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LETTER FROM THE EDITOR

WHITHER THE EU?

As we approach the third anniversary of the demise of the Constitutional Treaty, we await with interest the verdict of Irish voters on the Treaty of Lisbon. Even if it is approved and ratified by all other Member States, it is still a backward step for the EU. The “constitutional concept” has been abandoned and the EU has reverted to a treaty drafted by an IGC. Enhancing the democratic legitimacy of the EU is expressed as a primary aim. It is as if the people of France and the Netherlands, having rejected one vision of a more democratic union, are to have another thrust upon them. After we had all agreed that the IGC concept had had its day and Conventions were the way of the future, the Council has gone back to the past and returned to Member State governments being in full control. I, and many others had been critical of the Convention for being too, well - conventional in its makeup and approach, but the return to the IGC and a treaty is not only conservative, it is regressive. Full Member State control is the antithesis of Monnet’s vision, but also of Spinelli. It is more like the visions of de Gaulle and Thatcher.

There is much to welcome in the Treaty of Lisbon. There is to be a single Union with legal personality encompassing the EC. The TEU will remain, while the Treaty establishing the European Community will be renamed the “Treaty on the Functioning of the Union.” This would have an unfortunate acronym in English so will probably be known as the TFEU. The word “Community” will be everywhere replaced by “Union”. Such a profound change of identity deserves a new name. The new Union is going to be very different from the current one. There is determination to avoid “constitutional character”, ironic given that this is a constitution in all but name - and so it should be. The person to have been known as the ‘Minister for Foreign Affairs’ will remain the High Representative. “Minister” was always too state-like. ‘Law’ and ‘framework law’ will be abandoned with regulations, directives and decisions being retained, again, I believe, a good idea. There will be no mention of official symbols though these will not be abandoned.

There is to be no statement of the supremacy of Community/Union law as there was in the Constitutional Treaty. Instead, the case law of the Court of Justice (known to all as the European Court of Justice, but to be renamed the European Union Court of Justice) is to be noted in a Declaration. Supremacy is a fundamental principle of the Community/Union and it is a pity that it could not be explicitly stated in the foundation treaties.

Many of the innovations of the Constitutional Treaty are to be retained, but some have been modified. The Treaty is difficult to read as it makes amendments to the existing treaties rather than being a new standalone document like the CT. The publication of new consolidated versions of the Treaties as amended by the TL is welcome and very necessary.

The Charter on Fundamental Rights will be incorporated by reference. It is said to be made legally binding but this clause will be examined with great interest. This seems a messy way to ensure protection of fundamental rights in the EU. In the TFEU there will be provision for the Union to accede to the European Convention on Human Rights.

It will be explicitly stated that the Union will only act within its competences. How could it do otherwise? Such a statement seems unduly defensive but a further concession to political sensitivity.

The provisions on democracy from the Constitutional Treaty will be inserted as Title II. National parliaments are to be given 8 weeks to comment on draft legislation and if there is a majority of (weighted) votes cast by these parliaments, the Commission will re-examine the draft. The Commission can still maintain the draft, but a special procedure is activated.

Institutional changes will have to be made to both treaties. The European Council is to be made an institution and to have its individual President as in the Constitutional Treaty. However, as this person cannot preside over every configuration of the Council of Ministers, the rotating six-monthly presidency will have to remain. The conundrum of the composition of the Commission must be resolved and the President is to be given an enhanced role. It may be possible for the same person to be President of both the Commission and the European Council. That would be a huge job, but splitting it makes little sense. Perhaps it is the opportunity for a two-person team, one to concentrate on diplomacy and public relations, the other on detail in the Commission.

There is to be a very long transition to the new double majority system of voting in the Council of Ministers, with the new system not to be fully operational until 2017, and even then, subject to exceptions as set out in Art 1-25 of the Constitutional Treaty.

The ECT will be amended in particular to change its name and to subsume the EC within the EU. This may seem to achieve what many hoped for in a constitution: a short, readable document and a longer one with the details, but the TEU will not give an accurate picture of what the new EU will do.

So many of the innovations of the Constitutional Treaty are to be saved, but the whole exercise has the feeling of being taken away from the people and back into the safe hands of the politicians, bureaucrats and lawyers. Perhaps that is its natural home but it could be so much more. The EU got a long way as a technical, diplomatic apparatus, but it must embrace its mission to be democratic - truly a people's Europe.

The ratification process of the TL will be watched with interest, especially the forthcoming referendum in Ireland.

EU-Australia Relations

While the EU looks for renewal through the Treaty of Lisbon, Australia has had a change of government, which seems to herald a new era in EU-Australia relations. The new Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd is a former diplomat. While known for speaking fluent Mandarin and having served in China, he also served in Sweden. He does not have the same axe to grind with the EU as Mr Howard. In his recent overseas tour, he visited Brussels and issued a joint communiqué with Commission President Barroso. This stressed common values and historical, political, economic and cultural ties and common challenges in security and trade. There is new scope to work together on climate change and in the Pacific region. While both expressed a wish to bring the Doha Round of WTO trade negotiations to a conclusion, this is much more in the hands of the EU than Australia. It is to be hoped that co-operation in fighting terrorism is more productive than in the Haneef case.

There is to be a new Partnership Framework. Twelve years after the demise of the last attempt, this would indeed be welcome. It will be interesting to see what progress will be made by the next issue of the CESAA Review.

This Issue

This edition of the *CESAA Review* mainly consists of the winning entries from the 2006 CESAA Essay Competition. The editor can only apologise for the excessive delay in publication. Although considerable time has elapsed since they were written, the issues they canvas remain live. The editor would also like to express particular thanks to Brent Edwards for typesetting and editorial assistance in this edition's Review.

There will be another issue of the *CESAA Review* later this year. From 2009, it is to be subsumed by the *Australasian Journal of European Studies*.

Matt Harvey

May 9, 2008

STUDENT ESSAY:
TOTALITARIANISM - THE SPAWN OF EUROPE?

A. Lilian Goldsmith
Monash University, Melbourne

Europe is a continent generally associated with such lofty events as the birth of the Enlightenment, and liberal democratic thought. There is however, a flip-side to such great modern developments. In fact, it is feasible to assert that totalitarianism is, to an extent, both a European and a modern ideology. This essay will commence with a definition of key terms, namely 'totalitarian', 'European' and 'modern'. It will then examine certain political and social features of two countries - totalitarian Germany and Russia - including nationalism, ideas of universal class-based revolution, and use of liberal and Enlightenment ideals. It will conclude with the observation that it is possible to argue that totalitarianism in Germany and Russia drew upon modern European political theory and philosophical thought, and a reflection of the relevance of this observation for today's world.

Totalitarianism was a major twentieth century development. It first originated in the 1920s.¹ The term refers to a system in which control of the population is maximised - or 'total'- more so than in any other political system. It is the most extreme example of the individual's subordination to the state. Totalitarianism is a twentieth century phenomenon. This is attributable to the development during this period of technological means of controlling and transporting populations². Furthermore, new means of mass communication, including the use of radio and cinema, citizens could be subject to a constant barrage of state propaganda in a way never before possible. A new emphasis on state education systems as a medium of information dissemination also contributed to the control of the state.³ Thus, the state could achieve almost total control over individual citizens, in a manner not previously possible.

A widely cited analysis of totalitarianism was undertaken by Friedrich and Brzezinski. The authors identified in total eight salient features of totalitarianism. These were firstly, an official, all-embracing, chiliastic ideology; a single mass party, typically led by one person (the dictator); a terrorising system of police control featuring arbitrary coercion; an effective monopoly of the means of communication; an effective monopoly of armed forces; a centrally-controlled economy; a commitment to expansionism and the administrative control of the justice system.⁴ Another important feature emphasised by Arendt is a high level of citizen alienation.⁵

Criticisms of the concept include that the term is too broad to be useful, referring to the diversity of regimes categorised as totalitarianism, and also covering fundamental changes within individual regimes. The term is most useful if it is used as a paradigm, rather than as a model. Thus, totalitarianism as a political concept can be interpreted as, "a pure form of an idea, against which actual regimes are measured".⁶

Totalitarianism was originally an European phenomenon. Although totalitarianism later manifested itself outside Europe, with notable examples including Maoist China, DPR North

¹ For example, from 1925 Mussolini employed the term to describe the Italian fascist system.

² Bauman, Z. 1991, *Modernity and Ambivalence*, Polity Press, Oxford UK, p145.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Friedrich C. J., Brzezinski, Z., 1965, *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy*, Harvard UP, Cambridge MA, p19.

⁵ Arendt, H., 1951, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, New York.

⁶ Holmes, L. in Smelser, N & Baltes, P. (eds.) 2001, *International Encyclopaedia of the Social and Behavioural Sciences*, Vol. 23, Amsterdam, p4.

Korea, Laos and Vietnam, it evolved in Europe. Totalitarian regimes first came to power in Europe, in countries including Nazi Germany, Soviet Russia and Fascist Italy. Totalitarianism also took hold amongst the Eastern European nations. It can certainly be argued that totalitarianism has European origins, and to that extent is a European phenomenon. It had world-wide appeal however, and now survives most prominently outside Europe⁷.

