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To be Advised

Australian Voices: Some Elite Reflections on the European Union¹

Philomena Murray

Australia and the EU: the context and the need for data

“Making Australia’s voice heard in Brussels is one of the most important diplomatic tasks we face.” (Prime Minister John Howard)²

It is a quarter of a century since a book was written on the Australian relationship with the EU (Miller, 1976). It was a quarter of a century since Prime Minister John Howard visited the EU, when he made his European trip in July 2002. Since the 1970s, the EU has metamorphosed into a world power. International rules of the game have changed - as seen in the attempt by Australia to deal with the EU in all its complexity. John Howard’s visit in 1977 had not been a success, as the recently-appointed Minister for Special Trade Negotiations with the European Community (EC). He had criticized the EC’s agricultural protectionism, receiving little positive feedback. He left Brussels with a very low opinion of the European integration project. One observer has suggested that “the net result was perhaps to win some brownie points with Australian farmers but certainly not to reduce trade barriers.”³ Howard’s opposition to Europe’s agricultural protectionism was to remain firm. In 1997, he stated, “I have spent a large part of my political life denigrating, quite rightly, with some passion, the rotten anti-Australian policies of the EU that have done such immense damage to the agricultural industries of Australia and represent one of the high water marks of world trading hypocrisy.”⁴ Shortly before his trip to Brussels, he stated in Parliament: John Howard in Parliament on 14 May 2002:

“Whenever you are criticising restrictive and anticompetitive agricultural policies, never exclude the European Union because the EU’s predatory trading behaviour is infinitely worse than that of other countries”.

It is certainly not uncommon to hear such criticisms of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). Yet a great deal has changed in the relationship between the European Union (EU) and Australia. The relationship has moved beyond the CAP as the central focus of dialogue. The linkages have broadened immeasurably. Australia now deals with the EU in a large number of multilateral arenas and on a large number of issues.

¹ This article draws on my conference presentations, “Australian views on Europe and the EU-Australia relationship: an assessment”, to European Union-Australia Relations Workshop, Contemporary Europe Research Centre/National Europe Centre, University of Melbourne, 9 July 2002; and “What Australians think about the EU: Elite Perceptions and the Current Context” to Conference on The EU in International Affairs, National Europe Centre, Canberra, 3-4 July 2002. I thank Karen Hussey for her research assistance on this project.

² Speech by Prime Minister John Howard, “Australia’s international relations - Ready for the future”, Address to the Menzies Research Centre, Canberra, 22 August 2001

³ Mike Steketee: Rigged rules protect rich, *The Australian*, 13 July 2002

⁴ Quoted in Paul Kelly, Let’s court the newest big player, *The Australian*, 24 June 1998.

Australia has attempted to come to terms with the development and alterations of the EU's international role and the development of the EU's competences in areas of trade and foreign policy, security and immigration. The development of a series of meetings at several levels and of dialogue between Australia and the EU point to a maturing of the relationship beyond agricultural concerns.

To what extent, then, is the EU understood by Australian elites at present? How have Australians understood and responded to the EU, a regionally integrated trading bloc with considerable influence on the international political economy and political decision-making? Australia has responded in a variety of ways. Although not involved in the Europe-Asia meetings (ASEM), it has been an important participant in the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC). Although Australia led the Cairns group in trenchant criticism of the CAP, it deals as a state rather than part of a region, with the EU. It thus engages in relations with the fifteen member states of the EU individually, on the one hand, in what can be termed Old Bilateralism (OB) and, on the other, with the EU as a distinct entity, in what can be termed New Bilateralism (NB) (Murray, 2002c). The nature of that relationship, with the EU, is not easily understood for many Australians, not least because it is difficult to define and understand the role of the EU. The *sui generis* nature of the EU's political and international role render it complex to understand. It is commonplace for Australian observers to refer to the complex and changing nature of the EU.

The Australian emphasis on the CAP diminished with the conclusion of the Uruguay Round of GATT. Yet, despite the signature of bilateral EU-Australia formal agreements on science and technology, wine and mutual recognition, difficulties are evident in the relationship. These are often compounded by the challenge to Australian government and other agencies to negotiate with the EU as an international actor.

Australia has recently urged that there be a review of the most important declaration signed by the EU with Australia, namely the Political Declaration of 1997, itself the subject of considerable controversy. There has also been a need to analyse the perceptions of government and non-government actors who interact with the EU. To this end, a survey questionnaire designed to elicit these perspectives was designed and administered nationally in Australia. The survey, whose major findings are presented in this article, was carried out in 2001-2 and constitutes an attempt to redress the lack of data on elite perceptions to date. There has been a renewed interest in the EU-Australia linkage in recent years (Benvenuti, 1998; 1998-99; 1999; Murray, 1997; Murray, 2002a; Papadakis, 2002), although this has not been accompanied by public debate. Themes of contemporary accounts have been the emphasis by the Australian policymaking community on bilateral relationships with individual member states, especially the UK and the focus on the CAP. Criticism has been evident in some literature of Australian governments neglect of opportunities in the EU. The need to adapt to the EU's complexity and the need to overcome intransigent memories also feature (Elijah et al 2000, 2002; Groom, 1989; Murray, 1999, 2000, 2002a, 2002b; Papadakis, 2002).

Considerable international transformations have taken place since the first Howard visit to Brussels. There has been a significant sea change in attitudes to Europe and

more importantly a significant and massive increase in Australian trade with and investment with Europe. The political relationship is also improving. More analysis of the EU-Australia relationship is needed, particularly for Australia, which has been described as “a nation whose memory is in Europe, body is in Asia, conscience is in the Pacific and hip-pocket is in the US”⁵. It therefore seemed evident that this new study of perceptions was needed – a study that may also have implications for other parts of the world.

The Australia-European relationship is increasingly important, based on a burgeoning trade and investment relationship - a relationship that could be further consolidated by increased links in new areas of investment and trade and politics, as well as the targeting of more European markets. This article attempts to understand perceptions of issues, relating in particular to two - how does Australia make its voice heard in Europe and how should Australia deal with the EU?

Until recently, Australia’s interest in the EU was primarily CAP-focused, largely UK-influenced, and based on bilateral state-to-state relations, with little overt acknowledgment of the importance of the EU as a regional international actor. The continued reliance on the Old Bilateralism of traditional trade, diplomatic, cultural and social links with individual member states of the EU had impeded adequate recognition of the EU as a major international interlocutor. Thus although the EU was under attack for its supranational CAP, there was little understanding of other aspects of EU supranationalism, and of the merged competences in specific areas. The Single Market of the EU means that relevant policies and documents are determined at the EU level. The EU’s Common Commercial Policy and Common External Tariff are also set at the EU level of decision-making. It is important that Australia reposition from an old relationship based on individual linkages with the EU states to a new form of bilateral relations with the European Union and its institutions, which would also encompass those states.

The traditional, realist state-to-state way of thinking about diplomacy and markets is no longer relevant in dealing with the EU. This is not to state that the member states are not relevant – indeed, in the trade context, while the EU is a Single Market, it is not, for example, a single exporter. Rather, it is both useful and advantageous for Australia to acknowledge the central political, economic and judicial influence of EU policies. This move away from traditional perceptions was evident in the replies to the open questions of the Survey administered in Australia – for example respondents stressed the need for recognition of the EU as an international actor; the role of EU law; the international impact of the EU as an economic entity and Single Market; the extensive impact of the Euro, and the need to adapt to supranational and merged competences in policymaking and decision-making structures and outcomes.

As Australia considers its regional future - or futures-, it must move from a 20th century colonialist and realist perception of “Old Europe” to a post-Cold War, post-colonialist, New Bilateralist understanding of interdependence and new regimes with the “New Europe”. This encompasses bilateral and multilateral negotiations in its

⁵ Prof Ken Wiltshire, AO, Australian representative, UNESCO, quoted in The Bulletin, Dec 10 200-Jan 2 2001, p.45

advancement of state interests in the world marketplace and in international governance. It engages in trade and politics, combining on the one hand, tradition, history and heritage and, on the other, new forms of dialogue and new norms of governance. It is called upon to move decisively from a tradition influenced by British history to a recognition of the advantages of a closer pan-European connection. The new relationship with Europe requires a shift from a primarily bilateral realist state-to-state linkage to a combination of multilateralism and a bilateralism with the EU as a bloc.

It is not only in the survey that there is an understanding of a shift from traditional bilateral state-to-state relationship. This is manifest in the deepening of some aspects of EU-Australian diplomatic relations in recent years. There is evidence of increased attention to the substantial opportunities available to Australia – in trade, investment, government and community links - in a new Australian connection with Europe. This can be conceptualized as a transitional phase – or situation of liminality - from an old relationship based on individual linkages with the EU states (Old Bilateralism), to a new form of bilateral relations with the European Union and its institutions and states (NB). The New Bilateralism encompasses bilateral and multilateral negotiations in its advancement of state interests in the world marketplace and in international governance.

There has been renewed scrutiny of the Australia-EU relationship recently for a number of reasons. The failure of the negotiations on a wide-ranging framework Agreement between Australia and the EU; the opposition Labor party intention to renegotiate the Framework Agreement; the common interest in Asia; the renewed interest in the EU-Australia relationship after the Australian visits of European Commissioners Christopher Patten and Pascal Lamy in 2001 and 2002 and the Brussels visit by Prime Minister Howard, all prompted a need for a reassessment of the relationship and the need to connect with the European Union. There are tensions, friction and differences of priorities on many issues. What is it that strengthens and what undermines the relationship? What is the nature of current cooperation and what kind of future cooperation is possible?

The Survey and Methodology

The survey was developed to investigate elite perceptions of the relationship of Australia with the EU. This is the first survey on this issue in Australia that targeted a wide range of analysts and top decision-makers and stakeholders.⁶ Over 650 surveys were sent out for written response and 133 received - a response rate of 21%. The survey method adopted involved written replies to a standard questionnaire. The data

⁶ The list of recipients was drawn up from a smaller survey carried out by the author in 1998-9; companies profiled in the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) 2001 publication *ExportEU*; all contactable Australian members of the European Commission's EU Visitors Program, members of Australian parliamentary delegations to the EU; officials in government departments; government ministers; banks; insurance companies; all major exporters; alcohol exporters; mining companies; meat and cattle exporters; members of the Global Foundation; law firms dealing with Europe; members of Australian Business in Europe; Austrade, DFAT; Department of Education, Science and Technology; Australian Bureau of Agricultural Resource Economics; Chambers of Commerce; consultancy firms; the media; academics involved in research on Australian trade, investment, economics, politics and law and European studies and some members of the Contemporary European Studies Association of Australia.

were entered into a Statistical Packages for the Social Sciences (SPSS) file and analysed using descriptive statistical techniques. The respondent group was eight broad groupings - academic; business; trade/investment promotion; government advisor; parliamentary delegation; diplomat; media and other. These were further aggregated into three or four groupings, as appropriate, to facilitate the understanding of differences and variations across responses to different questions.

The survey first identified respondents by type and professional and personal links with countries of the EU. It then asked questions regarding respondents' assessment of the importance, the state and the significance of the overall trading, investment and agricultural trading links between Australia and the EU. The next series of questions dealt with specific Australia-EU new bilateral agreements: the Mutual Recognition Agreement; Science and Technology; Wine; nuclear material; and the Joint Declaration of 1997. A further set of questions addressed the implications of EU initiatives for Australia, such as the Euro and the closer cooperation among the member states of the EU. The survey also addressed assessments of the Single Market. The respondents were then asked to consider whether it was necessary to promote closer links between Australia and the EU and in which areas they might support closer cooperation. There was provision for open questions and the final question asked: "In your opinion, what issues should be kept in mind when formulating Australian policy towards the EU?"

Findings

There were disparities of views among different types of respondents (eg. Government and academics, traders and businesses) regarding their assessments of the state of the relationship, as well as the importance of the relationship between Australia and the EU. Government-related respondents were more positive about the state of the relationship than non-government respondents. While most respondents see the relationship as important, they are not all satisfied with it and this satisfaction level varies by respondent group, as seen below.


