organisation. If these hurdles can be overcome, benefits will flow to Turkey, the EU, and the broader international community.

Since the inception of the Turkish republic in 1923, Turkey's foreign policy has been Western and European in orientation. Yasmin Celik notes that Turkish-European relations 'have been shaped by Turkey's attempts to be accepted into the EU' (Celik 1999, p.96). Turkey's links with the EU date back to 1963, when it entered into an association agreement with the European Economic Community (a predecessor to the EU). The goal of this agreement was to progressively achieve full economic integration, culminating in the establishment of a customs union. The possibility of Turkey acceding to the EEC was also formally written into the agreement (Verheaugen 2000, p.2). However, the EU/Turkey customs union did not come into effect until the end of 1995, and progress towards Turkish EU membership has been even slower. Turkey officially applied for full membership in 1987. Yet at the Luxembourg European Council Summit of December 1997, the EU resolved to open accession negotiations with all of the 12 applicant states except Turkey. This rebuff threatened to jeopardise already strained Turkish-EU relations. Turkish officials believed that the EU had destroyed any prospect

of future membership, and refused to attend subsequent Council meetings. In 1998, fearing that Turkey would give up on its application, the European Council reaffirmed that Turkey should continue preparing for membership. The Helsinki European Council meeting of 1999 marked an historic moment in EU-Turkish relations when Turkey was finally accepted as a candidate for full membership. The Economist declared that 'after 36 years of temporising, [the EU is] ready to do the sensible thing and accept Turkey as a candidate' (*The Economist* 1999, p.16).

Yet despite this milestone, the European Commission's regular reports on Turkey's progress towards accession identified numerous areas of concern. Reports issued between 2000 and 2002 stated that Turkey fell far short of satisfying the Copenhagen political criteria for accession. While recognising that Turkey had initiated some institutional and political reforms, the Commission argued that their specific implementation did not guarantee a stable democracy and the rule of law. These reservations foreshadowed what was to come at the Copenhagen European Council Meeting of December 2002. At this summit, ten candidate countries were appointed members of the EU as of 1 May 2004: Turkey was not one of them. Instead, the European Council will decide in December 2004 whether Turkey has made sufficient improvements in the areas of democracy and human rights. If it is then satisfied that the Copenhagen criteria have been met, the EU will 'open negotiations without delay' (Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2003, p.3).

Turkey's reaction to this further setback was initially hostile. Turkish Prime Minister Abdullah Gul described the timetable as 'totally unacceptable' and 'an act of prejudice' (*The Financial Times* 2002a, p.7). Some Western commentators sympathised with Turkey's frustration, declaring that 'the EU has kept Turkey in limbo for long enough' (Parkinson 2002, p.17). The EU's decision confirmed earlier speculation that, amongst candidates, 'Turkey had lost its position at the head of the queue (if it was ever really there)' (Redmond 1993, p.53). While admitting its initial disappointment, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs now states that the timetable for negotiations should be viewed as the 'basis of a new stage in Turkey-EU relations' (Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2003, p.4). However, this latest development has led many to query EU motivations, and question whether Turkey can ever expect to attain full membership. It has also renewed debate over the cultural identity of both Turkey and the EU, and the extent to which these are compatible.

Officially, the EU argues that Turkey has yet to achieve a truly democratic state, in which human rights and the rule of law are guaranteed. Undoubtedly, Turkey's record on human rights is poor, particularly with respect to its treatment of Kurdish minorities. The European Court of Human Rights has repeatedly admonished the Turkish government on issues ranging from failure to respect the cultural rights of minorities, to failure to prevent torture and brutality perpetrated by the Turkish police (Mowbray 2001, p.61). There are also grave fears over the government's ability to control the powerful Turkish military. Since 1960, three military coups have systematically dismantled democratic institutions (*The Economist* 2002a, p.8). On the economic front, Turkey's per capita gross domestic product (GDP) is less than half that of Greece, the poorest of the member states

(Bainbridge 2002, p.276). While Turkey's economic relationship with the EU is advanced with respect to matters involving the customs union, the Commission has expressed continued unease about the instability of the Turkish economy, and high levels of corruption.