The characteristic 'modern' is used in this essay as pertaining to modernity. 'Modernity' was an historical period originating in Western Europe with a series of fundamental social-structural and intellectual transformations in the seventeenth century. It culminated as a cultural period with the growth of the Enlightenment.⁸ The Enlightenment was a social project, which pioneered ideas of reason and rationality, notions of human equality and universal human rights, and political concepts of democracy and liberalism. Another important concept of modernity was the growth of nationalism. Modernity manifested itself in social life with the growth of industrial (both capitalist and communist) society.⁹ Liberalism was the political legacy of modernity and the Enlightenment. It grew to prominence in the nineteenth century. However a series of crises in the latter half of that century detracted from liberalism's popularity. It was replaced in part by ideologies such as imperialism and socialism. After World War I and the Great Depression (1929-1933), a new form of political regime labeled 'totalitarianism' emerged. It is argued by some that totalitarianism was a product of the Enlightenment project of modernity. Whilst it seems, *prima facie*, counter-intuitive that such a liberal period of humanity could produce such an extremist right-wing movement, there is an underlying cogency to the argument. Totalitarianism was often perceived as a counter-project to 'Western'¹⁰ modernity. In this sense, totalitarianism drew on modern precepts, yet claimed to utilise them more effectively than rival Western modernity.

Historians such as Durkheim¹¹ and Weber¹² assert that totalitarianism arose partly in response to problematic fragmentation, experienced as a result of modernity. The twin modern phenomena of capitalism and the Industrial Revolution heralded fundamental changes to society. Mass urbanisation was experienced for the first time. By 1890, the proportion of Europeans living in urban centres had almost doubled on the 1850 figures¹³. Urbanisation was fuelled in part by an explosion in the rural population, reducing the number of available rural jobs. People sought work in the cities, which were ill-equipped to deal with the sudden population influx. Living conditions in working-class suburbs were dirty, diseased and overcrowded. The masses were unhappy with these circumstances, and unrest grew. Governments and the upper-classes were confronted with the possibility of a working-class uprising, and class tension became a serious issue. Furthermore, the process of mass relocation created a sense of upheaval and rootlessness amongst the populous. People were cut off from family and traditional support networks, and removed from their traditional connections with nature and the land. Totalitarian regimes purported to have a solution to emerging fractures in European society.

Totalitarianism claimed to be able to rectify social inequalities, by taking over the state. It offered new forms of social-embedment, via the nation, or social class. In Fascist Germany and Soviet Russia, calls to totalitarianism were made on a nation-centred approach, and a universal class-based vision respectively. Class and nation-states are the primary power actors and conflict-orientated forces in modern societies.¹⁴ Within totalitarianism they functioned as, "imaginary and alternative foci for ideological projects of a unity to be achieved

⁷ I.e. DPR North Korea, Laos, Vietnam.

⁸ Bauman, Z. 1991, *Modernity and Ambivalence*, Polity Press, Oxford UK, p4.

⁹ Bauman, Z. 1991, *Modernity and Ambivalence*, Polity Press, Oxford UK, p4.

¹⁰ I.e. Modernity as formulated in England, France, the USA etc.

¹¹ See *The Division of Labor in Society*, 1893.

¹² See *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, 1904.

¹³ Brooks, Stephen. *Nineteenth Century Europe: Documents and Debates*. MacMillan Education Limited, 1983, p186.

¹⁴ Mann, M. 1993, *The Sources of Social Power*. Vol. 2: *The Rise of Classes and Nation-States 1760-1914*, Cambridge UP, Cambridge.

through struggle.”¹⁵ Links with modernity can be clearly identified when examining how totalitarian regimes in Germany and Russia drew upon nation and class.

Nationalism was an important product of modernity. It was both an intellectual and popular movement encompassing geography, history, language and culture in order to create distinct national identities within Europe. The German philosophers Herder, Hegel and Fichte were instrumental figures in the movement. The unification of Italy and Germany were two notable successes for nationalism. Annexation of colonies by European powers also helped to further nationalism, as European nations could define themselves against colonial countries, not just against other European peoples.

National unification was initially problematic for Germany - bringing together diverse peoples, with little shared history¹⁶. In order to counteract these difficulties, a process of mythologising nationalism was undertaken. Thus, commonalities of the people, such as folklore¹⁷, anthems and ceremonies were popularised as a common history belonging to all German folk. The German thinker Herder developed in his writings the idea that the culture of the Volk (people) is innately valuable, and that each nation has a unique destiny. It is arguable that it was these ideas of nationalism, taken to an extreme, which helped fuel German totalitarianism. Thus, Hitler’s Nationalist Socialist German Workers Party was, “an attempt to coerce a highly pluralistic and over-divided community into an ideologically unified frame.”¹⁸ Noted German historian Gerhard Ritter agrees with this statement, writing that, “*Volksfuhrer* Hitler’s mission...was to accomplish that which the Emperor had been unable to accomplish...:to weld the nation into a closed, war-like community under the leadership of a really popular *Fuhrer*, respected by all...”¹⁹ This attempt made use of nationalistic and patriotic devices. A speech made by Hitler to the assembled *Reichstag* exemplifies this: “I know parties no more, I only know Germans.”²⁰ Ideals of courage, discipline, and selfless willingness to serve the community were implemented through participation in the armed forces, Hitler Youth and other community groups. The devotion of all forces towards one great end contributed to nationalistic and patriotic fervour. It can clearly be seen here that Hitler’s Nazi Party made use of a legacy of modernity, nationalism, in order to further its totalitarian regime.

Soviet Russia employed different, class-based means to draw together its populous. The idea of a class based-vision linked to universal goals is an essentially modern one. It was through technological developments of modernity, culminating in the Industrial Revolution, that a working-class ‘proletariat’ first emerged. In Soviet Russia, the importance of a class-based world mission was heavily emphasised:

“The strengthening of the internal and external position of the Soviet Union, the growth of its international importance and authority, its significance as a shock-brigade for the world proletariat and a powerful bulwark of the coming world proletarian revolution, are all very closely linked with the victories of communism in our country.”²¹

Soviet Russia invested the industrial proletariat with a world-historical vision and construed its collective interest as a direct link to universal goals. This was an integral component of its totalitarian regime.²² Yet the idea of universalism with equal rights being afforded to all, as touted by totalitarian Russia, has its roots in modernity.

¹⁵ Arnason, J.P. in Siegel, A. (ed.) 1998, *The Totalitarian Paradigm After The End of Communism*, Rodopi Publishing, Atlanta, p161.

¹⁶ Edrich, C.J. in Huntington S. & Moore, C. 1970, *Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society*, Basic Books, New York, p241.

¹⁷ I.e. The work of the Brother’s Grimm.

¹⁸ Friedrich, C.J. in Huntington S. & Moore, C. 1970, *Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society*, Basic Books, New York, p239.

¹⁹ Ritter, G. in Snell, J.1966, *War and Totalitarianism*, D.C. Heath & Co., Boston, p728.

²⁰ In Snell, J.1966, *War and Totalitarianism*, D.C. Heath & Co., Boston, p728.

²¹ Zhdanov, A.A., Speech at the First All-Union Congress of Soviet Writers (1934) in Zhdanov, A.A., 1950, *On Literature, Music and Philosophy*, Lawrence & Wishart, London, p10.

²² Unger, A. 1974, *The Totalitarian Party: Party and People in Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia*, Cambridge UP, Cambridge, p65.

Concepts of universalism and equality amongst mankind initiated with thinkers such as Montesquieu, Rousseau and Immanuel Kant during the Enlightenment. Montesquieu especially embodied Enlightenment universalism: the recognition of universal human rights, and that every individual is possessed with reason and rationality.²³ The Soviet vision of a world mission also reflected cultural changes ushered in by modernity, namely an emphasis on humanity's power and responsibility, an emphasis on progress and an awareness of the historical nature of human destiny and change. Totalitarianism could also be said to rely on modern notions of the relationship between individual and state, in particular social contract theories as proposed by Hobbes²⁴, Rousseau²⁵ and John Locke. The idea behind social-contract theories was that out of self-preservation, people chose to surrender their freedom to the state. Totalitarianism holds that when all power is ceded to the state/dictator, the state will function more efficiently and effectively and better provide for the people. This is in line with modernity's social-contract theory. Thus, it can be argued that Soviet Russia derived aspects of its philosophical basis from central tenets of modernity, and as such was 'modern'.

The Marxist-Leninist ideology employed by totalitarian Russia also drew heavily on Enlightenment ideals embodied in liberal democratic politics. Liberal democracy espouses individual equality, liberation and self-fulfillment - ideals held up as the goal of the proletarian revolution in totalitarian Russia²⁶. In Soviet Russia, democratic values of modernity were misrepresented as immanent forces of historical process, which would also guarantee the destruction of capitalism as dictated by the laws of history.²⁷ It is perhaps dubious how much relevance can be placed on the practical application of Marxist-Lenin theory in Stalin's totalitarian police state. In practice, it would seem Soviet Russia paid merely lip-service to liberal ideals, with its use of violence and terror to control the population. However, it claimed a liberal theoretical basis to its revolution. Thus, there is a clear link can be seen between modernity and espoused goals of totalitarian ideology in Soviet Russia. This link could be viewed as evidence of totalitarianism's 'counter-project' of modernity²⁸, in which totalitarian regimes attempted to harness and better utilise modern ideas in comparison to their western counterparts.²⁹

Nazism placed less reliance on liberal theory than the Soviets. Nazi Germany, vehemently opposed to the Left³⁰, rejected democracy as being infiltrated and tainted by Communism.³¹ However, the regime was still dependant on the central element of the democratic project: the idea of self-determination³². Germany's totalitarian regime merely radicalised the concept into a goal of complete mastery of society over its future, including its genetic future. The importance placed by Nazi Germany on scientific control over humanity also reflects modern notions of science. It was during the Enlightenment that ideals of rationality, reason and the perfectibility of mankind gained credence and popularity, through figures such as Francis Bacon and Isaac Newton and the writings of Voltaire. Science, as the epitome of rationality and reason, was enlisted to help attain man's perfection. The importance placed by modernity on science was echoed in totalitarian Germany. Germany's ideas of social prophylaxis, through the science of eugenics³³, were strongly influenced by

²³ See *The Spirit of Laws*, 1748

²⁴ See *Leviathan, or the Matter, Form, and Power of a Commonwealth, Ecclesiastical and Civil*, 1651.