Among these elite respondents, it was evident that there was considerable evidence of sophisticated knowledge of the EU, especially regarding the Euro, individual EU-Australia agreements (in particular the very successful Wine Agreement) and aspects of the Single Market and market access. Knowledge was evident in the increased awareness and good general comprehension of the various agreements compared to a smaller study carried out in 1998-9. This is not to state that overall assessments were positive. There were trenchant critiques of both interlocutors, the EU and Australia. The survey revealed many examples of criticisms of both past and current Australian government policy. This tended to question successive governments' and business emphasis on engagement within the Asia Pacific region. There was considerable dissatisfaction with the perceived emphasis on the relationship with the UK, although a minority of respondents expressed the view that the UK understands Australia best, of all the EU member states. There was considerable condemnation of the government's focus on the CAP.

The EU also came in for condemnation and criticism of the EU, focussed on CAP protectionism and the limitations of certain market access. Some respondents presented a perception of the EU as being almost exclusively concentrated on its

internal affairs and largely uninterested in other parts of the world. The comment was made that the EU is not interested in Australia.


There was considerable concordance of opinion among respondents regarding the need to develop the relationship beyond the CAP and to be wider in scope. Certainly, there has been an extensive broadening of the relationship and the issues on agendas has also been reflected in the Ministerial consultations since the Political Declaration of 1997. The completion of the GATT Uruguay Round has also removed a degree of the friction regarding agriculture (Elijah et al, 2002).

Figure 1: Importance and state of the Australia-EU relationship:




Respondents were asked to assess the state of the relationship and the importance of the relationship. Figure 1 illustrates that there is a considerable divergence between assessments of the relationship as important and those who consider the relationship to be in good shape. While 78% considered the relationship to be important, only 37% considered that the state of the Australia-EU relationship was good. 7% saw the state of the relationship as poor and 56% as fair. This assessment of the relationship as important is not reflected in the assessment of the current state of the relationship, which has less positive feedback from respondents. 78% saw the relationship as of high importance, 20% as of medium importance and 2% as of low importance

Figure 2



While all respondents see the relationship as **important**, business and government respondents are the two groups most likely to see it as important (see Figure 2). Academics accord less importance to this relationship than do these actors. However, when asked to assess the **state** of the relationship, all groups are considerably less positive than they are about its importance. Interestingly, the gap between their view of its importance and their view of its state is largest among business respondents and smallest among government respondents. In fact the gap between perception of its importance and perception of its state is over 50% for business respondents, but only just over 20% for government respondents, as seen in Figure 2. There is a 20% disparity between business assessment of the relationship as being in a good state and government respondents who assess it as good. Figure 3 illustrates this disparity.

Figure 3



Replies to the questions regarding the assessment of different aspects of the relationship are presented in Figure 4. Respondents were asked to consider the state of the agricultural trade links; EU-Australia investment links and overall trade links between Australia and the EU. Given the history of friction between Australia and the EU concerning the CAP and Australia's difficulty in exporting cattle, for example to the EU, it is not surprising that the agricultural trading relationship is rated as being less positive than the trading and investment links: 39% of the respondents assess the agricultural trade links as poor and 64% as fair and only 4.8% as good. It is therefore not surprising that an Australian press report during Prime Minister Howard's visit to Brussels stated:


“Brussels bureaucrats have released a half-baked plan to reform the notoriously bloated system of agricultural subsidies that is the Common Agricultural Policy of the European Union. John Howard was therefore right to respond cautiously.”⁷

Certainly, the CAP is still a major source of dissatisfaction, somewhat caricatured by Sharpston recently:

“The EU's agricultural market consists of butter mountains, wine and milk lakes and olive oil pools, surrounded by happy, lazy, over-subsidised EU farmers who are kept in idle luxury by the EU's policy of keeping all agricultural produce from third countries including Australia. It's unfair, it's pure protectionism and it's wholly unjustified. Thus might run a Southern hemisphere view of EU agriculture: but is it right?” (Sharpston, 2002, 29)


⁷ The Australian, Editorial: EU addiction to subsidies not cured yet, 15 July 2002

Figure 4



Survey respondents were asked if they considered that it was necessary to promote closer links between Australia and the EU. They were asked in which areas they would support the establishment of closer links and were provided a list of areas, to which multiple replies were allowed. Figure 5, which follows, presented the replies regarding future cooperation, with trade, business and research and development featuring most often in preferences. High percentages were evident in the multiple-response replies. 87% support the establishment of closer trade links; 85% supported closer business networks, and 83% supported increased educational agreements and exchanges. 81% of respondents supported closer Science and Technology/Research & Development linkages. 68% were in favour of increased cultural linkages; 67% of increased government links; 66% supported environmental links; 59% on immigration; 51% increased cooperation on health; 51% increased cooperation on human rights issues; 51% on media exchanges; 48% on international aid; 45% on police and legal services; 44% on security and 41% on sport. These areas of cooperation increasingly appear on the agendas of dialogue between the European Commission and Australian government, particularly in recent ministerial consultations, where market access, consumer agreement, veterinary agreement, Science and technology, wine, consumer agreements, mutual recognition, education, immigration and justice and home affairs issues and broad policy issues have featured.

Figure 5



Australian Voices on Europe and Australian Voices in Europe

While it is recognised that the number of respondents was relatively small, it is nevertheless worthy of analysis as the wealth of comment and assessment provided is the first of its kind in Australia. Despite Groom's gloomy pronouncement of elite amnesia regarding the EU in 1989, the survey brings to light significant elite understanding of the EU and its context. There is some dissatisfaction with what is perceived as a lack of willingness by Australian policymakers to understand New Bilateralism, particularly the possibility of increased and formalised linkages with the institutions of the EU. Some respondents perceive a lack of understanding of the EU in Australia and a lack of adequate education in Australia about the EU. A number of respondents see the need to express Australia's voice in Europe through increased engagement with the EU in Australia's policymaking circles and business groups. The difficulty in getting Australia's voice heard in Brussels was expressed by some respondents, some suggesting a lack of EU engagement with Australia, due to its interest in other issues.

Respondents see Australia expressing its voice in Brussels, in the New Bilateralism, with the development of an Australian diplomatic representation in Brussels to the EU and the fact that increased numbers of staff are posted to it. This voice is expressed by the increased interaction with the officials of the European Commission by Australian negotiators in Brussels.

Some respondents were in favour of having Australia's voice heard in the Old Bilateral fora also. The EU must not, for some, weaken Australia's traditional

relationships with the individual nation states of the EU – there was unmistakable nostalgia in some responses, as well as comments that the UK understands Australia best of all the EU member states and that Australia still deals best with the UK.

Making Australian Voices Heard: The Future

Respondents were asked “In your opinion, what issues should be kept in mind when formulating Australian policy relating to the EU?” and this gave rise to a wide range of responses. It was suggested that there should be more use of Australian multicultural/ethnic communities to help promote Australia goods in the EU, while others called for increased education and knowledge of the EU. There was also a call for increased attempts to have Australia’s voice heard in the EU, combined with efforts to promote European awareness of Australia. Increased institutional cooperation at government, political, parliamentary and official levels were called for, as well as intensified interaction on trade and investment and diversification of traditional trade links. Some respondents proposed increased interaction with two pillars of the EU, namely Common Foreign and Security Policy and Justice and Home Affairs, substantiating this with a recognition of common old and new security concerns, such as regional security and dialogue on immigration. Further, enhanced collaboration was suggested on issues of education, social concerns, aid, culture and the environment.

Difficulties in getting Australia’s voice heard were expressed in the understanding of the EU as a Fortress Europe, as internally focussed and denying adequate market access; as being protectionist on agriculture and continuing non-tariff barriers to trade. It is also difficult to have one’s voice heard if the interlocutor appears monolithic and over-complex at times. Many respondents referred to the EU’s complexity, opaque policymaking environment and convoluted regulations and legislation (Murray, forthcoming, 2003).

Finally, it is worth quoting some of the replies to this question regarding what should be kept in mind in framing Australian policy towards the EU:

The perception of the EU as a new international actor is evident in replies such as:

“In formulating its policies towards the EU, Australia should understand that the EU is an emerging polity and that existing bilateral relations with individual member states need to be supplemented by effective engagement with the EU as a regional and global entity”.

While the following respondent also holds this perception, there is also awareness of market access difficulties:

“The EU is a large, powerful, sophisticated entity. Australia must keep trying to increase market access but must be subtle and understand the political difficulties”

Several respondents lamented the fact that Australia did not sign the proposed Framework Agreement with the EU in 1997, as seen in comments that Australia’s “failure to sign the Framework Agreement was a grievous error which should be

remedied as soon as possible” and that this “was the single biggest mistake that Australian has made in its relationship with the EU, just as things were starting to improve over the farm subsidies issue”. Another stated: “Most other small countries in the world are desperate to achieve such an agreement with what is the world’s largest trading block. The Australian government threw away that opportunity, in the absurd fear that it would mean the EU would criticize Australia over its policies on aborigines (because of the standard human rights clause in all EU agreements).”

There remains some concern about the reliance on the UK as a major export market within the EU, as seen in the following comments:

“Viewed objectively, Australia’s heavy dependence on the UK trade and investment connection is grotesque; in size, Germany, France and Italy are all comparable markets with the UK, yet we have made relatively poor inroads there.”

“The EU is not just the UK”.

The need to harness old bilateralism with new bilateralism can be seen in responses regarding issues to be kept in mind in policy-making such as:

“Maintaining and enhancing the individual bilateral relationships alongside strengthened connections with EU institutions.”

“Balance between bilateral relations and relations with EU as a whole.”

In 1989, Groom perceived a collective amnesia among Australia’s otherwise well-informed elites regarding the European Community. That perception is still evident in replies such as:

“Australia and the EU have much to learn from each other in many areas of governance, public policy, business and civil society. Australians have limited knowledge and understanding of the nature and extent of European integration, except for a well-informed small minority”

“Limited knowledge in the Australian public about the EU as a whole and the non-British member states of the EU, their cultural identities, political systems, and specific interests in Australia and the Pacific.”

Another respondent called for understanding of the “transfer of competencies to EU level and recognition of the “evolving role of EU – and its increasing importance as a foreign policy actor”.

Conclusions

This survey reveals a growing understanding of the EU. Although criticisms of the CAP persist, there is a clear recognition of the development of broader policy agendas. Australia’s voice should not be heard only regarding the CAP or the UK. Further, given that the EU is a new type of regionalism, it is clear that it is difficult for many in Australia to come to terms with it. Successive Australian governments and negotiators are attempting to deal with what they perceive as a constantly shifting scenario, with changing boundaries. At the same time, it is tempting to cling to Old Bilateralism, the bilateral relations with individual member states, as these are more

predictable and there is a plethora of established bilateral agreements, some from the 19th century. The familiar is appealing – and safer than attempting to understand this ever-changing regional integrated body. The appeal of the OB is that its parameters are understood. As it appears that there is insufficient clarity about the EU's developing role, it is tempting for Australian negotiators to continue to accord primacy to the bilateral relationships, which both predate, and go beyond, EU issues, encompassing political, security, strategic, trade and investment issues. It is worthy of comment that government ministers and traders may well feel more comfortable with the Old Bilateralism. Yet, as Australia attempts to deal with this powerful regional trading entity, developing negotiating strategies, its relationships with the EU member states have also been transformed, to a degree.

There are still elements of collective amnesia of elites in the attitude of Australia to the EU (Groom, 1989, Murray, 2000) as well as intransigent memories regarding agriculture and the UK "betrayal". There is also a perception of a relative amnesia in the attitude of the EU towards Australia. It is true that the relationship has broadened in both policy scope and formalised agreements in recent years. There is still scope for increased cooperation and this survey has revealed that making Australia's voice heard in the EU is a challenging task but also an important and valuable one.