In recent years, Turkey has addressed these political and economic problems with a series of constitutional and legislative reforms. In 2001, thirty four amendments were made to the Turkish Constitution in order to improve human rights standards, strengthen the rule of law and restructure democratic institutions (Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2003, p.3). These reforms were implemented by complementary legislation and administrative measures. Upon coming to office in November 2002, the current Islamic-Reformist Government passed a 'Copenhagen Package' of legislation, specifically aimed at bolstering Turkey's chances of accession (Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2003, p.4). This legislation provided further protection of fundamental rights and freedoms, and sought to achieve greater transparency and competitiveness in the market economy. Although the Seville European Council stated in June 2002 that 'implementation of the required political and economic reforms would bring forward Turkey's prospects of accession,' (Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2003, p.4) clearly the EU adjudged that the reforms did not go far enough in addressing problems identified in European Commission reports.

Examining Turkey's eligibility under the Copenhagen criteria reveals some of the reasons why the EU has prevaricated on the issue of Turkish membership. However, in order to gain a complete understanding of EU-Turkish relations, it is essential to consider underlying political and cultural issues. These include Turkey's long-standing territorial dispute with EU member state Greece over Cyprus. Some Turks believe that Greece is fiercely opposed to Turkish membership, and that the EU is loathe to see fellow member states locked in bitter territorial disputes. Such a situation would not be unprecedented: the UK and Spain have long been at odds over Gibraltar. Lauren McLaren argues that 'it is impossible to have two member states who often appear to be on the brink of war with one another' (McLaren 2000, p.128). Yet common EU membership is more likely to aid than hinder negotiations over Cyprus, and increase chances of a peaceful resolution. Turgut Ózal states: 'Keeping Turkey outside the EU will not help to solve bilateral problems with Greece' (Ózal 1999, p.343). In fact, Greek foreign minister George Papandreou has identified the Franco-German reconciliation within the EU as a model for future relations between Greece and Turkey (*The Economist* 2003, p.19).

Arguably of greater significance are the very facts of Turkey's size, population and geographical location. Among current EU members and candidates, only Germany has a bigger population than Turkey (*The Economist* 2000, p.18). If Turkey maintains its high birth-rate, it will 'become number one by about 2020' (*The Economist* 2000, p.18). Peter Riddell argues that 'enlargement is fundamentally about power,'(Riddell 2002, p.13) and admitting a state of Turkey's size would clearly change the balance of EU decision-making power. Presumably, Turkey would have the largest number of votes in the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament. EU resources such as the Cohesion Fund would be drained by the need to address high levels of Turkish poverty. While

many of the new accession states experience similar levels of poverty, their need for assistance is lessened by the fact that they are far smaller than Turkey. In geographical terms, it is salient to note that *The Penguin Companion to European Union* asserts that 96% of Turkey's territory is located in Asia (Bainbridge 2002, p.278). Therefore, Turkey's membership bid raises questions about the boundaries of Europe. Riddell asks 'if Turkey is admitted, what is to prevent North African countries, Ukraine or even Israel from joining?' (Riddell 2002, p.13). Turkey argues that it has always been considered a European State, by virtue of its membership of the Council of Europe (since 1949), and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (since 1952). Turkish leaders have long boasted of the country's 'European vocation' (Muftuler-Bac 1997, p.54). The Economist supports this position, stating that applicant states should be judged on the basis of core values, not 'how far they are in miles from Paris or Berlin' (*The Economist* 2002c, p.9). This contention raises the most controversial, and arguably the most fundamental, issue regarding Turkish membership: culture.