²⁵ See *The Social Contract*, 1762.

²⁶ Unger, A. 1974, *The Totalitarian Party: Party and People in Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia*, Cambridge UP, Cambridge, p72.

²⁷ Brooks, S. 1983, *Nineteenth Century Europe: Documents and Debates*. MacMillan Education Limited, Sydney, p67.

²⁸ See Jarvis, S. 1998, *Adorno: A Critical Introduction*, Polity Press, Cornwall, Chpt 1.

²⁹ I.e. Western Europe, the USA.

³⁰ Friedrich, C.J. in Huntington S. & Moore, C. 1970, *Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society*, Basic Books, New York, p241.

³¹ *Ibid.*

³² Talmon, J. 1981, *The Myth of the Nation and the Vision of Revolution*, University of California Press, Berkeley, p214.

³³ Friedrich, C.J. in Huntington S. & Moore, C. 1970, *Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society*, Basic Books, New York, p246.

Enlightenment attitudes to science. At the centre of the ideology of modernity was the idea of the value of progress and of the superiority of the civilisation that promoted progress. This concept can certainly be identified in Nazi ideology, which praised the superiority of the German nation as it strived towards its goal of social restructuring. Again, clear links between modernity and totalitarian Germany can be identified here.

It is important to note however, that there is no direct and logical progression from modernity to totalitarianism. Whilst totalitarianism in Russia and Germany drew upon various modern influences, the examples given occurred in highly specific historical circumstances, in conjunction with other forces.

Whilst the analysis conducted here is not exhaustive, it goes some way to showing the influence of modernity on two European totalitarian regimes, Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia. This influence can be seen in the use of nationalism and class-based universalism. It can also be identified through liberal ideals of the Soviet regime, and through Enlightenment of self-determination and the perfectibility of man through science in Nazi Germany. Thus, it can be argued that in certain instances totalitarianism is, to an extent, both European and modern. At first glance, this conclusion seems counter-intuitive and contradictory to the historically-understood values and aims of modernity. Yet there are lessons to be learnt here, especially pertinent in today's world which also brays loudly of liberal democratic values only to silently succumb to fundamentalist and nationalist tendencies. *"History is not a straight line going from the beginning to the end, it loops and swirls, eventually finding its way back to places it has been before."*³⁴

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- http://web.syr.edu/~dtmerril/history_repeats.htm, "History Repeats": 12/9/06.

³⁴ http://web.syr.edu/~dtmerril/history_repeats.htm

STUDENT ESSAY:

THE ART OF MEMORIAL ARCHITECTURE: DANIEL LIBESKIND'S JEWISH MUSEUM IN BERLIN. HOW DOES LIBESKIND'S MUSEUM FUNCTION AS A MEMORIAL, THEREBY CONSTRUCTING MEMORY AND REPRESENTING HISTORY?

*You think that just because it's already happened, the past is finished and unchangeable? Oh no, the past is cloaked in multicoloured taffeta and every time we look at it we see a different hue.*³⁵

Dora Banyasz
The University of Melbourne

Introduction

Remembering and understanding the Holocaust has not only been a concern of Jewish people, but also of non-Jews, particularly in those countries where the atrocities took place.³⁶ This concern has inspired the building of many public monuments, memorials, and institutions, the Berlin Jewish Museum being one of these.³⁷ The impetus for this museum was the ethical-cum-political imperative of remembering the country's Nazi past.³⁸ Daniel Libeskind designed a museum which embodies the history and memory of the Jews, in a city that had not so long ago voided itself of Jews.³⁹ It is undoubtedly a work of art in its own right, visited by thousands before exhibits were even installed, and it is this aspect of the museum which will be explored in this essay.

Libeskind's museum seeks to respond to the 'paralysing dilemma Berlin faces in trying to reintegrate its lost Jewish past.'⁴⁰ The architectural design has succeeded in articulating in a visual and spatial format the void at the centre of German society of its lost and murdered Jews.⁴¹ It integrates the past and the future into a design which enables visitors in the present to appreciate the complexities and history of Berlin and its Jews. As Libeskind himself expressed in his speech for the opening of the museum, 'this museum should represent the future, not only the past; the beginning, not only the end ... and engage the visitor on a mental, visceral, and emotional level with the Jewish dimension of Berlin and German history.'⁴²

To use Pierre Nora's words, the building is a *lieux de mémoire*, reflecting a clear and identifiable 'will to remember.'⁴³ Although Libeskind expressly states that the museum is not a memorial, it can arguably be described as such, given that it is 'a place in which the story of the significance, sacrifice, tragedy and destiny of conflict can come alive.'⁴⁴ It is a space devoted to the remembrance of events past, to the repercussions of those events for the present and future, and is contributing to the process of the memorialisation of the Holocaust

³⁵ Milan Kundera, *Life is Elsewhere* (London: Faber and Faber, 1986), 105.

³⁶ James E. Young (ed.), *The Art of Memory: Holocaust Memorials in History* (Munich: Prestel-Verlag, 1994), 7.

³⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁸ Jan-Werner Müller, *Memory and Power in Post-War Europe: Studies in the Presence of the Past*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 18.

³⁹ Young, *At Memory's Edge*, 152.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 155.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*

⁴² Daniel Libeskind, *Daniel Libeskind: The Space of Encounter* (London: Thames & Hudson, 2001), 25.

⁴³ Pierre Nora, "Between Memory and History: *Les Lieux de Mémoire*" *Representations* 26 (1989), 132.

⁴⁴ Daniel Libeskind, "Catching on Fire"; available from <http://www.daniel-libeskind.com/words/index.html>; accessed 7 November 2006.

at large. Ultimately, through its powerfully evocative spatial and visual arrangement, which actually makes visible the consequences of German history, the museum confronts each visitor, thereby shaping memories on both the individual and the collective level.

The Museum

The architectural design of the museum itself articulates the history of the Jews of Berlin, and in many ways is contributing to the construction of a collective memory for all those who visit, and in particular for the city itself. In submitting his design to the city planners in 1989, Libeskind devoted himself to the spatial enactment of a philosophical problem, an architectural representation of historical meaning.⁴⁵ He sought to express the complex history of Jews in Berlin in architectural form and to make that story relevant to the present and future.

The linking of the Jewish Museum to the already existing Berlin Museum reflects the inextricable link between Berlin's history and culture and the city's Jewish culture. Upon entering the Jewish museum, the visitor is faced with three subterranean axes which intersect but lead to different ends, each representing one of three realities of German-Jewish history.⁴⁶ The first and longest axis, which begins in the Berlin Museum, leads up through the Stairs of Continuity to the exhibition space; to the present, and as of yet uncertain future.⁴⁷ The second axis leads out into the Garden of Exile and Emigration, a garden which represents the disorientation which awaited those who left Berlin and the disorientation of Berlin.⁴⁸ Approaching the Garden, the corridor rises, the path to exile being a difficult one, and whilst daylight is visible at the end of the corridor, the space becomes gradually narrower.⁴⁹ Inside the Garden are 49 seven metre high concrete columns in a rigid grid, standing on slightly sloped ground. At the top of each, vegetation grows, but almost invisible to the visitor. The third axis 'is a dead end, leading to the Holocaust tower.'⁵⁰ Entered through a heavy steel gate, the Holocaust tower is an oppressive and suffocating space. It is not heated in winter, nor cooled in summer, and lit only by a narrow shaft of natural light.⁵¹ The hum of the city is clearly audible but inaccessible.

The final architectural feature of the museum, the void, perhaps communicates most remarkably the history of the Holocaust. The void is an empty space that runs through the centre of the museum, violating 'every space which it passes'.⁵² It is consistently in the visitor's path. Through its inaccessibility, the void represents that which is absent, has vanished, but that must still be made present. However, the void does not simply make visible the disappearance of Berlin's Jews. It is representative of various voids which exist on different levels in Berlin: the absence of morality which allowed Berlin to void itself of Jews, an inner space empty of love and values that might have saved Berlin's Jews,⁵³ and the gap in continuity in the cultural history of Berlin's Jew.⁵⁴ This sense of a void is one of the central ideas behind the building, and as Caroline Weidmer articulates, is a 'brilliant architectural rendition of the ravages of a shattered civilisation.'⁵⁵ These articulated spaces force the visitor to engage with the implications of an ongoing history.⁵⁶ Combined, these architectural features form a

⁴⁵ Young, *At Memory's Edge*, 163.

⁴⁶ Jewish Museum Berlin, "Architecture"; available from <http://www.juedisches-museum-berlin.de/site/EN/04-Architecture/02-Libeskind-Building/04-Axes/axes.php>; accessed 7 November 2006.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

⁴⁸ Libeskind, *The Space of Encounter*, 26.

⁴⁹ Jewish Museum Berlin, "Architecture"; available from <http://www.juedisches-museum-berlin.de/site/EN/04-Architecture/02-Libeskind-Building/04-Axes/axes.php>; accessed 7 November 2006.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

⁵¹ Libeskind, *The Space of Encounter*, 26.

⁵² Young, *At Memory's Edge*, 164.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 165.

⁵⁴ Maria Alvarez, "Angst and the Architect", *The Age*, 7 October 2000, 2.