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Has the EU rescued the nation state? Ian Davidoff

In his contentious work, *The European Rescue of the Nation State*, revisionist historian Alan S. Milward, raises searing questions about the *contemporary* role of nation states in Western Europe.¹ Milward's unorthodox argument is that the purpose of the European Community policies was not to supersede, but rather to *reinforce* the nation state; and moreover, that they have succeeded in doing so. "Both the nation state and integration", Milward writes sardonically, "*appear* as fortunate accidents of the time, fundamentally contradictory tendencies, which nevertheless in promoting economic growth, fortuitously complimented one another."²

Milward's argument taps into a divisive debate of immense importance. The question of the EU and its relationship to the nation state has become a virtual screen onto which European analysts project their attitude towards not only the state but also the European project as a whole. Federalists, favouring the so-called 'pooling of sovereignty' of the constituent EU states, typically interpret the role of the nation state as being subordinated to that of EU structures and dictates. Those who argue that integration has served to *strengthen* the role of nation state, on the other hand, include not only revisionist historians, but not surprisingly, also intergovernmentalists and neo-realists.³ Adding complexity to this normative obfuscation of the debate is the growing body of deductive literature, grounded in international political economy, which engages with the broader question of how *globalisation* is impacting on the nation state in *general*. At the tip of *this* iceberg, one finds works no less than Susan Strange's seminal treatise, *The Retreat of the State*—to say nothing of its many detractors.⁴

Thus, whether the EU *has* rescued the nation state—or, has in fact, done the opposite—is inherently a barbed question to answer. Pointedness, at least in this instance however, does not translate to difficulty. For it would seem that the process of European integration has had something of a countervailing effect on the European nation state. While, on one hand, integration has significantly undermined the state's rational-based autonomy—its ability to deliver security and prosperity to its

¹ A. Milward, *The European Rescue of the Nation State*, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1993.

² *Ibid*, p.24. Italics added. That Milward's remarks are said tongue in cheek is confirmed by his *express* statement that the "process of integration was *deliberately* conceived and developed to preserve the nation states"; A. Milward, 'Allegiance: The Past and the Future', *Journal of European Integration History*, Vol.1, No.1 (1995), p.11.

³ This useful outline of the debate is borrowed from P. Murray, 'The European Transformation of the Nation State' in P. Murray and L. Holmes, (eds), *Europe: Rethinking the Boundaries*, Ashgate, Sydney, 1998, p.44.

⁴ S. Strange, *The retreat of the state: the diffusion of power in the world economy*, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1996; Cf, for example, L. Weiss, *The Myth of the Powerless State: Governing the Economy in a Global Era*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1998.

citizens—on the other, it has vested it with a new and critical role of piping power through to supra and sub-national agencies of government.

Before beginning the analysis proper, there is a prior need for definitional elaboration. What exactly is meant by ‘the nation state’ and similarly how are we to understand the ‘process of integration’? Without delving into the many nuanced debates that surround its exact function, the state can be best defined narrowly as a “distinct set of political institutions whose specific concern is the organisation of affairs...within a defined territory.”⁵ From such a definition (indeed, *any* definition), the limitations that inherently beset any analysis of the effect of European integration on *the* European nation state is manifest: namely, that owing to the fact that each nation state in the EU “differs according to size, population, economy, growth rates, democratic experience and model of government”, for example, the process of integration has *not* had precisely the same effect on all member states.⁶

As for understanding the process of integration, here it is difficult to go passed the work of Karl Deutsch. Writing over forty years ago, Deutsch proffered that “there is apt to be confusion about the term ‘integration’”—most notably between the deliberate political process of institution-building which constitutes formal integration, and the largely undirected process of economic and social interaction which constitutes informal integration.⁷ Far from creating ‘confusion’ however, for our purposes Deutsch’s delineation of the formal and informal aspects of integration serves to provide us with an apt, working definition of EU integration: that is, as simultaneous and interdependent processes of political institution building and of economic and social development.

With this limited understanding of the nation state and the integration process in mind, it is possible to map out how the *de jure* autonomy and legitimacy of the ‘average’ European state has been corralled by the process of integration. While, as will be shown, European states remain the key practitioners of government in that they legitimate and distribute power to other levels of government, with the deepening of integration they have nevertheless experienced a concomitant decline in their “rational” sovereignty.⁸ In particular, the decline in the salience of war and the restriction of the scope of national economic management—both directly and purposefully attributable to the EU project—have significantly weakened the bond that once tied European citizens to the their respective nation states and vice-versa.

Although there can be no gainsaying the fact that the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) instituted at the Maastricht inter-governmental conference (IGC) has thus far been an abject failure, there *is* significant truth to the fact that, as a result of

⁵ This useful definition comes from M.Teichmann (ed), *The Macmillan Dictionary of Politics*, (Fourth Edition), Macmillan, Melbourne, 1992, p.191.

⁶ Murray, *The European Transformation of the Nation State*, p. 49.

⁷ K. Deutsch *et.al*, *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1957, p.2.

⁸ The adjective ‘rational’ is borrowed from William Wallace who makes a distinction between that state’s rational legitimacy (which is the focus of the ensuing discussion) and what he terms “ideological legitimacy”, which he explains as identification with the ‘personification’ of the nation. W.Wallace, ‘Rescue or Retreat? The Nation State in Europe, 1945-93’, in P.Gowan and P.Anderson (eds), *the Question of Europe*, Veso, London, 1997, p.32.

integration, national politics in European countries is far less driven by the “hot” matters of war and peace.⁹ Some analysts, Mearsheimer chief among them, attribute Europe’s ‘long peace’ to the East-West confrontation, arguing that with the end of the Cold War “the stability of the past 45 years is not likely to be seen again in the coming decades”.¹⁰ Such foreboding, however, critically overlooks the fact that the European project had its very roots in a desire for the cessation of violent intercontinental hostilities; and moreover, that this cessation has been purposefully achieved through the ever-growing national economic interdependence among EU member states.¹¹ Increased economic interdependence has not only greatly increased the potential fallout from war, it has also functionally restricted its exercise.¹² Indeed, “it was no coincidence” that the efforts towards European cooperation began with the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC).¹³ Evidently, it was assumed that if these two commodities—both so central to war making—were brought under joint control, it would be “extremely difficult” for those countries involved to fight each other in the future.¹⁴

For the nation state, what this “unprecedented change” in its international relations has meant, is that its functional salience has inevitably been diluted.¹⁵ When citizens are faced with the prospects of real war—enemies, invaders, conquerors etc—they need their fellow citizens, and above that, their state. With its monopoly over the legitimate means of violence in a given territory, the modern state can claim “great legitimacy” if attacked, thereby rousing its citizens to a degree of commitment and common effort.¹⁶ Equally, if these legitimations are removed, with them goes a central support for the state's claims to sovereignty. And while it may be true that the grip of terrorism under which the Western world now finds itself post-September 11 will result in more ‘protectorate’ demands being made on nation states, it does not mean that Europe’s nation states will need, or be able, to demand the solidarity and mobilisation of state violence necessary for the effective pursuit of ‘total war’.

If the EU’s fostering of peaceful, quasi-civil coexistence between its member states has thus greatly undermined their primacy, the restrictions that integration has placed on the state’s ability to autonomously manage the economy poses an even more portentous threat to its *de jure* legitimacy. It has been shown that the necessity of the state as a public good arose not so much from the logic of territorial sovereignty, as

⁹ This concept of cool and hot politics is expanded upon in G. Mulgan, *Politics in an Anti-Political Age*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1994.

¹⁰ J. Mearsheimer, ‘Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War,’ *International Security*, Vol.15, No.1 (Summer 1990), p.56.

¹¹ Murray, *The European Transformation of the Nation State*, p. 47.

¹² On the former point see R. Jervis, ‘The Future of World Politics: Will it Resemble the Past?’, *International Security*, Vol.16, No.3, (Winter 1991/92), pp.39-73.

¹³ N.Gleditsch, ‘Democracy and the Future of the European Peace’, *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol.1 No.4, (1995), p.547.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ H.Hinsley, ‘The European Community: a body politic or an association of states,’ *The World Today*, Vol.45, No.4, 1989, p.4.

¹⁶ P.Hirst and G. Thompson, *Globalisation in Question*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1996, p.179.

from the need to manage the market economy.¹⁷ Capitalism could not function properly without an overarching political framework, and hence, with its development, the state increasingly functioned less as a private prerequisite of the powerful and more as an agent of the public. Together with functioning as “a shield against economic insecurity”, correcting the tendency of the market economies to cyclical booms and slumps has been a major responsibility assigned to the state, and one accepted from the 1930s onwards by governments of all developed countries.¹⁸

Given this state of affairs, Wallace’s astute assessment that “national economies no longer control national economies in Western Europe” has grave implications for the nation state’s accepted rational authority.¹⁹ Whereas advanced *non-European* states bemoan a situation whereby markets over which they were once masters, now effectively govern them, EU nation states have additionally transferred even nominal control of the levers of national economic management to the Union level. The integration of the global economy, especially of financial markets and multinational production networks, has irreversibly undermined the autonomy of *all* developed states, forcing them to adhere to policies of ‘sound finance’ (low inflation and sustainable debt repayment), while at the same time acting as an almost-binding “incentive to openness and an even greater deterrent to a defensive strategy.”²⁰ To the extent that the EU is a functionary of global economic integration, the European project has even *thus* served to undermine the autonomy of the European nation state. What is more however, is that in the context of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), EU states have also had to cede control over monetary policy manipulation to the European Central Bank, while simultaneously foregoing effective command over their own fiscal policies. The strict convergence criteria for monetary union laid out in Article 104c of the Maastricht Treaty enjoins member states to avoid excessive government deficits, and requires the Commission to “monitor...the stock of government debt in the member states with a view to identifying gross errors.”²¹ Paragraph 11 of the same article, meanwhile, even gives the Council of Economics and Finance Ministers the power to require member states with an excessive government deficit “to make a non-interest bearing deposit of an appropriate size...until the excessive debt has, in the view of the Council, been corrected.”²²

While in terms of its core functions, there can be little doubt that the European nation state has thus been rendered relatively impotent by EU integration, the process has certainly not eclipsed the nation state altogether. In their seminal work on globalisation, Hirst and Thompson convincingly argue that while the “state’s capacities for governance have changed and in many respects...have weakened considerably, it remains a pivotal institution, especially in terms of creating the

¹⁷ See, for example, J. Camilleri and J. Falk, *The End of Sovereignty? The Politics of a Shrinking and Fragmenting World*, Edward Elgar, London, 1992, pp.25-26; and Strange, *The retreat of the state*, p.xii.

¹⁸ Strange, *The retreat of the state*, p.75.

¹⁹ Wallace, ‘Retreat or Rescue?’, pp. 37-38.

²⁰ R.Cox, *Production, Power and World Order: Social Forces in the Making of History*, Colombia University Press, New York, 1987, p.305

²¹ Quoted in G. Majone, ‘From the Positive to the Regulatory State: Causes and Consequences of Changes in the Mode of Governance,’ *Journal of Public Policy*, Vol.17, No.2, (1997), p.142.

²² *Ibid.*

conditions for effective international governance.” The central function of the nation state, the pair submit, will become those of providing legitimacy for and ensuring the accountability of supranational and subnational government mechanisms.²³ And because it is the most ambitious and advanced project of international governance in the modern world, it is within the context of the EU that the nation state’s pivotal “suturing” role is similarly most precocious and discernible.²⁴

The European nation state’s centrality in the process of suturing power upwards to the international level is most strikingly witnessed by its transfer of regulatory functions upwards to the EU institutions, especially in the context of basal change. Here Murray’s depiction of the European state as evolving from a nation state to a member state within the EU is perceptibly to the fore.²⁵ It is the *member* states which define the future structure of the Union. New EU actions brought about under Article 235 of the EEC Treaty, as well as new policies and changes brought about by IGCs (such as Maastricht and Nice) are wholly reliant on the support of the member states for their realisation. The decision to render a specific domain of governance—be it economic, social, or otherwise—supranational, must ultimately be a joint decision of the member states in the Council or European Council.²⁶ Without such explicit suturing the EU would either cease to exist—or, at best, vital capacities for control would be lost, as there would emerge sizeable gaps in governance and the division of labour regulation.