McLaren notes that many Turkish elites believe that 'the heart of the problem' is that EU leaders perceive Turkey to be '(a) fervently Muslim and (b) not really European' (McLaren 2000, p.121). The EU has sought to downplay such perceptions: EU Ambassador to Turkey Karen Fogg maintains that Turkey is being judged 'on the same criteria as applied to other candidates' (*The Economist* 2000, p.17). However, some EU officials have suggested otherwise. In November 2002, Valery Giscard d'Estaing, former French president and current chair of the Convention on the Future of Europe, proclaimed that Turkey was 'not a European country' since it had 'a different culture, a different approach and a different way of life' (Riddell 2002, p.13). D'Estaing went on to proclaim that Turkish membership would be 'the end' of the EU, and expressed his desire to include an assertion of Christian values in his draft constitution for the EU. Riddell suggests that d'Estaing's views are shared by Christian Democrats in Germany and Belgium, and members of the alarmingly resurgent far right in France (led by Jean-Marie Le Pen) and Austria (such as Joerg Haider) (Riddell 2002, p.13). Although there are currently 15 million Muslims living within the EU, member states remain largely Christian, mainly Roman Catholic, countries (Riddell 2002, p.13). EU policy-makers may fear a backlash from anti-Muslim quarters: one unnamed prominent European politician has expressed concern that 'letting Turkey into the EU would mean more Le Pens and Haiders' (*The Economist* 2002b, p.21). However, it is vitally important that the EU stand up against such fascists. Welcoming Turkey into the EU would counter criticisms that the EU is insular, discriminatory and heterogeneous. It would allow the EU to credibly assert that it is a tolerant, diverse and culturally rich body. As Turgut Ózal wrote, 'the Europe capable of accepting Turkey as a full member will have risen above ethnocentrism' (Ozal 1989, p.356).

Turkey and the EU each stand to gain from Turkish membership. Many Turks have noted the economic and political improvements experienced in Greece since EU accession, and hope that Turkey will derive similar benefits (Celik 1999, p.107). Economic advantages that Turkey could expect to gain include increased avenues for trade, financial assistance for poor regions, and greater freedom in employment opportunities throughout Europe for Turkish workers. Politically, EU law and policy

frameworks would provide scrutiny over future developments in Turkey's fledgling democracy, and guidance in enhancing the protection of human rights. Meltem Múftúler-Bac believes that Turkish membership is essential in the creation of a 'liberal, democratic regime which respects human rights and the rule of law' (Múftúler-Bac 1997, p.91). Importantly, EU membership would also give Turkey greater credibility on the world stage, proving that it can work effectively with Western allies.

The potential benefits which the EU can expect to derive from Turkish membership are also considerable. Strategically, Turkey is an important ally in the establishment of a European Defence Force. If the EU is to forge ahead with its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) , Turkey will be important by virtue of its large military, strong presence in NATO and strategic location. The US has recognised Turkey's significance to military operations in the Middle East: it pressured the EU to admit Turkey in the hope that this would assist war on Iraq (Riddell 2002, p.13). Furthermore, allowing Turkey into the EU fold may help to secure peace in the region. No doubt, the EU will be in a better position to mould Turkey's behaviour once it is a member. Europe Minister Denis MacShane believes that the EU has the potential to help Turkey 'along the road to a fully functioning Islamic democracy,' and in doing so, create a 'bridge to the Muslim world' (Riddell 2002, p.13). A close and productive relationship between the EU and Turkey would be of great symbolic significance for broader relations between the Western and Muslim worlds, as it would signal that the values of the two are not inherently incompatible. The Economist notes that Turkey's bid for EU membership provides 'an historic chance for Europe but also for the Muslim world to show that their two great civilisations are not fated always to clash' (*The Economist* 2002c, p.20).

Turkey's road to EU membership has been long and difficult. There is truth in EU claims that Turkey has long failed to meet basic economic and political standards for accession. However, Turkey has begun to address these concerns, and if the EU fails to recognise this progress, it will leave itself open to criticism that it is acting on ulterior motives. In considering Turkey's application, the EU must face fundamental questions about its own geographical and cultural boundaries. Hopefully, this self-analysis will encourage EU leaders to welcome Turkey into a more rich and diverse Union. The potential benefits of this expansion would be felt not only by the EU and Turkey, but all of those who wish for improved relations between the Western and Muslim worlds.