⁵⁵ Caroline Weidmer, *The Claims of Memory* (London: Cornell University Press, 1999), 7.

⁵⁶ Libeskind, *The Space of Encounter*, 28.

confronting piece of architecture, which in turn establishes 'a permanent trace of the past in the future.'⁵⁷ The architecture communicates multiple aspects of the history of Berlin's Jews. The museum, however, does not simply represent the Holocaust in a vacuum, but as an event on the continuum of Jewish life in Berlin, which continues to exist today up through the Stairs of Continuity.

Where, when, by who, for whom?⁵⁸

Memory is never shaped in a vacuum;⁵⁹ 'the past is narrated in accordance with a need for self-preservation in the present, and the types of narratives thereby created are entirely enmeshed in the historical and cultural contexts that have engendered them.'⁶⁰ Thus, the context and time in which this museum was built, as well as who it was built by and for whom, are important considerations in analysing how the museum constructs memory and represents history.

The historical and social context amid which the museum was planned and built sheds some light on the way in which the Nazi past is remembered. In the 1960s, members of West Berlin's Jewish community declared that the city was obligated to build an independent Jewish museum.⁶¹ Through the 1970s and 1980s, the debate continued, and extended to encompass the issue of whether the proposed Jewish museum should be an independent museum, or alternatively form a part of the Berlin Museum.⁶² Eventually, in 1988, the Berlin Senate called for designs for a museum, which would both be a part of and separate from the Berlin Museum.⁶³ Libeskind's design was accepted by the Senate in 1989, only months before the fall of the Berlin Wall. Over the next decade the building process faced numerous difficulties, many relating to budget restrictions resulting from the costs of reunification, but was finally opened to the public in 1999.⁶⁴ The division of Germany for a period of almost thirty years not long after the Holocaust undoubtedly resulted in the formation of two distinct collective memories of the Holocaust. In East Germany, official memory of the Jewish catastrophe, when not repressed, was created through the myth of anti-fascism.⁶⁵ In West Germany, initially a code of silence prevailed in which a few heroes were pulled from the remains of national defeat, until the 1970s, when a flood of memory burst open as a key element of national self-definition.⁶⁶ Commemoration of Kristallnacht, for example, was all but covered by a shroud of silence and neglect for more than three decades. It was only in the late 1970s that West German newspapers began to commemorate the anniversary of this event.⁶⁷ Upon reunification, former East Germans were essentially expected to adopt West German memory of the Holocaust, as the process of assimilation commenced.⁶⁸ The museum now forms the backbone for Germany's collective memory, and plays an important role in reunifying the post-war division of memory.

The location of the museum is significant because in the memorialisation of any event the location of the memorial has a considerable bearing on how the event is remembered. We thus see the Holocaust remembered from varying angles in Germany, in Israel, in the US, and in other affected countries, demonstrating that one event can generate a variety of memories. As

⁵⁷ Ibid., 24.

⁵⁸ Or what James Young refers to as the 'texture of memory', in James E. Young, *The Texture of Memory: Holocaust Memorials and meaning* (London: Yale University Press, 1993), ix.

⁵⁹ Ibid., 2.

⁶⁰ Weidmer, *The Claims of Memory*, 5.

⁶¹ Young, *At Memory's Edge*, 158.

⁶² Ibid., 159.

⁶³ Ibid., 160.

⁶⁴ Ibid., 171.

⁶⁵ Weidmer, *The Claims of Memory*, 5.

⁶⁶ Ibid., 4.

⁶⁷ Y. Michal Bodemann (ed.), *Jews, Germans, Memory* (Michigan: The University of Michigan Press, 1999), 185.

⁶⁸ Weidmer, *The Claims of Memory*, 5.

James Young articulates, 'depending on where these memorials are constructed and by whom, these sites recall the past according to a variety of national myths, ideals, and political needs ... each reflects both the past experiences and current lives of their communities, as well as the state's memory of itself.'⁶⁹ In Israel, martyrs and heroes are remembered, redeemed by the birth of the State of Israel, whilst in the US, the principles guiding Holocaust memorials are the American ideals of liberty, pluralism, and immigration.⁷⁰ In Germany, memorials tell of the absence of the Jews. This fracturing of the memory of the Holocaust in different countries demonstrates the subjectivity of memory. Berlin's Jewish Museum can be interpreted as having been built because of the government's and the country's need to explain the nation's past and to ensure that the Holocaust does not evaporate from the collective memory of society, to ensure that it is never forgotten.

Libeskind's personal background is also highly relevant to the question of how the museum constructs memory and represents history. Libeskind was born in post-war Poland, the son of Holocaust survivors, who had lost most of their family.⁷¹ Feeling directly implicated in what the museum represents, Libeskind designed the museum according to his personal understanding of the events of the Holocaust, it is partially his response to the past.

The increasing temporal and generational distance from the experience of the Holocaust is also significant.⁷² The museum was clearly built for a present and future Germany, for a Germany where personal memories of the Holocaust are slowly evaporating, and all memory is becoming second-hand. Over time, as new generations visit the museum under new circumstances, it will become invested with new meanings.⁷³ Consequently, the museum will never be static. Rather, the memory it constructs will be constantly evolving, as interpretations change and meaning is generated in new social and political environments.

All these factors combined illustrate well Maurice Halbwach's argument that memory is determined by a social context, as well as the notion 'that there are as many memories as there are groups, that memory is by nature multiple and yet specific; collective, plural, and yet individual.'⁷⁴ Furthermore, both individual memory and collective memory are an 'ongoing process'⁷⁵, subject to modification.

The Theatre of Memory and History

Whilst history and memory are two distinct ways of approaching the past, they are also mutually dependent. This is illustrated in Libeskind's museum, where the physical spaces evoke a representation of history and simultaneously construct memory.⁷⁶ Renowned violinist Isaak Stern expressed the view that 'the atmosphere of forlornness and disorientation was so strong that for me this building says more than a thousand memorials, statues, pictures, or screams.'⁷⁷ Thus, for every visitor, the museum is supplementing their memory or knowledge of the Holocaust and the history of the Jews in Berlin. Each visitor will take from their experience of Libeskind's building what their social framework allows them to, what their theatre of memory permits, and the museum will perhaps allow individuals to view their experiences differently and in a new matrix of meaning. Similarly, the museum is building a collective memory for the city of Berlin, and more expansively for all those who visit. Collective memory is formed

⁶⁹ Young (ed.), *The Art of Memory*, 19.

⁷⁰ Young, *The Texture of Memory*, 2.

⁷¹ Libeskind, *The Space of Encounter*, 23.

⁷² Young (ed.), *The Art of Memory*, 13.

⁷³ Young, *The Texture of Memory*, 3.

⁷⁴ Nora, "Between Memory and History: *Les Lieux de Mémoire*", 122.

⁷⁵ Müller, *Memory and Power in Post-War Europe*, 21.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 39.

⁷⁷ Jewish Museum Berlin, "Press"; available from http://www.juedisches-museum-berlin.de/site/EN/06-Press/current_press.php; accessed 7 November 2006.

through a medium shared by two or more individuals; this medium is in essence a theatre in which events are re-enacted and portrayed.⁷⁸

Libeskind expressed that one of the basis ideas that formed the foundation for the museum was 'the necessity to integrate physically and spiritually the meaning of the Holocaust into the consciousness and memory of the city of Berlin.'⁷⁹ This is achieved through the multi-sensory experience that the museum provides, and which leads visitors to an understanding and or evocation of events.⁸⁰

The void, one of the central ideas underpinning the building, is an expression of the ongoing presence of the Holocaust in Germany for Jews and gentiles alike. For the Holocaust not only resulted in the physical extermination of six million Jewish lives, but has also left an indelible mark on German society for subsequent generations. The void makes not only the history of the Jews of Berlin, but also the history of Berlin as influenced by the Holocaust, manifest in the experience of the museum. In a sense it represents a history that can never be fully articulated with words, images, or exhibits, and makes 'palpable a sense that much more is missing here than can ever be shown.'⁸¹ This is in stark opposition to many other museums, where it is implied that what you see is all there is to see, all that there ever was.⁸² Importantly, this void, imbued with metaphoric significance, forces the visitor to reflect and respond, to confront their own perceptions and understanding of the Holocaust. It represents history on various levels, and as Jacques Derrida explains, is 'totally invested with history, meaningfulness, and experience.'⁸³ It will thereby, over time, contribute to the construction of a collective memory of the Holocaust for the city of Berlin, and for all those who visit the museum, whilst also presenting a history of the Jewish dimension of Berlin.

The subterranean linkage of the old Berlin Museum to the new Jewish Museum illustrates both a historical dichotomy and symbiosis between Berlin and its Jewish population. Not only does it contextualise the Holocaust within a much broader history of German-Jewish relations, highlighting the independent nature of Jewish society and experience, it also demonstrates that the history of the Jews of Berlin is deeply intertwined with the history of the city itself. Thus, the physical space and form give substance beyond the visible, which was exactly the conception with which Libeskind worked,⁸⁴ presenting to the visitor a contradictory autonomy on the surface but a binding together in depth.⁸⁵

The Garden of Exile and Emigration and the Holocaust Tower are representing history in a remarkable way. History is traditionally represented through words and images. However, these two spaces in essence try to emulate, on a physical and cognitive level, the experiences of emigration and the Holocaust. Libeskind's building, like any other memorial space, has an essentially dialogical quality; the visitor's response to the museum is as important as the physical structure itself. Until visited and engaged with, the museum remains inert.