In terms of *downward* suturing, integration has necessarily invested the European member state with the critical task of “constructing a *political* basis of consent for the macroeconomic policies of the Community.”²⁷ Only at the *national* level can effective societal coalitions be built, in the form of broad-brush agreements between the major social actors stipulating the sharing of, and conditions necessary for economic success. The state’s orchestration of cooperation between the old ‘social partners’ leads to a significant degree of national consensus, which in turn, underpins its ability to take maximal advantage of potential and actual European-level macro-economic agreements on its citizens’ behalf. Not surprisingly, then, as we have witnessed the Single European Market and monetary unification, so too have we seen a “renaissance of [state-driven] corporatism” across Europe, whereby the German state has been contemporarily branded “the architect of a corporatist order” and, equally, corporatism “the dominant figuration in Dutch industrial relations.”²⁸

Finally, the European state now also has renewed salience as the locus of power and management supporting increasingly-important regional levels of government. There is a growing empirical literature identifying the general importance of regional

²³ Hirst and Thompson, *Globalisation in Question*, p. 171

²⁴ *Ibid.* p.184.

²⁵ Murray, *The European Transformation of the Nation State*, p. 45.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 50.

²⁷ Hirst and Thompson, *Globalisation in Question*, p.158. Italics in original

²⁸ J. Grote and P.Schmitter, ‘The Renaissance of National Corporatism: unintended side-effect of Monteray Union or calculated response to the absence of European Social Policy’, *Transfer*, Vol.1-2, (1999), pp.34-63; G.Lehmbruch, ‘Der Beitrag der Korporatismusforschung zur Entwicklung der Steuerungstheorie,’ *Politische Vierteljahresschrift*, Vol.37, No.4 (1996), p.741 cited in Grote and Schmitter, ‘The Renaissance’, p.48; J.Visser, ‘Two Cheers for Corporatism, One for the Market: Industrial Relations, Unions, and Labour Markets in the Netherlands,’ *British Journal of Industrial Relations*, Vol.35, No.2, (1997), p.392.

government to national economic prosperity. Owing in part to the internationalisation of markets in manufacturing goods, industry is increasingly converging on regional centres, and because they have exclusive access to local knowledge and information, it is argued that it is *regional* governments which are best placed to assess and meet the needs of industry.²⁹ In the *European* context, moreover, the centralisation of the EU is serving to even further promote the importance of effective regional government—this being evidenced by the growth of regional provision of education and training, industrial finance and other services for industry.³⁰ And why this rise in regionalism is of such significance for the European nation state, is because it is *they* who provide both domestic constitutional framework and policy support (mainly in the form of fiscal resources) for lower tiers of government. And as Hirst and Thompson rightly point out, those nation states, such as Germany, which provide regional governments with the greatest support—most notably (and paradoxically) often in the form of granting them relative functional autonomy—are also “the most successful national economies” in Europe.³¹

For the European nation state, EU integration represents something of a double-edged sword. The state’s two most important core roles have been the defence of national territorial sovereignty and the preservation of internal order through the management of the capitalist system, and yet it is precisely these elements of European statehood which have been brought into question by the deepening of integration. The growing level of interdependence among EU member states has greatly reduced the likelihood that any of these countries will resort to aggression as a means of solving a perceived problem, and equally, integrated product markets, and more immediately, economic and monetary integration within the Union, are eroding the very foundation of the ‘managerial’ state. At the same time, however, by lengthening the chain of governance, as it were, integration has conferred critical new ‘suturing’ roles onto the European state; roles which, in fact, represent the very functional sinews of integration. At this crucial point, however, it is necessary to issue a caveat. While Milward’s contention *vis-a-vis* the European *rescue* of the nation state, as *he* intended it, thus seems spurious, it may still hold on comparative grounds. After all, amidst the frequent and well-noted impotence of the western nation state in the face of recent changes in the international political economy, at least the European version now has its central suturing roles to sustain it.

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²⁹ See, for example, J. Rees, G.Hewings and H.Stafford (eds), *Industrial Location and Regional Systems: Spatial Organisation in the Economic Sector*, Bergin, Brooklyn, 1991; and J.Zeilin, ‘Industrial Districts and Local Economic Regeneration’ in F.Pyke and W.Sengenberger (eds), *Industrial Districts and Local Economic Regeneration*, International Institute of Labour Studies (ILO), Geneva, 1992.

³⁰ See L.C., Budd, ‘European Regional Distribution Coalitions in a Global-Local Environment’, *Current Politics and Economics of Europe*, Vol.4, No.2 (1994), pp.17-38.

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Student Essay**'New' Labour might be New – but Is It Really 'Labour'?**
Daniel Perkins**Introduction**

The election of Tony Blair's British Labour Party to government in the spring of 1997 heralded a sea-change in the United Kingdom's political culture on a number of levels. Firstly, it marked the conclusion of an extraordinary 18 unbroken years in power for the Conservative Party, an era that, while it may have concluded under the leadership of John Major, will always be synonymous with the revolutionary (and divisive) reign of Margaret Thatcher. But of no less importance, it signaled the internal entrenchment and popular legitimation of a new guiding philosophy for the Labour Party: that of 'New Labour'.

This paper seeks to critically analyse the essence of New Labour at the levels of its underpinning ideology and political program, and demonstrate that whilst on a superficial level the party is indeed a fundamentally different one to 'Old Labour', closer examination of its policies reveals that rather than possessing a truly 'new' ideology, the Labour Party is more often than not merely recycling versions of Conservative Party philosophy, representing what has been termed by some as the neo-liberal consensus of British politics.³²

Sowing the Seeds of New Labour: British Political Culture, Thatcherism and the Breakdown of the Post-War Keynesian Consensus

To understand the repositioning of the British Labour Party as 'New Labour', it is important to have an understanding of its historical, political and cultural context in the British polity. Britain's origins as a social democratic welfare state were established in the period immediately after World War II with the development of the 'Keynesian social contract',³³ which was to assist in the rebuilding of British social and economic life in the aftermath of the ravages of war and economic depression. This economic model mandated redistributive taxation policies, the collective provision of social services and resources and some government intervention into the economy in order to provide for full employment and wage growth.³⁴ And whilst there was a degree of party-political conflict over the exact policy settings of the British economy over this period, the social democratic welfare state as a model of economic and social organisation enjoyed a broad degree of bipartisan support.³⁵

³² Colin Crouch, 'The Terms of the Neo-Liberal Consensus' in *Political Quarterly*, Vol 68, 1997 and Colin Hay, 'Blairism: Towards a One-Vision Polity?' in *Political Quarterly*, Vol 68, 1997.

³³ Jeffrey C Isaac, 'The Road (Not?) Taken: Anthony Giddens, the Third Way, and the Future of Social Democracy' in *Dissent*, Vol 48, No 2, Spring 2001.

³⁴ See, eg, Tariq Ali, 'The Blair Kitsch Project' in *Monthly Review*, Vol 51, No 8, January 2000; Crouch, *op cit*, p 352 and Hay, *op cit*.

³⁵ Crouch, *op cit*, p 352 and Hay, *op cit*, pp 372–3.

However the confluence of a decline of trade union power that coincided with the ‘Winter of Discontent’ of 1978–79,³⁶ the election of Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative Party to government in 1979 and the rise to pre-eminence in economic thinking of the needs of global financial capital in the later 1970s and early 1980s³⁷ saw Britain begin substantial economic and societal restructures, in what has become known as Thatcher’s (counter)revolution.³⁸ Her New Right ideology sought to ‘demolish the old edifice’³⁹ of the social democratic welfare state through the large-scale privatisation of public resources, substantial tax cuts, initiatives to restrict the influence of trade unions and the promotion of a ‘stakeholder’ or ‘enterprise’ economic and political culture.⁴⁰ This revolutionary program sought to redefine British political norms, transforming it into a ‘property owning democracy’⁴¹ premised upon the ‘natural logic’ of markets,⁴² where the role of state was substantially pared back (‘replacing “state–citizen” relations with “provider–client” ones’).⁴³ Whilst initially generating substantial opposition amongst some sectors of society,

[s]o successful was Thatcherism as a ‘hegemonic’ project — and so weak by contrast was the social democratic alternative on offer between the early 1980s and late 1990s — that ... its anti-inflation, low tax and liberal labour market policies have become socially and politically embedded.’⁴⁴

The Abandonment of Class and the Socialist Project: Radical Change in the Labour Party

It was in this climate that the Labour Party found itself struggling for political relevance for much of the 1980s and early 1990s. Labour’s initial response leading up to the 1983 election (after the defection of some sections of the party to form the Democrats, later the Liberal Democrats) was to take a sharp turn to the political left, in the hope of capitalising on public discontent with some of the initial pain caused by Thatcher’s economic reforms. However, this was an endeavour destined not to bear electoral fruit.

³⁶ Crouch, *op cit*, p 352.

³⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁸ Ali, *op cit*; James E Cronin, ‘New Labour in Britain: Avoiding the Past’ in *Current History*, Vol 98, No 627, April 1999, p 181; Michael Freedden, ‘The Ideology of New Labour’ in *Political Quarterly*, Vol 70, 1999, p 43 and David Marquand, ‘After Euphoria: The Dilemmas of New Labour’ in *Political Quarterly*, Vol 68, 1997, pp 335 and 338.

³⁹ Ali, *op cit*.

⁴⁰ *Ibid*; Cronin, *op cit*, p 181; Detlef Jahn and Matt Henn, ‘The “New” Rhetoric of New Labour in Comparative Perspective: A Three-Country Discourse Analysis’ in *West European Politics*, Vol 23, No 1, January 2000, p 45 at fn 27; Martin Rhodes, ‘Desperately Seeking a Solution: Social Democracy, Thatcherism and the “Third Way” in British Welfare’ in *West European Politics*, Vol 23, No 2, April 2000.

⁴¹ Cronin, *op cit*, p 181.

⁴² Michael Harris, ‘New Labour: Government and Opposition’ in *Political Quarterly*, Vol 70, 1999, p 55.

⁴³ Freedden, *op cit*, p 43.

⁴⁴ Rhodes, *op cit*.

Upon reflection on its floundering electoral fortunes, Labour rationalised its deteriorating support by reference to perceived shifts in British class relations. While Labour remained confident that it would always be the traditional ‘party of the working-class’ (and especially unionised labour),⁴⁵ it theorised that the number of voters *identifying* themselves as working-class, and sharing typically working-class concerns and values, was in terminal decline. In the face of this breakdown of class voting allegiance (which had traditionally been especially pronounced in Britain) and a shrinking natural supporter base, the Labour Party realised that achieving electoral majorities would become increasingly difficult without radical change.⁴⁶ It would need to ‘extend [its] appeal to new (predominantly middle class) electoral constituencies’.⁴⁷

Labour became convinced that, in the face of the popularity of Thatcher’s New Right politics amongst members of the middle-class and ‘aspirational’ working-class, remaining the party of the working-class would mean that it would be consigned to electoral irrelevance. It therefore sought to attune itself to the ‘mainstream political, social and economic perspectives of the mass of the public’ by ‘modernising’ its party’s structures and policy platforms under the successive leaderships of Neil Kinnock, John Smith and Tony Blair.⁴⁸ Thus, ‘New Labour’ was born.