REFERENCES

The Economist (1999). 'The European Union decides it might one day talk Turkey', 16 December 1999.
The Economist (2000). 'Why are we waiting?', 8 June 2000.
The Economist (2002a). 'A General speaks his mind', 14 March 2002.
The Economist (2002). 'Great – if they really happen', 8 August 2002.
The Economist (2002b). 'Too big for Europe?', 14 November 2002.
The Economist (2002c). 'Turkey belongs in Europe', 5 December 2002.
The Economist (2003). 'The Magic of Membership', 16 January 2003.
The Financial Times (2002). 'A Christmas vote for Turkey', 4 December 2002.
The Financial Times (2002a). 'Turkey swallows its disappointment', 14 December 2002.
Bainbridge, T (2002). *The Penguin Companion to European Union,* London: Penguin Books, 2002.
Celik, Y (1999). *Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy,* Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1999.

European Commission (2001). *The European Union: still enlarging,* Luxembourg: Office for Official Publication of the European Communities, 2001.

European Commission (2003). 'Report: Turkey', <http://www.europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/e40113.htm> April 2003

Fontaine, P (1998). *Europe in 10 Points,* Luxembourg: Office for Official Publication of the European Communities, 1998.

Jones, L (2003). 'Turkey's EU entrance shows two great civilizations not fated to clash', in *Washington Report on Middle East Affairs,* Vol.22, No.1, March 2003.

McLaren, L.M (2000). 'Turkey's Eventual Membership of the EU: Turkish Elite Perspectives on the Issue', in *Journal of Common Market Studies,* Vol.38, No.1, 2000.

Mowbray, A (2001). *Cases and Materials on the European Convention on Human Rights,* London: Butterworths, 2001.

Múftúler-Bac, M (1997). *Turkey's Relations with a Changing Europe,* Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997.

Ózal, T (1989). 'Turkey indivisible from Europe,' in *Turkey-Economic Dialogue,* Vol 30, 1989.

Ózal, T (1991). *Turkey in Europe and Europe in Turkey,* London: K Rustem & Brother, 1991.

Parkinson, T (2002). 'What more must Turkey do before Europe says yes?', in *The Age,* December 20 2002.

Redmond, J (1993). *The Next Mediterranean Enlargement of the European Community: Turkey, Cyprus and Malta?,* Cambridge: Dartmouth Publishing Company, 1993.

Riddell, P (2002). 'On the issue of admission, EU is making a meal of Turkey', in *The Australian,* 9 December 2002.

Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2003). 'Turkey-EU Relations: the Post-Helsinki Phase', <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/ad/adc/latest.htm>

Verheaugen, G (2002). 'The Enlargement Process and Turkey's Place in this Process', speech given at the Bagazici University, Turkey, 9 March 2002.

PUBLIC, ELITE AND MEDIA PERCEPTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION IN THE ASIA PACIFIC REGION (AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND, THAILAND, AND SOUTH KOREA): A COMPARATIVE STUDY.

Katrina Stats, Research Assistant, University of Melbourne

The Contemporary European Studies Association of Australia (CESSA) is one of four national European Union Studies Associations (EUSAs) participating in a multidisciplinary, transnational, comparative research project investigating perceptions of the European Union in the Asia Pacific region. A Jean Monnet grant from the European Commission totalling 142,000 EUR was awarded to fund the two year project titled *Public, Elite and Media Perceptions of the European Union in the Asia Pacific Region (Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, and South Korea): A Comparative Study.* The project is being coordinated by Prof. Martin Holland and Dr. Natalia Chaban of the National Centre for Research on Europe (NCRE) at Canterbury University, Christchurch, New Zealand and also involves researchers in Australia, Thailand and South Korea.

The project follows on from a two-year pilot project investigating perceptions of the European Union in New Zealand conducted by Dr. Chaban together with Prof. Holland at the NCRE at Canterbury University, and a study of Australian elite's perceptions of the EU by Dr. Philomena Murray at the Contemporary Europe Research Centre (CERC) at the University of Melbourne. These studies are the exception to a dearth of empirical research into the contemporary understandings of the EU in non-EU countries. The relative lack of research in this area is striking given the increasing importance of relationships with, and the growing impact of, the EU in the Asia Pacific region as it emerges as a powerful international economic and political actor.