Conclusion

The museum functions on one level as a common site of memory, where each visitor is invited to remember in their own way, in their own framework, in their own theatre of memory. This has implications for both individual and collective memory. On another level, however, the museum reflects an understanding of history, which integrates the history of the

⁷⁸ Bodemann (ed.), *Jews, Germans, Memory*, 181.

⁷⁹ Daniel Libeskind, "The Jewish Museum Berlin: Between the Lines"; available from <http://www.daniel-libeskind.com/projects/pro.html?ID=2>; accessed 7 November 2006.

⁸⁰ Young, *The Texture of Memory*, 12.

⁸¹ Young, *At Memory's Edge*, 179.

⁸² *Ibid.*, 179.

⁸³ Daniel Libeskind, *Daniel Libeskind: radix-matrix* (Munich: Prestel-Verlag, 1997), 111.

⁸⁴ Libeskind, *The Space of Encounter*, 24.

⁸⁵ Young, *At Memory's Edge*, 174.

Jews of Germany and the repercussions of the Holocaust.⁸⁶ As the president of Berlin's Jewish Community commented upon approving Libeskind's design: 'No future visitor will be able to look around the Jewish Museum without taking in the history of Berlin; nor will anyone be able to visit the Berlin Musuem without experiencing the history of Berlin's Jewish citizens in the past and present.'⁸⁷

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⁸⁶ Daniel Libeskind, "The Jewish Musuem Berlin: Between the Lines"; available from <http://www.daniel-libeskind.com/projects/pro.html?ID=2>; accessed 7 November 2006.

⁸⁷ As quoted in, Young, *At Memory's Edge*, 170.

ENLARGEMENT TO THE EAST & THE FUTURE OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

Sebastian Strangio

Melbourne Researcher currently based in Phnom Penh, Cambodia

The May 2004 enlargement of the European Union - encompassing Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Hungary, Malta, Cyprus and the Baltic States - was unprecedented in its scope and is likely to have a significant effect on the future trajectory of economic and political integration in Europe. Arguably, the accession of the Central and East European countries (CEECs) from the isolation of the Cold War period to full membership of the European community is the principal challenge arising from the latest enlargement round. At first glance, the challenge does indeed seem daunting: the eight acceding CEECs, whilst representing a combined area of 23% of the existing EU-15 and roughly a quarter of its population, contribute only 4% of its GDP.⁸⁸ The relative underdevelopment of the CEECs is also reflected in the structure of their economies, which are heavily reliant upon agriculture and wedded to the large and inefficient state industries established under communism. Politically, the enlargement has realigned the Union, shifting it away from its West European roots and stretching it to the southern and eastern fringes of the European landmass - towards the Balkans, Russia, Ukraine and the Caucasus. The 'return to Europe' of so many post-communist CEECs with diverse and heterogeneous populations could have far-reaching implications for the internal workings and institutional dynamics of the enlarged EU-25.

The 2004 enlargement has since attracted its fair share of criticism. Although others have predicted that the objective, long-term benefits of the fourth enlargement round will outweigh any potential costs - that it will be 'a win-win situation', to quote Alan Mayhew - the prognosis is still uncertain.⁸⁹ Whether such a 'widening' of the EU can be implemented only at the expense of the 'deepening' of Europe's economic and political integration - or whether both will continue to proceed 'hand-in-hand' as the European Commission claims⁹⁰ - is an argument that cannot be settled with any certainty only two years after the accession of the new member states. And given the unprecedented size and ambitious scope of the 2004 enlargement, comparisons with past rounds of EU enlargement are perhaps misplaced. Although apprehension has preceded each previous round of EU/European Economic Community (EEC) enlargement, such fears have generally given way under the reforms and growth brought on by accession and membership of the EU/EEC. For example, the accession of Greece in 1981, followed by the accession of Spain and Portugal in 1986, introduced three relatively poor countries into the EEC and raised fears that the EU's power balance would be 'tilted' to the south. As it turned out, predictions that Spain and Portugal would act as an 'Iberian bloc' and affect institutional decision-making turned out to be overblown. Likewise, the antagonistic posture of the United Kingdom in the 1980s and 1990s was never serious enough to derail the process of European integration - even though it may have seemed so at the time.⁹¹ It would be tempting to predict that the 10+2 enlargement round will, in the medium to long-term, follow a similar pattern. However, despite some similarities, it would be foolish to assume that the same benefits will accrue for the 2004 enlargement as for previous, smaller episodes of

⁸⁸ Alan Mayhew, *Recreating Europe: the European Union's Policy Towards Central and Eastern Europe*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 183.

⁸⁹ Mayhew, *Recreating Europe*, 199.

⁹⁰ Jan Zielonka, "How New Enlarged Borders Will Reshape the European Union," *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 39, No.3 (September 2001): 510.

⁹¹ Neill Nugent, "Previous Enlargement Rounds," in Neill Nugent (ed.), *European Union Enlargement*, (Basingstoke & New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 28-9.

enlargement. As Andas Inotai has put it, ‘the problems, challenges and tasks of today’s Europe can hardly be compared to those of two decades ago’.⁹²

In extending its borders to the east, the EU has embraced a number of highly diverse member states whilst at the same time diversifying its own membership base. This diversity, represented most clearly by the acceding CEECs, is the primary challenge of the 2004 enlargement. The inclusion of the cultural and ethnic watersheds of central and eastern Europe will likely alter notions of what it means to be ‘European’, and the degree to which ‘Europeanness’ comes to be correlated with the span and ideals of the EU itself. On an institutional level also, the inclusion of the CEECs could pose new challenges to the decision-making mechanisms of the EU-25 and, given their current attachment to the United States, further hinder the development of a common European stance in foreign policy. The CEECs are also far from a monolithic bloc of post-Soviet republics, diverging significantly in such areas as ethnic composition, economic development, previous relations with the EU and differing levels of success in implementing the *acquis* in the years leading up to the 2004 accession.⁹³

Ultimately, of course, any survey into the ‘success’ of the EU’s latest enlargement round has to measure itself against a predetermined set of goals. But the EU itself has not provided a succinct set of objectives for its project of enlargement: the avowed aim of creating ‘an ever closer union’ describes a process, not an end goal. The EU’s *Agenda 2000: Strengthening and Widening the European Union* observes that one of the greatest tasks for the EU is to ‘heal the divisions of Europe and to extend the peace and prosperity to the central and eastern European countries that present EU countries have’.⁹⁴ But such lofty aims leave the issue of political integration tantalizingly unanswered: is the EU aiming to be a loose economic union or some form of Westphalian super-state, complete with standing army and a unified foreign policy? It could be argued that this very ambiguity offers the only guarantee of consensus amongst so diverse a group of member states, who are each able to interpret the end goal of European integration in a different way to suit the exigencies of domestic opinion.⁹⁵ If this is the case, the eastern enlargement is unlikely to wring a more precise end-goal out of the European Commission; if anything, the increased diversity of its membership means that the definition will only grow more vague.

Given that Jan Zielonka has written that ‘one can hardly identify the aims and criteria of enlargement without determining the aims of the EU itself’,⁹⁶ an analysis of the 2004 enlargement should begin with the challenge of diversity and how it is likely to impact on the current trajectory of European integration. Even with no clearly elucidated end goal, we can examine the degree to which the accession of ten different new member states - including eight CEECs - will strengthen or weaken Europe’s proven ability to reach consensus, promote economic growth and carry on the underlying project of political integration in the coming years. Given the concerted attempts by the EU-15 to smooth the path to membership and ensure strict European ‘standards’ have been upheld in the transition, it could be said that the long-term credibility and power of the European project hinges on the success - or lack thereof - of the 2004 enlargement.

⁹² Andras Inotai, “The ‘Eastern Enlargements’ of the European Union,” in: Cremona, Marise (ed.), *The Enlargement of the European Union*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 89.

⁹³ Inotai, “The ‘Eastern Enlargements’ of the European Union,” 93-4.

⁹⁴ *Europe’s Agenda 2000: Strengthening and Widening the European Union*, (Priority Publications Program, 1999), available [Online]: http://ec.europa.eu/comm/agenda2000/public_en.pdf [Accessed 18 May 2006], 3.

⁹⁵ Zielonka, “How New Enlarged Borders Will Reshape the European Union,” 508.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 528.

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The main challenge arising from the European Union's enlargements - in the past, present and future - has been the challenge of diversity. In particular, the way in which the EU has managed to ameliorate the difference between member states and promote a culture of consensus in the face of such 'historical' antagonisms. While it may appear daunting, diversity has a tendency to be Janus-faced, able to act as the basis of a culture of consensus - in the sense of the EU's 'unity in diversity' rhetoric - just as easily as it can also create and exacerbate divisions on the European mainland. Jan Zielonka and Peter Mair have argued that the 'demonization' of diversity is often misplaced and that 'not all types of diversity need prove detrimental to the process of European integration'. Arguably, the challenges and opportunities of the 2004 enlargement are merely two sides of the same coin, able to shift depending on the context.⁹⁷ As has already been noted, earlier constellations of the Union managed to function despite encompassing a diverse set of member states, a number of which at various times harboured feelings of mistrust towards the European project. Even by the standards of the most ardent federalist, the EU is not aiming to make identical clones out of its member states; by the same token, neither is it likely to become a fully integrated Westphalian polity. The ultimate aim of integration, given the lack of a definition from Brussels, is rather about identifying shared objectives and points of common interest. For instance, Eurobarometer polls have shown that identification with a supranational 'European' polity is quite low, but that it has not held back the wave of popular support for accession in the CEECs.⁹⁸

As Zielonka and Mair observe, the acceptance of the *acquis communautaire* - the long list of conditions preceding accession to the EU - could even be seen as an indication of convergence.⁹⁹ Certainly, the enlargement into eastern and central Europe has not been taken lightly by the EU-15. Prior to the Copenhagen summit of 1993, Article 237 of the treaty of the EEC stated that 'any European state may apply to become a member of the community'.¹⁰⁰ At Copenhagen, such ambiguity was replaced with a series of rigorous standards, which have since acted as a benchmark for EU membership. Likewise, a vast body of European law has been to be integrated into the national legislation of the candidate countries. On one hand, such forms of membership conditionality are necessary for 'protecting' the future integration process in Europe, safeguarding the unique institutional frameworks of the Union from the influx of new member states.¹⁰¹ On the other hand, arguably, they have also acted as a potent foreign policy tool of the EU-15, exploiting the Union's considerable power of attraction to affect change in the internal workings of sovereign states outside the EU.¹⁰² A judgement on whether the 2004 enlargement will strengthen or weaken the EU must inevitably involve an analysis of these institutional checks and balances, and the degree to which they have been successful in ameliorating the vastly increased diversity of the EU-25 since May 2004.