Signal achievements at an organisational level in furtherance of this modernising objective included the (controversial) deletion of clause 4 of the party’s constitution (which committed it to the attainment of the socialist objective of ‘common ownership of the means of production’), the weakening of trade union influence in party decision-making and policy formulating fora,⁴⁹ and the effective marginalisation of the party’s socialist left-wing leaders and members.⁵⁰

In addition to these structural changes, New Labour also sought to reposition itself ideologically, effecting a ‘radical programmatic change’.⁵¹ It committed itself to pro-business policies such as promoting flexibility in employment conditions and facilitating conflict-free workplace bargaining. To appeal to the City of London, it promised responsible economic management, an end to deficit budgets, minimal government intervention in the economy and a ‘co-equal ... synergistic relationship’ with markets.⁵² And for the benefit of the expanding middle class, New Labour resolved to implement taxation cuts and facilitate the extension of ‘shareholder democracy’.⁵³ Whilst maintaining some social policies that were consistent with traditional notions of social democratic politics (notably with respect to education and the relationship between government and civil society), the overwhelming tenor of the

⁴⁵ Ben Pimlott, ‘New Labour, New Era?’ in *Political Quarterly*, Vol 68, 1997, p 332.

⁴⁶ David Rubinstein, ‘How New is New Labour?’ in *Political Quarterly*, Vol 68, 1997, p 339.

⁴⁷ Jahn and Henn, *op cit*, p 26.

⁴⁸ Harris, *op cit*, p 55.

⁴⁹ Ali, *op cit* and Cronin, *op cit*, pp 181 and 185.

⁵⁰ Cronin, *op cit*, p 181 and Rubinstein, *op cit*, p 339.

⁵¹ Jahn and Henn, *op cit*, p 40.

⁵² Freedden, *op cit*, p 47.

⁵³ See generally Tony Blair and Gerhard Schröder, ‘The Third Way/Die Neue Mitte’ in *Dissent*, Spring 2000 and Crouch, *op cit*, p 352.

reformed Labour Party platform was decidedly to the political right of the traditional Labour socialist program.

Finally, Labour's structural and policy changes were couched as representing a new political 'Third Way' (a philosophical and ideological framework appropriated from Anthony Giddens' work) which transcended the 'previous debates and dichotomies'⁵⁴ of socialism and capitalism — presenting itself as moving to new, post-ideological plane, where it would address political problems pragmatically and 'honestly', without reference to the 'outdated dogma or doctrine' of the politically counterposed Left and Right.⁵⁵

Everything Old Is New Again: New Labour's Policies Critically Examined

Whilst New Labour's transformation has certainly been successful in achieving the short-term objective of securing electoral victories for the party (with the Labour Party returned with landslide majorities in the House of Commons at both the 1997 and 2001 general elections),⁵⁶ it has not been achieved without a degree of internal disquiet and occasionally strident academic criticism. Foremost amongst the critiques has been the charge that New Labour's political program has been so fundamentally altered as to no longer represent that of a truly social democratic party. Rather, critics allege, New Labour is merely recapitulating policies 'which less than ten years ago were associated with the (new) right, and repudiated by the (old) left'⁵⁷ — and is now complicit in what amounts to a neo-liberal political consensus which does not 'transcend' traditionally opposed political dogmas, but rather simply abandons one for the other.

I intend to analyse New Labour's policy record comparatively to those platforms traditionally promoted by political parties of the social democratic–labour left and those promoted by the Conservative Party under Thatcher on three critical fronts:

New Labour's relationship with trade unions (its traditional supporter base);

New Labour's relationship with the owners of capital (its traditional political 'opponents'); and New Labour and the social democratic welfare state (its economic and social achievement *par excellence*).

New Labour and the Trade Union Movement

It is clear that New Labour's intent with respect to trade unions is to distinguish and detach itself from them in order to negate their perceived influence in the party. Cronin and Pimlott argue that New Labour has taken deliberate and conspicuous measures to 'avoid the appearance of catering to unions'⁵⁸ and 'preserve maximum distance from the unions'⁵⁹ to the point where 'Old' Labour has been equated with union-dominated Labour⁶⁰ — and therefore any return to the close relationships of the

⁵⁴ Cronin, *op cit*, p 180.

⁵⁵ Freedon, *op cit*, p 47 and Blair and Schröder, *op cit*, p 51.

⁵⁶ See generally Hugh Berrington, 'Election Report: After the Ball Was Over ... The British General Election of 2001' in *West European Politics*, Vol 24, No 4, October 2001.

⁵⁷ Hay, *op cit*, p 372.

⁵⁸ Cronin, *op cit*, p 185.

⁵⁹ Pimlott, *op cit*, p 332.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

past necessarily admits of a failure of the New Labour project as a whole. Such policies (formulated by a party that ‘had roots in the trade unions and had long seen itself as the unions’ defender’) actively shunning the trade union movement must certainly be seen as a substantial break with traditional Labour values.⁶¹ However such measures cannot be properly viewed as novel in nature, as bringing an end to trade union influence in both the workplace and society at large was a *raison d’être* for Thatcherism’s sweeping neo-liberal reforms.⁶²

New Labour and Business

With respect to relations with the owners of capital and business, New Labour’s record also demonstrates a dereliction of its social democratic roots. New Labour has repeatedly proclaimed that the responsibility of government is to do all it can to support enterprise but never believe it is a substitute for enterprise⁶³ and ‘to neither place fetters on capital nor stand in the way of the market’.⁶⁴ In furtherance of this, New Labour believes that ‘[c]ompanies ... must not be gagged by rules and regulations’. Specifically in the realm of industrial relations and employment, Blair *et al* have expressed various commitments to promotion of a ‘flexible’ labour market, a policy described by Barkan as nothing more than ‘code’ for ‘temporary and part-time contracts, different wages for the same work, greater ease for employers to fire and lay off workers, fewer regulations for health and safety.’⁶⁵ Such intentions, (often under the ambiguous guise of there being ‘no feasible alternatives’ in this age of pervasive globalisation)⁶⁶ foster what Ali describes as ‘deregulated capitalism’,⁶⁷ and, I would argue, sit distinctly uncomfortably with the traditions of Old Labour (devoted to mixed public-and-private economies and the protection of working conditions) and social democratic–labour politics more generally, but are entirely consistent with New Right philosophies promoted and adopted under the preceding Conservative government.⁶⁸

New Labour, Social Democracy and the Welfare State

New Labour’s statements on the issue of taxation and the redistribution of wealth to provide for public services can also, in my view, be seen as divergent from traditional expectations of social democratic–labour party policy. New Labour has made restraint on taxation a central plank of its platform, coming to office with a pledge not to raise income taxes, and since then propagating slogans such as ‘keep what you earn’ that are indicative of a scaling back of the country’s progressive taxation system.⁶⁹

With respect to public expenditure, whilst Blair has repeatedly promised to deliver improved public services, especially in the area of education and training for

⁶¹ Cronin, *op cit*, p 185.

⁶² Ali, *op cit*.

⁶³ Blair and Schröder, *op cit*, p 51.

⁶⁴ Cronin, *op cit*, p 186.

⁶⁵ Joanne Barkan, Annotations to Tony Blair and Gerhard Schröder’s ‘The Third Way/Die Neue Mitte’ in *Dissent*, Spring 2000, pp 54 and 58.

⁶⁶ *Ibid*, p 53–4 and Hay, *op cit*, p 377.

⁶⁷ Ali, *op cit*.

⁶⁸ Marquand, *op cit*, p 335. See also Barkan, *op cit*, p 61.

⁶⁹ Barkan, *op cit*, p 61.

employment in the 'knowledge economy', he has simultaneously promoted efforts to make savings on the nation's social security bill through the removal of Britons from the welfare recipient lists, to be achieved by enticing some recipients into 'flexible', low-paid jobs, and by raising the threshold for the payment of disability benefits.⁷⁰

These taxation and welfare cuts, and proposed expansions in the provision of some public goods, should be seen in the context of the overwhelming majority of public statements from New Labour Chancellors of the Exchequer committing the government to reigning in public expenditure and consistently delivering surplus or balanced budgets. Whilst Tony Blair has argued that 'tax reform and tax cuts can play a critical part in [modern social democratic governments] meeting their wider social objectives',⁷¹ the flaws in such logic are canvassed by Barkan, who observes that 'Third Way-ers assume they can lower taxes, get more economic growth, and then collect more tax revenues. Sounds like David Stockman and voodoo economics all over again.'⁷² Given that '[i]n the long run, it is difficult to see how the Labour Party can perform the acrobatic feat of simultaneously satisfying middle-class voters on tax *and* providing [public services] for the under-privileged',⁷³ my view is New Labour's resolute antipathy to being seen as a high-taxing-high-spending government is likely to prevail over the demands for expensive improvements to public goods such as education, transport health and social security. In my view, Labour's objective of effecting a gradually declining role for the state in the provision of public services, a paring back of the redistributive progressive taxation model in place since the Second World War and the commitment to the delivery of balanced or surplus budgets into the future bear strong similarities to Margaret Thatcher's Conservative government's scaling back of social protection and the simultaneous abolishment of many progressive taxation policies only few years ago.⁷⁴

Conclusion

Some commentators have welcomed New Labour's political realignment as a belated recognition that '[c]apitalism has brought unique prosperity to much of the world',⁷⁵ and that in a post-Cold War political climate, the strident promotion of traditional socialism was always unlikely to resonate with voters. Indeed Harris has argued that the Third Way and New Labour represent the political left finally offering a more 'coherent and honest' worldview than they have been prepared to in times past.⁷⁶

However, whatever one may think of the relative political merits of New Labour's repositioning, I would argue that it is nonetheless a misnomer. Despite protestations by some academics to the effect that New Labour's Third Way represents a unique and identifiably modern ideology for the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries,⁷⁷ I would argue that the New Labour program does represent a reprisal of many Thatcherite New Right policies, merely presented by a traditional social democratic-labour party under the guise of a forging a third political way. For this

⁷⁰ Blair and Schröder, *op cit*, p 63–4.

⁷¹ *Ibid*, p 57.

⁷² Barkan, *op cit*, p 63.

⁷³ Pimlott, *op cit*, p 332.

⁷⁴ Ali, *op cit*.

⁷⁵ Bernard Crick, 'Still Missing: A Public Philosophy?' in *Political Quarterly*, Vol 68, 1997, p 345.

⁷⁶ Harris, *op cit*, p 61.

⁷⁷ See, eg, Cronin, *op cit*, p 183.

reason, I would argue, whilst the policies propounded New Labour are indeed very different and unexpected for a party of the political left that purports to be maintaining a social democratic tradition,⁷⁸ and mark a substantial departure from the program of Old Labour, they do not represent a political package which has not before been seen in Britain. For rather than finding unique policies to counter those put forward by the Tories, I would argue that the New Labour has effectively beaten the Conservative Party at its own game, by accepting, incorporating and effectively marketing Thatcher's policies rebadged as New Labour's revolutionary alternative: the Third Way.⁷⁹

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⁷⁸ See, eg, Blair and Schröder, *op cit*, p 51.

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PERSPECTIVES

Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany

Informationservice

Interview with Karsten D. Voigt, Coordinator of German-American Cooperation in the Field of Intersocietal Relations, Cultural and Information Policy in the Federal Foreign Office, on German-American relations on the ARD television programme Morgenmagazin on 25 September 2002

On the differences in German-American relations:

I believe that with regard to German-American relations one of the best results [of the German elections] is that the one anti-American party in the German Bundestag, the PDS, has been eliminated from the Bundestag. [...] What was under discussion in the election campaign was not anti-Americanism but a specific decision and a specific policy of the Americans, and here there are differences between the two Governments. These differences are all the more painful because the views of the people in the two countries are not so far apart... The same critical questions that are being asked in Germany are also being asked by parts of the American population. [...]

On intervention in Iraq:

There is a lot of scepticism in the United States about what to do after a victory in Iraq and how to subsequently stabilize the situation there? In other words, questions that are also being asked in Germany. It is particularly painful for President Bush that the questions he is hearing in his own country are, as it were, being reinforced by an ally putting these questions to him as a government. This, therefore, is not primarily a case of tension between [the people themselves] but a difference of opinion between governments, one that concerns a very specific question, for in the case of Afghanistan and in the fight against international terrorism we are in agreement, as we are in our assessment of Saddam Hussein.

[...]