Thus, the overall aim of the research project is to identify, measure, and compare the nature, content, and shifts of Asia Pacific's media impact, public opinion, and elite attitudes towards the EU. The first phase of the project involves monitoring and analysing a selection of the national media (five daily newspapers and two daily news broadcasts in each country) for a twelve-month period. This will be followed by the design and implementation of a national survey to gauge public perceptions of the EU, and a series of interviews to be conducted with media, business and political elites.

A primary objective of the project is to disseminate the results to as broad an audience as possible with the aim of enhancing knowledge and awareness, increasing the visibility, and promoting discussion of the EU in the Asia Pacific. Using the media, presenting at public seminars and academic conferences, publishing material and creating an Asia Pacific database of resources, the results will be fed back to each of the targeted groups – the general public, media representatives, and national elites – as well as to students, researchers, academics and practitioners from a variety of backgrounds and across a range of disciplines. As well, it is envisaged that the research will have a number of practical implications, namely, informing local, regional, and EU policy-making. It is

hoped that the research and results will contribute to the ongoing debate on external perspectives on European integration.

Katrina Stats, the Australian research assistant, is based at the Contemporary Europe Research Centre (CERC) at the University of Melbourne under the supervision of Dr. Philomena Murray. In March of this year, she travelled to Christchurch for a week of training with Dr Natalia Chaban, meeting with fellow researchers Paveena Sutthisripok from Chulalonkorn University, Thailand, and Kim Se Na from Kyonggi University, South Korea. The project was officially launched on Friday 12 March at Canterbury University, Christchurch in a public seminar, *Australia-Korea-NZ-Thailand Jigsaw: EU Perceptions in Asia-Pacific.*

The researchers will next meet in September 2004 in Christchurch to compare media findings from each of the four countries and to present at a conference organised by Canterbury University, "*Outside Looking In: Multidisciplinary Perspectives on the EU*". The results of a national public survey to be conducted in each country will be brought together in February 2005 in Bangkok and interviews with national media, political and business elites will be compared in Melbourne in July 2005. The results of the project will culminate in a final conference, "*EU and the Dialogue between People and Cultures*" in Christchurch towards the end of 2005 and will be published as a book.

EU STUDIES NEWS

CONFERENCES, CALLS FOR PAPERS

Asia-Pacific EU Conference
"Outside Looking In": Multidisciplinary Perspectives on the EU
9-11 September 2004

This conference is the 2nd meeting of the Asia-Pacific EU Studies Association (the inaugural conference was held in Seoul in May 2003). THE ASIA-PACIFIC EU STUDIES ASSOCIATION BRINGS TOGETHER ECSA / EUSA associations across the region – from India in the west to China and Japan in the east and Australia and New Zealand in the south. The conference is sponsored by EUSA-New Zealand, the NCRE and the European Commission.
Please visit the NCRE website to find out more: http://www.europe.canterbury.ac.nz/

The National Europe Centre at the Australian National University, and the
Australian Universities Europe Network (AUEN) are pleased to sponsor:
The Challenges of Postgraduate Study
5 August 2004
This conference responds to the urgent call of graduate students for advice with the practical factors of postgraduate study. Enhancing research skills and improving and improving the grasp of current and future research projects, this event will also outline the skills and experiences early career scholars are expected to demonstrate by the time they have completed their postgraduate research degrees.
For more details refer to the NEC website at: www.anu.edu.au/NEC

The First Oceanic Conference on International Studies
Department of International Relations
Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies
Australian National University
14-16 July 2004
In recent years the number of scholars in Australia, New Zealand, and the Pacific studying and teaching international relations and global politics has grown dramatically. And the diversity of work currently underway is greater than ever before. The first Oceanic Conference on International Studies is designed to bring this growing community together, to help build satisfying and productive networks and relationships, and to showcase the variety of world class research being conducted in the region. For more information on this   conference please email Mary-Louise Hickey at Marylouise.Hickey@anu.edu.au.