The success of the eastern enlargement of the EU will largely depend on the degree to which the interests of the EU-15 and the acceding CEECs manage to converge in spite of the ethnic, cultural and economic disparities that exist between them. It will also depend on the effect of the *acquis* in the new member states, and the role it plays in fostering or moulding the aforementioned consensus. In short, it is the degree of mutual compatibility - in both

⁹⁷ Peter Mair & Jan Zielonka, "Introduction: Diversity and Adaptation in the Enlarged European Union", in: Mair & Zielonka (eds.), *The Enlarged European Union*, (London & Portland: Frank Cass, 2002), 2.

⁹⁸ Laurie Buonanno & Anna Deakin, "European Identity," in: Nugent (ed.), *European Union Enlargement*, 87 & 95.

⁹⁹ Mair & Zielonka, "Introduction: Diversity and Adaptation in the Enlarged European Union", 8.

¹⁰⁰ Nugent, "Previous Enlargement Rounds," 35.

¹⁰¹ Karen Smith, "The Evolution and Application of EU Membership Conditionality," in: Cremona (ed.), *The Enlargement of the European Union*, 106-7 & *passim*.

¹⁰² See Smith, "The Evolution and Application of EU Membership Conditionality," 108 & Olav Stokke, "Aid and Political Conditionality: Core Issues and State of the Art," in: Stokke, Olav (ed.), *Aid and Political Conditionality*, (London & Portland: Frank Cass, 1995), 11-3.

concrete and normative terms - that will prove most important in judging the success of the most recent round of European enlargement.¹⁰³ As it will be argued, the 2004 enlargement has taken place without the paralysis that many expected. At this (admittedly early) stage, it appears that the provisions of the Copenhagen criteria and the awareness within the EU-15 of the necessity of reform have played a vital role in preparing both member states and candidate states for the institutional, political and economic workings of the Union. The challenges facing the EU since the 2004 enlargement - and the approaches taken towards meeting them - will be discussed under the following headings: a) identity challenges; b) economic challenges; c) institutional and decision-making challenges; and d) challenges to the EU-25's external relations.

The question of European identity and the impact that the eastern enlargement will have on its long-term patterns are difficult to pin down with any certainty. The EU may have set thorough political and economic benchmarks for membership, but the Union remains ambiguous on the issue of identity: it has stated that any European democracy can theoretically apply for membership, yet has failed to provide a robust explanation of what is meant by 'European'.¹⁰⁴ This is unsurprising, since the question of 'Europe' is wrought with political and cultural implications that could create unnecessary tensions within the EU. As William Wallace has put it,

*What Europe you see depends on where you live. 'Europe' is a moveable set of myths and images, both positive and negative, embedded in national histories and vernacular literatures. There is no idea of Europe common to all European states, and therefore also no agreement on where Europe ends. West and East Europeans, Northern and Southern Europeans all have their own definition of what Europe means and where it ends - and all are equally convinced that they are offering a generally valid definition (emphases added).*¹⁰⁵

The emphasis on the *national* aspects of European identity has interesting parallels with Eurobarometer polls conducted before the 2004 accessions. The polls found that CEEC residents were more concerned in the instrumental gains that would result from EU membership rather than the edifying prospect of a 'return to Europe'.¹⁰⁶

The main effect of the recent enlargement has been to extend the EU's territorial extent - and therefore its particular brand of 'European' identity - further across the continent. Although levels of European identification amongst EU citizens remain limited - usually playing second fiddle to national and regional allegiances - the extension of the EU to the eastern steppes and the Balkans arguably 'shuts out' any competing European model and asserts the primacy of the EU's own conception of Europe. Put differently, the European Union, since 2004 and more than ever before, is becoming coterminous with 'Europe', while 'European' is coming to describe the unique system of supranational, social democratic government that characterizes the Union.

On the whole, European identity is a luxurious concept. Given Europe's heterogeneity, some doubt 'whether the constitution of an European *demos* with a tenable collective identity is possible at all'.¹⁰⁷ Historically, Europeanness has primarily emerged in circumstances of political stability and economic prosperity, which could perhaps explain why the concept of

¹⁰³ Helene Sjursen, "Why Expand? The Question of Legitimacy and Justification in the EU's Enlargement Policy," *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 40, No. 3 (2002): 494.

¹⁰⁴ Robert A. Jones, *The Politics and Economics of the European Union*, (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 1996), 275.

¹⁰⁵ William Wallace, "Where Does Europe End? Dilemmas of Inclusion and Exclusion," in: Jan Zielonka (ed.), *Europe Unbound: Enlarging and Reshaping the Borders of the European Union*, (London & New York: Routledge, 2002), 79.

¹⁰⁶ Buonanno & Deakin, "European Identity," 87.

¹⁰⁷ Dieter Fuchs & Hans-Dieter Klingemann, "Eastward Enlargement of the European Union and the Identity of Europe," in: Mair & Zielonka (eds). *The Enlarged European Union*, 19.

Europe would appear weaker in the developing CEECs and stronger in the West. While there is clearly no *single* version of European identity, the EU has succeeded in identifying points of common interest - that is, political stability, social welfare and economic prosperity - upon which a sense of 'Europe' can be built. As Laurie Buonanno and Anna Deakin point out, the tradition of social democracy may prove to be the firmest basis for the formation of a European identity.¹⁰⁸ While the latest enlargement of the EU may challenge this Western conception of 'Europe', it will also likely strengthen the EU's credentials as the standard bearer for the peoples of Europe and create the conditions required for such the 'imagined community' of Europe to come about and flourish.¹⁰⁹ The degree to which the EU will be able to sustain this in the face of future enlargements - encompassing, for instance, Turkey, Ukraine and the Balkans - is still open for debate.

Thus far, the most tangible achievement of the 2004 enlargement has been in the field of economics. The arguments originally put forth by those predicting the potential strength of the EU-25 economy are compelling, and have been borne out - albeit in a more limited sense - by the progress of the new member states since May 2004. Indeed, the goals of economic growth, increased trade and security within the post-Soviet republics in eastern and central Europe are possibly the most commonly shared objectives within the EU-25 and therefore a firm foundation for further cooperation. The economic achievements of the enlargement have not taken place without problems. However, as of 2006, the concrete benefits in this area have easily outweighed the drawbacks, many of which were preempted by the pre-accession negotiations and the agreements reached at Copenhagen and Schengen. By a strict cost-benefit analysis, the 2004 enlargement has certainly been worth the effort.

Even before the accession of the CEECs to the EU, the increased contact with EU member states in Western Europe had wrought positive changes in the atrophied socialist economies of the East. From 1997 to 2005, GDP per capita in each of the CEECs has improved against the EU-15 average, growth that has undoubtedly been driven by economic restructuring and the implementation of the *acquis*.¹¹⁰ Following enlargement, economic benefits have accrued on both sides of the divide. Since 2004, the CEECs have experienced steady economic growth. The EU-25 posted GDP growth of 2.6% in 2004, well below global growth but robust by EU standards. Growth in the ten acceding countries was much higher in the year following accession, with Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia showing GDP growth of 7.1%, 7.5% and 5.9% respectively. Less - though still significant - gains were shown also by Hungary and Poland.¹¹¹ Alan Mayhew has further argued that the EU-15 will also gain from the enlargement, citing the benefits of an enlarged single market, which is likely to bring increased two-way trade between the EU-15 and the CEECs.¹¹² The EU is unambiguous in claiming credit for the increased growth, describing the provisions of the *acquis* as fostering a 'process of modernization affect[ing] the political and administrative culture of the acceding member states, as well as their economic, and ultimately their social, environment'.¹¹³

Much of this has to do with the establishment of a stable and secure business environment on the European continent. Indeed, security and peace have arguably been the most significant achievements of the European integration project since the 1950s, and the extension of such a 'zone of stability' to the east has likewise been a success, although with

¹⁰⁸ Buonanno & Deakin, "European Identity," 102.

¹⁰⁹ See Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism*, (London & New York: Verso, 1991).

¹¹⁰ See table in "Enlargement, Two Years After: An Economic Evaluation," *European Commission Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs, Occasional Papers, No. 24 (May 2006)*, available [Online]: http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/occasional_papers/2006/ocp24en.pdf [Accessed 18 May 2006], 34.

¹¹¹ Debra Johnson, "Developments in the Economies of the New Member States and the Candidate Countries," *Journal of Common Market Studies* Vol.43, Annual Review (2005): 200-02.

¹¹² Mayhew, *Recreating Europe*, 190.