I believe that anyone who produces arguments in America that are credible in demonstrating that that person is not only against Saddam Hussein – something which is undeniably the case for the Germans – but that that person has solutions for solving

the problem of Saddam Hussein without the use of military force will also get a hearing there, and that anyone will also get a hearing who asks: What are you going to do following a military victory, how are you then going to achieve stability there, and how long do the troops then have to remain in order to establish a stable, alternative regime. But someone who says that the problem of Saddam Hussein does not exist and that the problem is the policy of the Americans will not be listened to. I also believe – as does Gerhard Schröder – that the Germans must make it even clearer than they have so far that Saddam Hussein is running a criminal regime which is a potential threat to the region, and that we are only arguing about whether this can be solved by the return of the inspectors under United Nations leadership or whether a war needs to be waged.

On the state of bilateral relations:

First of all, the damage is repairable. It exists, but it can be repaired because the interests, values and aims on both sides are so very similar that both sides have an interest, as it were, in continuing to work together on projects such as Afghanistan, the Balkans, as well as the reform and enlargement of NATO. Thus it can be repaired. But we will have to work on it, and the first efforts must come from the German side and will come from the German side. But efforts must also be made in America to recognize that the Germans are now really committed to working to contain the damage. And while we fully appreciate the irritation caused over certain remarks, the Americans should now show that they also respect the Germans as a partner with a different point of view regarding a specific question.

'The Euro – What does it Mean for Australian exporters?'*

The following article represents the opinions of Tim Harcourt, Chief Economist, Austrade, one of the key speakers at the Euro Seminars.

The euro was introduced to world financial markets in January 1999. Since then, many Australian businesses have been working in euros in accounting and corporate terms. The EU estimates the economic benefits from the introduction of the euro to be worth about 1% per annum. If the euro zone is successful, this will advantage Australian exports. For instance, after the first stage in 1999, Australian exports to the EU increased by 16% in 1999-2000 compared to a 6% average growth for the 1990s. This, of course, will depend on the extent of trade growth benefiting Australia versus trade diversion within the euro zone.

There are additional benefits from the introduction of the euro. For Australian businesses, the euro will reduce transaction costs and improve price transparency across European borders. The change will make it easier for Australian companies to source the cheapest inputs from Europe without any conversion inconvenience. Similarly, if an Australian exporter has a product or service that can be competitively sold to Europe, it can now get noticed across the whole region because of the common currency. Greater transparency will assist competition, allowing competitive Australian goods and services to find markets across Europe.

This is particularly important in today's international business climate. Charles O'Hanlon, Austrade's Executive General Manager for Europe, believes the common currency will make life easier for Australian exporters in gaining a foothold in the European market. He noted, "The single currency will play an important psychological role for Australian business in removing another barrier to doing business across borders. It makes third market strategies within the EU a more attractive proposition and may even reduce 'Channel fever' for UK-based Australian companies which are still reluctant to do business in Europe."

But what will happen to EU countries outside the euro zone, such as the UK? As observed by Charles O'Hanlon, some Australian companies are excited by the euro zone's prospects and are already positioning themselves for the possible UK entry to the euro zone in the future. Take, for instance, The Big Idea, a London-based marketing company that recently helped Santarium introduce its 'So Good' product to the UK market. The Big Idea offers a full market presence for Australian companies. This 'one-stop shop' provides the business case, the research, and the brand development, right down to the selling to the retailer.

According to The Big Idea's Managing Director, Dan Koziol, the euro will have a positive impact on the company's EU focus and will assist Australian companies in

* Reprinted from *EU News*

raising their brand awareness across Europe. He believes that the administration involved in converting between a number of national currencies wasted time and resources for Australian exporters. However, the elimination of conversion costs is only a small part of the benefit Australian companies will experience with the advent of the euro.

He sees three main benefits. Firstly, lower currency volatility will reduce risk for Australian exporters. Previously, Australian exporters had to work in countries with widely different inflation rates (such as Germany versus Italy). Secondly, there will be less risk associated with currency fluctuations for European importers (particularly distributors who were nervous about the impact of currency changes against the Australian dollar).

Finally, he sees more stable consumer behaviour in reaction to similar emotional price points. "Consumer behaviour is often driven by price points. The retail price will often be rounded up or down forcing export prices to differ considerably between regions. So if your product sells at 6 francs in France and 2,000 lire in Italy, the likelihood is that the European retailer will now want to price it at just below €1 - slightly increasing the price in France and decreasing it in Italy. This standardisation driven by consumer price and value perception is likely to streamline pricing structures across European market, helping Australian exporters with a 'one price fits all', Koziol said.

Koziol is concerned about the UK staying outside the euro zone but notes that the UK government "has been encouraging companies here to consider trading in euros alongside sterling".

In summary, 1 January, 2002 marked the beginning of a new era in international finance and trade. All eyes will be on how effective the euro is and how euro zone members react to the new currency. It is hoped that the economic benefit in Europe will provide spin-offs to the world economy, including Australia. The euro will assist Australian companies to do business in Europe by reducing transaction costs and improving price transparency. It will also potentially affect other countries who have opted to remain outside the euro zone but who may enter in the future.

INSIGHTS

Report of the Inaugural Workshop on EU-Australia Relations Philomona Murray, President CESAA

The European Union (EU) is Australia's most important trading partner and a source of one third of all foreign investment in Australia. Two-way trade is increasingly at a rapid rate and Australia is now the largest supplier of wine to the EU. There is a long and mature relationship between Australia and the countries of Western Europe. The relationship with the EU is both broadening in scope and policy range and deepening in understanding. Why then is this issue not debated or accorded as much attention as it arguably deserve? The Contemporary Europe Research Centre (CERC) of the University of Melbourne and National Europe Centre at the ANU are bringing together experts to discuss these issues in a comprehensive manner.

On 9 July 2002, the Contemporary Europe Research Centre (CERC) hosted a workshop on European Union (EU)-Australia relations. It was the first in a series of national workshops initiated by CERC, as part of the Jean Monnet EU-Australia Project on EU-Australia Relations and the National Europe Centre Work Programs, with the support of the Contemporary European Studies Association of Australia (CESAA). The Workshop was sponsored by CERC and the National Europe Centre at the Australian National University, with the support of the European Commission, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, and the European Australian Co-operation Centre at the University of Melbourne.

The aim of the workshops is to provide an opportunity to reflect on and understand the past relationship and examine long term and more immediate policy concerns. The workshops examine challenges facing the EU and Australia and the issues that will contribute to and shape the future relationship. The context for the workshops includes the recent Ministerial Consultations, which seek to explore the relationship and opportunities for future cooperation, as well as Prime Minister John Howard's recent visit to Brussels. Research reported in and arising from the workshops will focus on policy issues and outputs. The aim is to discuss policies, present critical perspectives and identify constructive ways of advancing the relationship between Australia and Europe.

The inaugural workshop came under the auspices of the Jean Monnet Fund of the European Commission. Speakers included Ambassador Piergiorgio Mazzocchi (Ambassador and Head of Delegation of the European Commission to Australia and New Zealand); Dr Vijoleta Braach-Maksvytis (CSIRO); Dr David Camroux (Institute of Political Studies, Paris); Ms Lucy Charlesworth (DFAT); Mr Jean-François Desvignes (Embassy of France in Australia); Mr Graeme Rankin (DEST); Mr Keith

Rhodes (Department of Innovation, Industry and Regional Development); Mr John Tinney (Swinburne University); Ms Lynne Hunter (Delegation of the European Commission); Dr Mile Terziovski (The European Australian Cooperation Centre); Mr John Gage (NEC); Mr Mark Ritchie (Cattle Council of Australia); Dr Jens Mohr (JM Management Services) and Dr. Philomena Murray (CESAA and CERC, University of Melbourne).

The range of speakers reveals the breadth and depth of the relationship. There is no room to be complacent about the links, however, as tensions and misunderstandings remain. There is the issue of agricultural protectionism by the EU, which distorts world markets and has an adverse impact on Australian agricultural exports. There is considerable disagreement about environmental issues, as Australia declines to sign the Kyoto protocol, which the EU has signed. Yet the Workshop revealed that there is considerable scope for increased cooperation and the CERC, the NEC and CESAA will be at the forefront of analysis of this cooperation, in addition to providing policy advice to policymakers.

It was clear that the EU-Australia relationship is a complex one, a thriving one and yet fraught with difficulties and misunderstandings. Nowhere was this more apparent than in the debate on the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). The Workshop participants made it clear that relationship is a multidimensional one, dealing with trade, investment, agriculture, science and technology cooperation, educational exchanges, several bilateral agreements of varying significance and yet based on many common values and a new willingness expressed by both sides to engage in increasingly productive dialogue and exchanges of views and cooperation.

The presentations of the Workshop will be published. However below is a brief summary of relevant policy issues that were raised:

- There remain distinct difference of opinion regarding the need for Australia to push for a Framework Agreement, after the breakdown in negotiations in 1997.
 - There is a clear need to utilise the NEC and CERC resources in order to advance the study of the EU Australia relationship. Australia is largest supplier of wine to the EU and has been for the last 5 years.
 - A perception of the need for recognition of the fact that the EU is Australia largest trader and has been for 11 years.
 - The need to work on common values – the point was made that on so many issues the EU and Australia are in fact on the same side
 - The need to analyse the implications for Australia of the mid-term review of the Cap in the context of Agenda 2000, released on the same day as this Workshop was held, in Brussels
 - The need for increased dialogue between Australia and the EU on the forthcoming WTO round; on a multilateral approach to global problems; on the International Criminal Court and environmental issues
 - There was criticism of the Australia government for failing to take account of the multiplicity of the EU and of the European dimensions of all national policies of the nation states of the EU
 - The need for DFAT to take account of the EU as an international actor, regarded by some a key message of the CERC survey of elite attitudes EU-Australia relations;
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- The need for DFAT to factor in the internal transformations of the EU and secondly to contend with the EU as a massive actor – as both a possible ally and a counterweight to Australian interests.
- The fact that the common positions and policies adopted by the EU will have an increased impact on Australia. It is therefore vital that Australia work with the EU on all fronts.
- The need for understanding of the fact that, especially recently, there have been many meetings at difference level of Australia officials and Ministers with the Commission and representatives of the EU Presidency – seen as the hallmarks of a sophisticated relationship
- The need to recognize that EU in trade negotiations speaks with one voice
- The need to continue to monitor the ASEM process and its implications for Australia
- The need to for increased debate in Australia regarding the implications for Australia of regional integration in the EU and Asia
- The need to clearly recognize the issues of collective amnesia (Groom) and intransigent memories (Murray) in the CAP debates.
- An understanding of the broad range and depth of the EU Australia relationship was called for, and a concomitant avoidance of a single issue perspective.
- The need for more debate on the fact that even if Australia does not feature much on the EU radar screen, it is engaged in a number of activities with the EU, ranging from trade and investment to newer issues such as the environment and security – i.e. moving from single issues focus to a more comprehensive engagement.
- Need to follow and monitor the current review process taking place on the Political Declaration

The Workshop was divided into a series of panels and relevant abstracts are provided below. The first panel was focused on an **Overview of EU-Australia Relations**. Ambassador Piergiorgio Mazzocchi (Delegation of the European Commission), who presented a paper on ‘Putting the Australian-European Union Bilateral Relationship in Perspective’ and the importance that needs to be given in Australia to the multidimensional relationship. Dr David Camroux (Institute of Political Studies, Paris), gave a paper on ‘The Implications of Europe-Asia Relations for Australia’ and Australia’s lack of membership of a regional bloc. This theme was also taken up by Dr Philomena Murray (CERC/Department of Political Science, University of Melbourne), who presented her findings on ‘Australian Views on Europe and the EU-Australia Relationship: An Assessment’ and proposed an understanding of the EU under the rubric of “New Bilateralism”. Ms Lucy Charlesworth (European Union Section, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade), gave a presentation on ‘Australia and the EU: The Agenda in the New Millennium’ in which she illustrated the current DFAT perspectives.