International Symposium - The European Far Right: Pathology and Prospects
The National Europe Centre, Australian National University

Friday 6 August 2004

The virus of far right extremism which has flourished in Europe and Australia in recent years will be the subject of a public, one-day symposium at the National Europe Centre. The symposium will discuss the reasons for the ultra-right syndrome and assess its impact on mainstream political discourse. Papers will concentrate on the distinctive social, political, 'cultural' and cyber communications developments which are spawning and shaping contemporary far-right parties, movements and 'groupuscles'.

For more information: www.anu.edu.au/NEC/conferences.php

International conference - New Security Agendas: European and Australian Perspectives
Menzies Centre (King's College London)
1-3 July 2004.
This conference is sponsored by Menzies Centre, in association with the Contemporary Europe Research Centre (University of Melbourne). For further details visit the Web site for the Menzies Centre
For more information: http://www.kcl.ac.uk/depsta/menzies/events/events.htm#security

The Australian Centre and the Department of History at the University of Melbourne present the
British World Conference III
2-4 July 2004.
Subsequent conferences are planned for the University of Auckland (2005) and the Institute of Commonwealth Studies, University of London (2006). For full details, visit the conference website at www.australian.unimelb.edu.au/BritishWorld/.

The University of Sydney presents
"The Italian Effect: Radical Thought, Biopolitics and Cultural Subversion"
9-11 September 2004.
The keynote speaker will be Franco 'Bifo' Berardi, who is the leading Italian 'nomadic' cultural theorist and media activist whose projects include *Radio Alice* and *Telestreet*. For full details and registration information, visit the conference website at www.arts.usyd.edu.au/departs/rihss/italianeffect.html.

Other conferences relating to the EU can be found at:
http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/calendar/index.html

GRANTS/ FUNDING

The Seventh Biennial Conference of the Australasian Association for Communist and Post-Communist Studies (AACPCS) will be held at the Australia National University in Canberra on 4-5 February 2005. The conference theme is "Systemic Transformation of Communism: The Record of the Past Quarter Century in Communism and Post-Communism". Joint sponsors include: the Transformation of Communist Systems Project, the Centre for Arab and Islamic Studies (the Middle East and Central Asia), Contemporary China Centre, and the Research School of Pacific Asian Studies. The deadline for proposed panels is 31 August 2005; for papers, 30 November 2004.

The Australian Universities Europe Network (AUEN) is offering Research Travel Grants for those scholars wanting to conduct research in Europe in 2004 and 2005. The deadline for submissions is 2 July 2004. On offer are both postgraduate and early career/post doctoral grants.
For details: http://www.anu.edu.au/NEC/2004%20AUEN%20Travel%20Grant.pdf.

The *CESAA Review* is a formally refereed journal which aims to publish scholarly articles of a high standard related to theoretical and empirical aspects of contemporary European studies. Its research agenda is to further the development of European studies in Australia and New Zealand, and to provide a forum for debating issues relating to contemporary Europe, as well as Australia and New Zealand's relationship with Europe.

Unsolicited manuscripts of 5,000-7,000 words (exclusive of bibliography and endnotes) in any area of contemporary European studies are welcomed by the *Review*. Articles should not be under consideration for any other journal. Authors should submit three copies of their contribution, typed double-spaced on A4 paper, together with a disk copy formatted in Microsoft Word (PC) 6.0 or later. Author's name and affiliations should appear only on the cover of the manuscript, which will be detached prior to forwarding to referees. Each manuscript should be accompanied by an abstract of not more than 150 words. Articles should be referenced using the Harvard referencing system. External referees formally assess articles and final decision on editing, publication and content rests with the CESAA Editorial Board, which will comprise of members of the CESAA Committee.

Authors should retain a copy of their contribution, as manuscripts submitted for publication will not be returned.