¹¹³ "Enlargement, Two Years After: An Economic Evaluation," 1.

only two years hindsight it is difficult to make definitive judgements. Mayhew cites the 'Aussöhnung' between Germany and Poland and smaller historical grievances between Italy and Slovenia and between the Germans and Czechs as vital to the future security of Europe.¹¹⁴ The EU could provide the arena for the amelioration of such volatile historical disagreements, much in the same way that it has fostered Franco-German cooperation since the end of the Second World War.

Olli Rehn, the EU's Enlargement Commissioner, has claimed that 'the clear evidence of the economic benefits for all EU member states should remove any remaining misperceptions [about the enlargement]' and that the enlargement has seen a 'thorough economic and political transformation that has improved the security and welfare of EU citizens'.¹¹⁵ But despite Rehn's effusive prognosis, the enlargement has not been an unqualified success. Sjursen has claimed that enlargement may even be counterproductive to the aim of creating a stable and secure Europe, given the vacuum that is likely to open up to the east of the EU-25 and the increased difficulty in reaching consensus on issues of security.¹¹⁶ The stipulations of the Schengen agreement, governing Europe's border regime, has also affected trade in eastern Europe's border regions, bureaucratizing what have historically been flourishing cross-border transactions. In particular, trade over the Polish-Ukrainian border has run into difficulties under the provisions of Schengen, an occurrence that is likely to reinforce economic divisions between the EU and non-member states in future.¹¹⁷ Given the EU's (at least partial) popular mandate, perceived drawbacks are almost as significant as actual ones. The issue of labour mobility in particular has long been the heart of opposition to the eastern enlargement, sparking fears that the industrialized Western economies would be flooded with cheap labour from the CEECs. Although the fears of mass migration from the East following the 2004 enlargement have so far proved misplaced, the EU has a considerable public relations challenge in attempting to convince EU-15 citizens that the enlargement will be in their long-term interest. Without the benefits of hindsight, it is difficult to judge how the attitude of the public may manifest itself in the medium to long-term. The failure of the draft EU Constitution to survive popular referendums in the EU-15 in 2005 may point the way to the future of the European integration project.

Even though the Union has been criticized by some for recreating old divisions further to the east with its latest enlargement,¹¹⁸ such a division will in the long-term be preferable to the Iron Curtain division of the Cold War, even if only for the fact that the EU now encompasses more member states on the 'prosperous' side of Europe. The most pervasive effect of the enlargement may indeed be that it fortifies the European economy against the rise of newly industrializing and densely populated nations such as India and China. As Katinka Barysch has put it, 'enlargement has allowed the emergence of a pan-European division of labour. This, in turn, will help the EU economy to stay competitive in a globalized world economy'.¹¹⁹ Like other processes of globalization - judgement upon which will be withheld - such competitiveness is not likely to be achieved painlessly.

A greater challenge, in the opinion of some, is that likely to result from the 'bridging' of legal and administrative gaps between the EU-15 and the new member states. Although the implementation of the *acquis* may have established a thorough legal conformity on paper,

¹¹⁴ Mayhew, *Recreating Europe*, 186.

¹¹⁵ Olli Rehn, cited in: "Enlargement, Two Tears On: all win as new Member States get richer," *European Commission Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs*, Press Release (3 May 2006). Available [Online]: <http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/06/557&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en> [Accessed 18 May 2006].

¹¹⁶ Sjursen, "Why Expand? The Question of Legitimacy and Justification in the EU's Enlargement Policy," 498.

¹¹⁷ Buonanno & Deakin, "European Identity," 99.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁹ Katinka Barysch, "Enlargement Two Years On: Economic Success or Political Failure?" *Briefing Paper for the Confederation of Danish Industries and the Central Organization of Industrial Employees in Denmark*, April 2006, available [Online]: http://www.cer.org.uk/pdf/essay_enlargement_two_%20barysch.pdf [Accessed 20 May 2006], 1.

Zielonka points out that the same law may function differently in different places depending on the local legal culture.¹²⁰ Such local ‘attitudes’, masked by the top-down imposition of European legislation from Brussels, could also pose challenges to the functioning of the EU-25’s decision-making bodies, such as the European Parliament, the Council of Ministers and the European Commission. Although the EU’s decision-making processes do not seem to have been seriously ‘paralyzed’ by the 2004 enlargement, the alleged lack of a democratic culture in the east may prove to be the most problematic element of the Union’s rush to welcome in the states of Eastern Europe. Overall, however, the institutional transition from the EU-15 to the EU-25 has been surprisingly smooth, clearly a result of the preplanning and institutional adjustments undertaken by the EU in the decade preceding the enlargement.

In the years leading up to the accession of the CEECs, the EU-15 made significant reforms to its existing institutions whilst avoiding an overhaul of its decision-making process. Both the 2000 Treaty of Nice and the 2003 Act of Accession sought to prepare the EU institutionally for enlargement. David Phinnemore points out that institutional reform has been a constant in the European integration process and would probably have taken place regardless of the enlargement.¹²¹ In order to address fears that the EU would face intractable language complications and problems reaching consensus, the Council of Ministers implemented changes to its qualified majority voting (QMV) system, by which the EU’s larger states will likely gain. However, under the new reforms, the five largest members of the EU will also lose their second representative in the European Commission, shifting the balance towards the newest members.¹²² Most other organs and advisory bodies have also made small changes to accommodate the expanded membership pool. As Neill Nugent has argued, such reforms have helped to ensure that the overall change in the EU-25’s internal dynamics will not be drastic.¹²³

More important than such institutional tweaking has been the attempt, throughout the 1990s and early 2000s to ‘socialize’ the CEECs in the workings and ‘culture’ of the Union. The implementation of the *acquis* has played a role in this process by encouraging the establishment of social democratic institutions in the candidate countries, which have the function of ‘prescrib[ing] desirable and proscrib[ing] undesirable behaviour’.¹²⁴ In the years before 2004, the EU-15 also welcomed political groups and delegations from the ten candidate countries to take part as observers in the European Parliament, an attempt to raise awareness of the cultural and political requirements of membership.¹²⁵

David Phinnemore has described the institutional challenges of the 2004 enlargement as a ‘manageable scenario’ that has been well handled by the EU-15, ensuring a smooth institutional transition to a Union comprising, eventually, as many as 28 states.¹²⁶ As with the EU generally, the institutional homogenization of the acceding CEECs has not been undertaken purely for uniformity’s sake; rather, it has been undertaken in order to foster a democratic culture throughout Europe, within which a diversity of institutional forms will theoretically be able to flourish. In the final analysis, ‘effective governance in the enlarged EU requires a balance to be struck between a workable institutional framework... and a recognition of diversity and complexity across the European continent’.¹²⁷ The former, in its current configuration, seems well placed to ameliorate the negative effects of the latter in an enlarged Europe.

¹²⁰ Zielonka, “How New Enlarged Borders Will Reshape the European Union,” 513.

¹²¹ David Phinnemore, “Institutions and Governance,” in: Nugent (ed.), *European Union Enlargement*, 118 & 131.

¹²² Phinnemore, “Institutions and Governance,” 123-5.

¹²³ Neill Nugent, “Introduction” to: Nugent (ed.), *European Union Enlargement*, 11.

¹²⁴ Darina Malova & Tim Haughton, “Making Institutions in Central and Eastern Europe, and the Impact of Europe,” in: Mair & Zielonka (eds.), *The Enlarged European Union*, 103.

¹²⁵ Phinnemore, “Institutions and Governance,” 130.

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*, 131.

¹²⁷ Malova & Haughton, “Making Institutions in Central and Eastern Europe, and the Impact of Europe,” 118.

The increased diversity of the EU-25 also has important implications for the development of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and other international workings. While the increased size, population and resource base of the EU-25 will undoubtedly increase its weight in international trade negotiations such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), its unity may suffer on political issues. Burdened by ten additional member-states - and, consequently, ten additional voices - the creation of a coherent CFSP seems further away than ever. The invasion of Iraq by the United States in March 2003 cast the differences between the EU's member states into stark contrast. While France and Germany spearheaded a campaign of anti-war rhetoric, the CEECs fell into line behind Spain, Italy and the United Kingdom in lending their support to the US. The episode demonstrated the possible contradiction between processes of Europeanization and Americanization in eastern Europe, with potentially dire consequences for the EU's foreign policy.¹²⁸

However, these failings are perhaps not as serious as might at first be assumed. Much of the EU's international power arguably derives from the size and strength of its economy as well as its 'magnetic allure' for states around the world. Descriptions of the EU as a 'normative' power avoid such pitfalls by downplaying assumptions that the EU must necessarily pursue the trappings of the Westphalian super-state: that is, total conformity on foreign policy issues and the establishment of a strong European army to project European power abroad.¹²⁹ Zielonka has argued that such a goal has become ever more unlikely since the 2004 enlargement and that further enlargements will diminish its likelihood further.¹³⁰ This is not to say that the 2004 enlargement will 'weaken' the EU, even though it may continue to lack any significant military force beyond the newly created Rapid Response Force. It could also be argued that the values and norms that the EU projects through its particular form of consensus-based government are more effective at fostering stability and prosperity than, for instance, the 'hard power' approach of the United States, based primarily on military power.¹³¹ The values and norms underpinning the project of EU enlargement - closely linked to perceptions of European identity - have their own appeal. The divergence of the EU member states during the Iraq crisis was a further expression of the diversity that exists both within the EU-15 and the EU-25. As we have already seen, disagreements between member states have not historically posed an insurmountable obstacle to the European integration project; there is no reason to believe that current differences will be any different. Furthermore, it is clear that such differences are not intractable: changes of government in Spain (2004) and Italy (2006) have effectively reversed the foreign policies of those nations. Such fluctuations and divisions are part and parcel of the day-to-day workings of a supranational, consensus-based entity such as the EU.