The multidimensional aspects of the relationship was a key theme as well as the fact that the relationship has broadened considerably in recent years, in terms of scope, levels of interaction, dialogue and contacts.

The second Panel examined **Science And Technology** cooperation between Australia and the EU. Dr Vijoleta Braach-Maksvytis (CSIRO), presented a paper which highlighted Australia's excellent international track record in innovation and transnational cooperation in several technologies in a paper which examined 'Emerging Sciences and New Models for Collaboration', followed by an illustration of the many possibilities for cooperation, at national and supranational levels, by Mr Jean-François Desvignes (Embassy of France in Australia), who spoke on 'From FEAST to FEAST-France'. An Australian government perspective was given by Mr Graeme Rankin (DEST), whose paper discussed 'Australia's Science and Technology Relationship with Europe - An Unequal Partnership?' and highlighted the problems as well as the success stories in this form of cooperation and the need to maintain bilateral relations with the member states as well as the EU.

The third Panel focused on **Investment Issues**. Mr Keith Rhodes (International Investment, Department of Innovation, Industry and Regional Development) presented a paper outlining issues and options under the title of 'Direct Investment Trends in EU and Australia', outlining barriers to growth such as distance, market size, tax regimes and non-membership of an Asian trade bloc. Mr John Tinney (Swinburne University, formerly General Manager Europe, Austrade), presented a paper based on his extensive experience in Austrade, regarding 'Helping Australian Business to Succeed in Europe' and pointed to the need for further analysis of the factors for successful investment and establishment in Europe.

The fourth Panel once again examined issues of **Science and Technology**, with Ms Lynne Hunter (Delegation of the European Commission) presenting a comprehensive overview of opportunities in 'Science and Technology and the 6th Framework Programme'. The need for simplified rules and regulations was recognized and the need to maximize S and T. Issues of governance and citizens in the knowledge-based economy present opportunities for social scientists to participate in the 6th Framework Programme. Dr Mile Terziovski (The European Australian Cooperation Centre, University of Melbourne) then gave a presentation based on actual participation in such cooperation in the past, in his paper on 'The European Australian Cooperation Centre: Past, Present and Future Projects involving European and Australian Cooperation' and pointed to the benefits of the use of the internet and the barrier of distance.

The fifth Panel took the important theme of **Trade Issues**. Mr John Gage (National Europe Centre; School of Economics, ANU), in his paper, 'The Pursuit of Rational Mutual Self-Interest: Seeking the Common Ground Between the EU and Australia in Agricultural Affairs' opened a debate on a theme which has been at the heart of tension between the EU and Australia, namely the CAP. The role of agriculture in the psyche, tradition and trade profile of Australia and the EU was discussed as well as possible means to move beyond that focus of the relationship. This was followed by Mr Mark Ritchie (Policy Director, Cattle Council of Australia), who elaborated on 'Market Access requirements for High Quality Australian Beef into the European Union' and illustrated the problems of the EU quota system as a form of agricultural protectionism. Issues of both tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade were debated in this context. He ended by setting out Australia's current position and negotiating stance in the context of the WTO. Finally, Dr Jens Mohr (Management Consultant/Director, JM Management Services), presented an overview on 'Political and

Economic Aspects of the Relationship’, emphasizing the need for increased cultural and educational cooperation between Australia and the EU and also with individual member states.

During the **Concluding Remarks** and summing up by Mr Michael Parker (FEAST) and Dr. Murray and the general debate, the issue of missed opportunities in the relationship was aired. It was agreed to send copies of relevant publications to CERC so that these works on EU-Australia relations would be based in at least one location. The participants were unanimous in their agreement that the relationship was highly relevant and needs increased policy-focused examination as well as considered academic analysis.

THE EUROPEAN UNION IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS **Elm Papadakis, Director, National Europe Centre**

The first major conference organised by the National Europe Centre at the Australian National University was held in Canberra on 3-4 July 2002 at the Shine Dome. Its theme, *The European Union in International Affairs*, attracted scholars from around Australia as well as Europe, New Zealand and the United States to speak on issues including the implications of the Euro, European responses to September 11, trade policy-making, environmental policy, common foreign and security policy and Europe’s relations with developing countries. There were 98 registrations including representatives from the diplomatic community, the Australian Government and the European Commission. There was a general acknowledgement of the very high standard of the presentations across such a wide range of themes.

At the mid-point of the conference, the ANU Robert Schuman Lecture was presented by His Excellency Carlos Bastarache Sagües, Secretary General for European Affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Spain. The lecture gave a detailed account of the process and the challenges of European enlargement from a Spanish perspective. Its theme was of the mutual benefits from enlargement, both to existing EU members and the accession nations, and there ensued a lively discussion on the pros and cons of this process. The Robert Schuman Lecture was one of several opportunities for interaction between government representatives and academics. Others included the opening address by His Excellency Piergiorgio Mazzocchi, Ambassador and Head of Delegation of the European Commission to Australia and New Zealand, as well as presentations by senior officials in the Commission on such matters as the External Dimension of the Euro and the Common Foreign and Security Policy. There was a strong presence of officials from Australian government departments, some of whom made presentations as discussants to papers on such topics as environment policy, EU enlargement and the Common Foreign and Security Policy.

The conference provided a valuable opportunity for interaction among researchers, many of whom had not met previously, and some of whom also took part in a subsequent conference ‘Asia-Pacific Studies in Australia and Europe: A Research Agenda for the Future’. Apart from the ANU Robert Schuman lecture, which included many members of the community who were not involved in the two conferences, two

receptions were held to enhance the opportunities for making new contacts and renewing old friendships.

The conference attracted media coverage, both on radio and television. Most of the papers from the conferences have been published as part of the National Europe Centre Papers Series and can be found at <http://www.anu.edu.au/NEC/publication.html>. Further dissemination of revised versions of these presentations is planned through commercial or other avenues. The conference program can be found at <http://www.anu.edu.au/NEC/july.html>.

The organization for the conference depended crucially on the support of various organizations and participants. Apart from the funding and support of the European Community represented by the Commission of the European Communities and the ANU, there was extensive cooperation between the conference organizers and researchers in preparing the program. The planning for the conference was organised in association with the Department of Politics at the University of Glasgow, the Centre for European Studies at the University of New South Wales, the Centre for Research on Europe at the University of Canterbury, the Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation at the University of Warwick, the Contemporary Europe Research Centre at the University of Melbourne and the Faculty of Arts, the Humanities Research Centre, the National Institute for Asia and the Pacific and the National Institute of Government and Law at the ANU. In particular, we appreciated the input of Dr David Camroux, Professor Richard Higgott, Professor Martin Holland, Dr Philomena Murray and Dr Alasdair Young. The organizers had also discussed the program with Dr Heather Field and we were very shaken by the news of her sudden death only a few days before this event. Dr Field was a very enthusiastic member of the Australian research community in European politics. She published on the European Union's Common Agricultural Policy, Union enlargement and Yugoslavia, and was the founding editor of the Australasian Journal of European Integration. Dr Field contributed greatly to the profile of European Studies, through her excellence in both teaching and research. Her enthusiasm and commitment to academic life will be greatly missed, and we deeply regret she was unable to participate in this unique and very successful event.



2002 Essay Competition on Europe

The Contemporary European Studies Association of Australia announces its 10th annual student essay competition

The Prize

The prize is \$250 for each category plus one year's free membership of CESAA, There will be a book prize for the runner up in each category.

The Categories

- Best essay by an undergraduate
- Best essay by an Honours or post-graduate student

The Topic

Any topic relating to contemporary Europe. Your field could be postwar history, law, economics, politics, society or culture. Your subject could be the European Union or any part of Europe as long as it focuses at least in part on the EU or on Europe as a whole (essay on individual countries are not accepted). If in doubt, please contact the organiser, Mr. Bruno Mascitelli, email bmascitelli@swin.edu.au or Tel: (03) 9214 5363.

How to Enter

Submit **ONE** essay of between 2000 – 5000 words in length. An essay that has already been assessed by an academic is acceptable. The essays will be judged by a panel of judges selected by CESAA. Two copies of your essay (typed and double spaced) should be sent by 1st December 2002 to:

CESAA Essay Competition
Attention: Bruno Mascitelli
CESAA Vice-President
School of Business, European Union Studies
Swinburne University of Technology
John Street, Hawthorn, 3122 Vic.

The essay should have on a separate page your name, full address, institution, category (undergraduate or Honours/post-graduate) and a contact phone number and/or email. Do not put your name on the essay title page.

This competition is supported by the Delegation of the European Commission to Australia and New Zealand and the EU Jean Monnet Project award to CESAA. It is open to all students in Australian tertiary institutions. CESAA judges reserve the right not to award a prize.

EUROPEAN STUDIES NEWS

BOOKS, JOURNALS AND THE INTERNET

European Integration OnLine
Papers features three new papers at
<http://eiop.or.at/eiop/>

Angelina Topan *'The resignation of the Santer-Commission: the impact of 'trust' and 'reputation'.*

This contribution begins with reciting the facts behind the resignation of the European Commission under Jacques Santer, followed by theoretical considerations on the significance of trust and reputation from the principal-agent-theory perspective. The third part puts the emphasis on discussing as to which extent a loss of trust and reputation had an influence in the resignation of the Santer-Commission. The author concludes that the Santer-Commission underestimated the increased power of the European Parliament. The inadequate information policy and the increasing practice of manipulating documents led to a loss of trust. After the threshold had been crossed in connection with the BSE-scandal further violations finally led to the destruction of reputation of the Santer-Commission.

Troels B. Hansen and Bruno Scholl, *Europeanization and Domestic Parliamentary Adaptation: A Comparative Analysis of the*

Bundestag and the House of Commons

The aim of the article is to explain the institutional development of the parliamentary scrutiny systems in Germany and the UK on the basis of existing Europeanization frameworks. So far these attempts have concentrated on policy specific analyses or on the development of governmental or administrative structures. There has been no attempt to explicitly link the evolving discussion on the role of national Parliaments and the development of scrutiny structures to the theoretical debate about Europeanization and domestic change. We will apply a strict top down approach taking on board key notions of the Europeanization literature such as misfit, mediating factors or domestic change. However, in order to grasp the various dynamics at work we had to specify the existing frameworks. The rather undefined concept of 'misfit' between the European and national level is divided into three sub-categories: constitutional, functional and cultural misfit. This allows for a more differentiated analysis of how the various mediating factors exerted their influence on the development of the domestic institutions. Drawing on explanatory models from sociological as well as rational choice institutionalism we argue that cultural factors such as the attitude towards European Integration account for the longer term developments of the scrutiny systems whereas formal mediating institutions such as national Governments or Courts are responsible for the more abrupt changes.

Erol Kulahci, *Theorizing party interaction within EPFs and their effects on the EU policy-making process*

Since the last decade, the development of European Party Federations (EPFs) has been followed with increasing attention from scholars. However, the analysis of EPFs' impacts on EU policy-making has been quasi-neglected. Therefore, the main objective of the paper is to present a comprehensive conceptual framework for analysing the party interaction within EPFs and their effects on the EU policy-making. Accordingly, the argument will be developed in four steps. First, the paper will review the state of the art in order to show that a causal theory is missing. Secondly, it will ask how to construct a causal theory and how the analytical framework may be empirically tested. Thus, and thirdly, it will make clear that it approaches the EU as a useful location of policy-making. Fourthly, the paper will argue that it is necessary, on the one side, to focus on party interaction within EPFs and, on the other side, to distinguish between the decentralised and the centralised party interactions in order to adequately analyse the various effects of EPFs on the EU institutional modes. In this regard, the paper will not only elaborate the main descriptive and explanatory hypotheses but also illustrate most of them with empirical examples.