Contributions may be sent to:

CESAA Review
P.O. Box 2125
Hawthorn 3122
Australia
Tel: (03) 8344 5151
Fax: (03) 8344 7906
Editors: Karen Hussey, Rita Wilson
Email: kehussey@unimelb.edu.au
Rita.Wilson@arts.monash.edu.au

Back issues: To order back copies of the CESAA Newsletters/Review Numbers 1 to 30 send $5.00 per copy – cheques made out to CESAA (specify editions) to the address above. Some editions of the CESAA Review are available to download, from the CESAA website at:

www.cesaa.org.au

The Contemporary European Studies Association of Australia was launched as an independent body on 16 March, 1991 in Melbourne. The initiative for such an Association was based on the experience of the national Associations for Contemporary European Studies in each of the member states of the European Union and elsewhere, which is an experience of cooperation, sharing of learning and research interests and dissemination of information and critical analysis on contemporary issues.

AIMS OF THE ASSOCIATION

CESAA's objectives are:

- to promote teaching and research in contemporary European Studies;
- to provide a forum for discussion of contemporary European issues;
- to publish work of high quality in European studies;
- to maintain and foster links between tertiary educational institutions;
- to foster links among academics in Australia and internationally;
- to encourage European Studies in secondary schools;
- to advise interested government and non-government organisations.

The establishment of the Association reflects a desire that academics in Australia from all tertiary institutions, as well as interested individuals, participate in the activities of one Association throughout Australia. The approach of CESAA is interdisciplinary and interprofessional.

CESAA is an active member of the world-wide network of the European Community Studies Associations (ECSA), based in Brussels. CESAA was also a founding member of the Asia Pacific Network of ECSAs.

CESAA REVIEW SUBMISSIONS: The Editorial Board is pleased to consider manuscripts dealing with contemporary European issues. Articles will be subject to peer review and independent academic refereeing. For more information, see the CESAA Review Style Guide at the end of this issue.

MEMBERSHIP DETAILS

CESAA welcomes new members and offers the following membership rates:

Students/retired/unwaged	$ 30.00	2 years	$ 50.00
Individuals	$ 70.00	2 years	$120.00
Institutions	$150.00	2 years	$250.00

Membership includes subscription to the *Asia-Pacific Journal of EU Studies* and CESAA's own fully refereed *CESAA Review*. (*Please add $10.00 for overseas memberships to cover cost of mail.)*

To join, please forward the application form at the back of the CESAA Review, together with the membership fee (cheque or money order) payable to CESAA, to:

CESAA Membership Secretary
P.O. Box 2125, Hawthorn
Victoria 3122, Australia

Membership forms are also available on our website at: www.cesaa.org.au

CESAA COMMITTEE 2003-2004:

Office-holders:

Bruno Mascitelli, Swinburne University, (President)

Carol Strong, Deakin University (Vice-President)

Larry Sheehan, University of Melbourne (Treasurer)

Dora Horvath, University of Melbourne (Membership Secretary)

Anthony Bidgood, Monash University, (Secretary)

Members:

Lynne Hunter, European Commission Delegation, Canberra

Fiona Machin, University of Melbourne

Katrina Stats, University of Melbourne

John Tinney, Swinburne University

Dr. Jürgen Tampke, University of New South Wales

Dr. Teresa Chataway, Griffith University

contemporary european studies association of australia

2003-4 Membership Application Form

I
Name: _____

Address:_____
_____
_____

Fax No.:_____

Telephone No.:_____

E-mail:_____

Date:_____

Please forward with membership fee (cheque or money order) payable to CESAA to:
    CESAA
    P.O. Box 2125,
    Hawthorn VIC 3122, Australia

Subscription Fees (Please circle.)

	1 year (to end 2004)	2 years (to end 2005)
Students/retired/unwaged	$30.00	$50.00
Individuals	$70.00	$120.00
Institutions	$150.00	$250.00

Membership includes subscription to CESAA E-News; the CESAA Review/Australian Journal of European Studies and the Asia Pacific Journal of EU Studies.

Please add $10.00 for overseas memberships to cover cost of mail.

Office use only

Received:_____Signed:_____

59

Notes

_____