Visit the EIoP at: <http://eiop.or.at/eiop/>

EIoPortal <http://eiop.or.at/> includes: European Research Papers Archive (ERPA) and EuroInternet link collection

New Issue German Law Review
Russell Miller & Peer Zumbansen
Editors in Chief, German Law Journal

Dear Readers of German Law Journal:

We are pleased to announce to you the new issue of German Law Journal. Review of Developments in German, European and International Jurisprudence, which is now available at www.germanlawjournal.com

As you will see from the Table of Contents below, this issue could not be more timely. Barely a fortnight after the general elections in Germany, we seize the moment for an intermediate reflection upon political campaigning, the role of media and the Constitutional Court's assessment of emerging trends in pre-election competition. Whether or not we are witnessing a substantial shift from topical towards more personal, TV-propelled political campaigning of individual competitors, the grown importance of televising and base-touching via easily recognizable individual traits cannot be denied. For the time to come, it will doubtless be the courts that are asked to define what allegedly is compatible with democratic campaigning. The citizen might in fact become the passively onlooking spectator, ignited only evermore occasionally by scandal-loaden, populist identity politics. The citizen as a spectator was already the topic of the Constitutional Court's "TV in the Courtroom" - decision of last year. See

http://www.germanlawjournal.com/past_issues.php?id=49

The much discussed "Ms Pretty" - decision by the European Court of Human Rights carries over the fundamental issue of the right to die - see the essay on the decision by Susan Millns. Olivier Segnana comments on the "Pfizer" and "Alpharma" decisions by the European Court of First Instance (T 13/99, T 70/99) of 11 September, 2002 and Kai Ambos reflects the state of international law in

light of the US attitude towards the International Criminal Court. As a birthday gift to Hans Kelsen's 121. birthday on 11 October, we publish a wonderful review of a brilliant study on Kelsen's concept of international law. Furthermore, you find the intricate review-essay by Malcolm MacLaren on a collection of papers dedicated to the role of non-governmental organisations in international law and politics. Also in this issue we have Volker Röben's comment on the FCC's decision on parliamentary minorities in investigative committees, Katja Schweppe's comparative study on child protection laws in Europe as well as Rüdiger Hansel's report on the recently held Annual Conference of the Society of Postgraduate Civil Law Researchers.

We do invite you to submit casenotes and articles as well as book reviews or suggestions for reviews. Please send us your feedback and commentary!

Please send your submissions to either Russell Miller at ramiller@uidaho.edu or Peer Zumbansen at zumbansen@jur.uni-frankfurt.de
Journal Website:
www.germanlawjournal.com

Comparative European Politics

Announcing the launch of a major new international peer-reviewed journal on

the comparative politics and political economy of contemporary Europe. Spanning political science, international relations and global political economy, the aim is to provide an international and interdisciplinary forum for research, theory and debate.

Comparative European Politics (CEP) arises out of a unique editorial partnership linking political scientists in Europe and North America. CEP defines its scope broadly to include the comparative politics and political economy of the whole of contemporary Europe within and beyond the European Union, the processes of European integration and enlargement and the place of Europe and European states within international/global political and economic dynamics.

Submissions

If you would like to submit a manuscript to Comparative European Politics or to make an informal enquiry, contact the editors at CEP@palgrave.com

Postal address:
Palgrave Macmillan Journals
Houndmills, Basingstoke,
Hants RG21 6XS, UK

Email:
journal-info@palgrave.co

Conferences and Calls for Papers

European Union Studies Association
Eighth Biennial International
Conference 27-29 March 2003
Nashville, Tennessee Hilton Suites
Nashville Downtown

The European Union Studies Association invites scholars and practitioners engaged in the study of Europe and the European Union to submit panel and paper proposals for its 2003 Eighth Biennial International Conference. The Program Committee plans to promote the broadest possible exchange of theoretical approaches, disciplinary perspectives and research agendas.

The Committee actively seeks proposals that analyze the EU in comparative perspective, explore the relationship between EU and national politics/policy, or assess the role played by the EU in global politics. The Committee welcomes proposals in anthropology, business, economics, government, law, modern history, politics, sociology, and other fields that investigate aspects of European integration. Participation by graduate students and non-traditional scholars is welcomed.

The 2003 Program Committee is: John Keeler (Political Science, University of Washington Seattle), Chair Karen Alter (Political Science, Northwestern University, and EUSA Board) William Brustein (Sociology, University of Pittsburgh) Hugo Kaufmann (Economics, City University of New York Graduate Center) Amy Verdun (Political Science, University of Victoria, Canada) Joseph Weiler (New York University School of Law)

Please note the following:

- We welcome both paper and panel proposals, particularly those that foster transatlantic dialogue.
- The Program Committee reserves the right to make changes in panels, including their composition.
- All those appearing on the conference program must be current EUSA members.
- Participants are limited to two appearances on the conference program (two papers or one paper and one discussant role; chair roles do not count toward the appearance limit).
- We cannot honor individual scheduling requests; by submitting a proposal you agree to be available from 8:30 a.m. on Thursday, March 27th through 6:00 p.m. on Saturday, March 29th.

The firm deadline for receipt of paper and panel proposals in the EUSA office is Tuesday, October 15, 2002. We regret that we cannot consider proposals received after this date. You will be notified of the Program Committee's decision regarding your proposal by December 15, 2002.

We will once again have a poster session option available for those (1) whose work is not yet ready for a formal paper, (2) whose paper or panel proposal is received after the proposal deadline, and/or (3) whose paper proposal could not be coherently accommodated on an available panel.

How to submit a paper or panel proposal: All proposals must be accompanied by the appropriate cover sheet, mailed to current EUSA members with the Spring EUSA Review and posted as printable PDF files on our Website at <http://www.eustudies.org/conf2003.html>, and the appropriate abstract (see cover sheet). Proposals must be mailed

to: European Union Studies
Association 415 Bellefield Hall
University of Pittsburgh Pittsburgh,
PA 15260 USA



EUROPEAN COMMISSION



DG Education and Culture

**SIXTH ECSA-WORLD
CONFERENCE**

Brussels, 5-6 December 2002

**'Peace, Security and Stability:
International Dialogue and the Role
of EU**

Employment Opportunities

Comparative Politics/International Relations. Eastern Michigan University. *Applications deadline: 1 December 2002*

The Department of Political Science invites applications for a tenure track position at the rank of Assistant Professor in Comparative Politics and International Relations, beginning August 2003. The Department has 18 tenure lines supporting major programs in Political Science, Public Law, Public Administration, and an MPA. Candidates should have the Ph.D. by the time of appointment (though advanced ABDs will be considered), and demonstrate a strong commitment to both teaching and research.

Field of specialization is open, but strong preference will be given to the politics and foreign policies of Western Europe and/or Post-Soviet Eastern Europe and Russia. We particularly seek candidates able to teach foreign policy, international conflict, and transnational issues (such as regional integration, ethnic and gender issues). In addition to upper division courses, teaching responsibilities will include Introduction to Comparative Government and/or International Relations, and American Government. **Full review of applications will begin December 1**, and the position will remain open until filled. A complete application should include: curriculum vitae, graduate transcripts, at least three current letters of reference, samples of scholarship, course syllabi, and student evaluations.

EMU is a regional comprehensive university enrolling approximately 24,000 students, located in Ypsilanti, MI, adjacent to Ann Arbor in Southeast Michigan. The university is an Equal Opportunity employer and particularly welcomes applications from women and members of minority groups.

For additional information, contact: Comparative Search Committee Chair, Dept. of Political Science, Eastern Michigan University, Ypsilanti, MI 48197, 734/487-3113 email: Rhonda.Kinney@emich.edu

Mail application materials to: Comparative Politics, Posting F0319, Academic Human Resources, 202 Boone Hall, Eastern Michigan University, Ypsilanti, MI 48197.

Visiting Professor (Rank Open) in Politics and International Relations and Associate Director of the European Union Centre of California. One Year Leave Replacement Academic Year 2003-04.

Scripps College, Claremont California

Applications deadline: 25 November 2002

Scripps College, a women's liberal arts college with a strong interdisciplinary tradition, invites applications for a one-year, full-time leave replacement for the academic year 2003-04. The position combines programmatic duties with teaching. The programmatic duties include developing activities for the 2003-04 academic year

(speaker series, workshops, conferences, etc.) on European or transatlantic topics, overseeing the academic activities of the Center (working papers series, etc), and its outreach activities, as assisted by staff. The teaching load is four courses for the year: Introduction to International Relations; an introductory course on the European Union; the European Union Junior Scholars Seminar; and an advanced topics course regarding issues in contemporary European or transatlantic affairs. Advising on senior theses is also anticipated. Ph.D. and demonstrated teaching experience required; demonstrated administrative experience preferred.

Send a letter of application, curriculum vitae, and three letters of reference to: European Union Search Committee, Scripps College, Box 1017, 1030 Columbia Avenue, Claremont, CA 91711. Inquiries: dcrone@scrippscol.edu

Consideration will begin immediately and will continue until closing on **November 25, 2002**. Applicants may learn more about the college, the department, and EU Center at www.scrippscollege.edu. Scripps College is one of seven members of The Claremont Colleges cluster located 35 miles east of Los Angeles. In a continuing effort to enrich its academic environment and provide equal educational and employment opportunities, Scripps College actively encourages applications from women and members of historically underrepresented groups.

**NATIONAL EUROPE CENTRE at the Australian National University
Policy Prospects in Agriculture: The European Union and Australia
Postdoctoral Fellow (Academic Level A)
(Fixed Term)**

Reference No: 1247

Applications deadline: 7 November 2002

The Centre, with support from the Grains Research and Development Corporation, is seeking to appoint a Postdoctoral Fellow to work on a project on rural and regional development objectives and policies in both the European Union and Australia, including the implications of sustainable development objectives for future agriculture support policy, the diverse institutional arrangements for attaining these objectives and the domestic and international pressures that will drive the formulation of agriculture support policy.

You should have a background in the social sciences in such areas as Economics, Political Science, Public Policy, Sociology or other relevant disciplines. As well as pursuing research and publication, you will be required to collaborate with colleagues within the project. Appointment will be for a fixed period of three years at Academic Level A within the salary range of \$42,317-\$51,066 pa. In addition, there are generous superannuation provisions and opportunities for external earnings within University policy.

Enquiries:

Professor Elim Papadakis

Ph. 6125-9896 or 6125-3173

email: Elim.Papadakis@anu.edu.au

website: www.anu.edu.au/NEC

For Selection Documentation:

Susan Riches

Staffing Recruitment Officer

Ph. 6125 5969

email: Susan.Riches@anu.edu.au website: www.anu.edu.au/hr/jobs/1247.pdf

(phone/fax: national 02; international 61 2).

**NATIONAL EUROPE CENTRE at the Australian National University
Work Program on the European Union - Postdoctoral Fellow (Academic Level
A) (Fixed Term)****Ref. No: 1248***Applications Deadline: 7 November 2002*

The Centre, with support from the European Community, is seeking to appoint a Postdoctoral Fellow to work on a project in any of the following areas that are of interest to and will contribute to better understanding of the European Union and/or relations between Australia and the European Union: questions of governance and legitimacy, including issues of the functioning of institutions, migration and integration, civil society, and perceptions of government and industry; and trade, economy and open

markets including convergence and divergence in the WTO, EU enlargement, sustainable industries and the environment, globalisation and the Single European Market.

You should have a background in the social sciences in such areas as Economics, Political Science, Public Policy, Sociology or other relevant disciplines. As well as pursuing research and publication, you will be required to collaborate with colleagues within the project.

Appointment will be for a fixed period of two years at Academic Level A within the salary range of \$42,317-\$51,066 pa. In addition, there are generous superannuation provisions and opportunities for external earnings within University policy.

Enquiries:

Professor Elim Papadakis

Ph. 6125-9896 or 6125-3173

email: Elim.Papadakis@anu.edu.auwebsite: www.anu.edu.au/NEC*For Selection Documentation:*

Susan Riches

Staffing Recruitment Officer

Ph. 6125 5969

email: Susan.Riches@anu.edu.au website: www.anu.edu.au/hr/jobs/1248.pdf

(phone/fax: national 02; international 61 2).

MEMBERSHIP FORM TO GO HERE. NEED SOFTCOPY OF IT. Khussey.