III

In much of the literature on European Union enlargement, there is a schism between constructivist and rationalist explanations of Europe's rush to enlarge. Those of the latter persuasion interpret enlargement as a policy driven by a clear perception of gain on the part of all involved. Constructivists, on the other hand, look to the less tangible norms and values - such as social democracy and economic liberalization - that have helped drive the enlargement process. In the final analysis, this dichotomy is perhaps a false one, for enlargement - and particularly the May 2004 enlargement into eastern Europe - has premised itself at various times on both rationales and benefited accordingly. As Heather Grabbe puts it, the twin processes of 'deepening' and 'widening' are not mutually exclusive, the latter perhaps offering

¹²⁸ Sjursen, "Why Expand? The Question of Legitimacy and Justification in the EU's Enlargement Policy," 498.

¹²⁹ See Ian Manners, "Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?" *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 40, No. 2 (June 2002): 235-58.

¹³⁰ Zielonka, "How New Enlarged Borders Will Reshape the European Union," 530.

¹³¹ See Frank Shimmelfennig, "The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union," *International Organization*, Vol. 55, No. 1 (2001): 47-80 & Sjursen, "Why Expand? The Question of Legitimacy and Justification in the EU's Enlargement Policy," 499-501.

more opportunities for the furthering of the project of European integration towards as-yet undefined ends.¹³²

Without a definite end-goal, the benchmark by which we define European integration is open for negotiation. This survey has purposefully refrained from pinning down a subjective definition, which would have served to strait-jacket its analysis, given the diversity of opinion and the different visions for Europe's future expressed within the EU itself. Just as 'deepening' and 'widening' are not inherently contradictory processes, neither are the normative and materialistic challenges (and opportunities) of enlargement likely to play out in isolation. As an economic entity, the EU is constrained by its identification as a 'European' body. Likewise, the concept of welcoming the whole of 'Europe' under the EU's aegis is tempered by economic, political and strategic considerations. The interplay between these two factors will undoubtedly dictate any further enlargements of the EU to outlying regions of the continent.

It has been argued that the 2004 enlargement will ultimately strengthen the EU, both economically, shielding it from the effects of globalization, and politically, strengthening the sense of shared identity underpinning the Union - and, consequently, the EU's 'soft' or 'normative' power in an increasingly globalized world. However, just as past rounds of enlargement offer a spurious standard for judgment of the current enlargement round, so too will the current round not prove overly useful in judging the effects of any future expansion of the EU. The 'widening' of the EU in 2004 encompassed a particular group of CEECs that are well positioned, despite short-term challenges of economic underdevelopment and political instability, to form the core of a prosperous new Europe, freed from the polarization of the Cold War. It is possible that a further enlargement could stretch the boundaries of credibility too far, and weaken the EU's economic and normative power. In the mean time, however, the EU-25 seems set to grow stronger. It has already been argued that diversity has been and will remain to be as the most intractable challenge for the EU-25 and any larger constellations of the Union. If the will is there, it could also prove to be the European Union's greatest achievement.

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¹³² Heather Grabbe, "What the New Member States Bring Into the EU," in: Nugent (ed.), *European Union Enlargement*, 70.

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STUDENT ESSAY:

LAICITE AND THE HEADSCARF DEBATE

Natalie Windle
The Australian National University, Canberra

The debate about the headscarf, *l'affaire du voile*, in late twentieth and early twenty-first century France has revealed that the French Republican concept of *laïcité* is value-loaded. There is no literal translation for the French term *laïcité*, but its closest English counterpart is secularism. *Laïcité*, is better defined in terms of its practice, as Riva Kastoryano states,

In practice, the principle of *laïcité* translates into the neutrality of the state toward religious denominations, which becomes synonymous with tolerance... (Thus it is) the main factor of social cohesion, the pillar of Republican France.¹³³

Yet, the origins of *laïcité* are traced through France's Catholic national heritage, and in its contemporary context, *laïcité* has emerged without its claimed neutral values. This is exemplified by the difficulty in accommodating Islam within French society, especially after postcolonial immigration.

The ensuing debate on *laïcité* has been characterised by the conflict between legislation and actual social conditions, which reveals that *laïcité* is dogmatic and its suitability is limited to a mono-religious society, rather than the current reality of religious pluralism. The issue is further exacerbated by the conflict between the state and the ethnic community, because Muslim immigrants maintain a strong connection to the transnational Muslim world, external to France. Despite the state's attempt to incorporate Islam into the French political structure, particularly by the creation of the Conseil Français du Culte Musulman (CFCM), the issue has remained problematic. This was evident in *les affaires du voile* over the period from 1989 to 2004, in which the school, as the fundamental example of public space, experienced heated controversy about the wearing of religious symbols in a supposedly *laïque* place. Effectively, *les affaires du voile* are connected to the much deeper social problem of the *intégration* of Muslim immigrants within French society. In fact, the very definition of *laïcité* in this debate is paradoxical; it is either interpreted as the tolerance or suppression of religious expression. Thus, the traditional concept of *laïcité* is value-loaded, as is exemplified by its inability to adapt to a religiously plural society, and a redefinition of the term is required in the face of contemporary debate.

As Catholicism has held a predominant position throughout French history, it remains a significant part of the French national heritage; a heritage which embodies Republican ideals, including *laïcité*. Indeed, it was the conflict between the Church and the State which initiated the concept of *laïcité* as early as 1795, when the formal separation between Church and State was decreed.¹³⁴ The consequent legislation has ensured that the historical memory of Catholic France remains pertinent to the contemporary situation, even though practising French Catholics have become increasingly uncommon. For example, while 67 percent of French people surveyed in 1994 referred to themselves as Catholic, only 10 percent were practising

¹³³ Riva Kastoryano, 'France's veil affair: National institutions and transnational identities', *Inroads*, Vol. 15 (Summer 2004) p. 66

¹³⁴ William Safran, 'Religion and Laicite in a Jacobin Republic: The Case of France', in William Safran (ed.) *The Secular and the Sacred, Nation, Religion and Politics*, London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2003, p. 55

Catholics.¹³⁵ Nonetheless, the decline in the predominance of active Catholicism within French society fails to undermine Catholicism's part in the national heritage.

*Despite the increasingly secular and pluralistic nature of French society, Catholicism is so clearly woven into the fabric of French history and culture that most other religions appear somehow foreign and do not fit comfortably into the French context.*¹³⁶

Laïcité was designed for the French Catholic society, who faced little, if any, competition in the religious sphere and thus, *laïcité* is restricted to a mono-religious environment. Effectively, the relationship between *laïcité* and Islam in the late twentieth century is problematic and reveals that *laïcité*, in its traditional form, cannot escape its historical Catholic prejudice.

Laïcité, in relation to the historical balance between the Catholic Church and the State, was particularly challenged by the introduction of Islam to French society as a result of postcolonial immigration. Between 1954 and 1968, France 'welcomed' more than one million North Africans to her shores¹³⁷ and by 2004 the Muslim population of France totalled more than five million.¹³⁸ More importantly, at the same time, the Republican philosophy of racial equality was challenged by the foreignness of Islam to French society. According to the philosopher, Alexis de Tocqueville, Islam is incompatible with democracy and enlightenment due to "its inability... to separate the religious from the political and civil spheres."¹³⁹ This mindset holds that Islam opposes the very essence of *laïcité*. It has been emanated through the notion that Islam

*challenges France's long national history of relations between religion and the state, starting with the emancipation of the individual from community constraints that were largely religious in nature.*¹⁴⁰

However, this is a gross misconception because 95 percent of public opinion believes that it is possible to be fully integrated into French society and still practice Islam in private,¹⁴¹ while "an ever larger number of Muslims appreciate the particular culture of *laïcité*, because it allows all religions to express themselves."¹⁴² In addition, and to the detriment of Islam's integration into French society, Muslim immigrants have been grouped together in the French *banlieues*: "rundown high-rise estates in the outer suburbs"¹⁴³ where there is an unemployment rate greater than twenty percent.¹⁴⁴ The result is that concentration is synonymous with segregation, and "second- and third- generation immigrants thus feel doomed to a meaningless, ghettoised existence characterised by ostracism and economic deprivation."¹⁴⁵ Therefore, not only is Islam alien to the traditional French society, but it has also faced severe difficulty in terms of integration into the *laïque* structure of the Republic.

The considerable conflict between the theory and the reality of *laïcité* is illustrated by the inconsistencies between French legislation and society. The following laws exemplify the process of legislation regarding *laïcité*; firstly, under the Napoleon Concordat of 1802, Catholicism was recognised as the majority religion, secondly, the 1901 law on the Right of Associations rendered freedom of association a legal right, subject only to a simple declaration, and finally, the 1905 law on the separation of religion and state intended to

¹³⁵ Jean-Paul Guetny, 'Les Français sont-ils religieux?', *L'Etat de la France*, Paris: La Decouverte, 1994, pp. 202-205 in William Safran, op. cit. p. 57

¹³⁶ William Safran, op. cit. p. 58

¹³⁷ Neal Robinson, 'France', in David Westerland and Ingvar Svanberg (eds.) *Islam Outside the Arab World*, New York: Saint Martin's Press, 1999, p. 340

¹³⁸ Emmanuel Terray, 'Headscarf Hysteria', *New Left Review* (March-April 2004) p. 120

¹³⁹ Cheryl B. Welch. *De Tocqueville*, Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 119

¹⁴⁰ Riva Kastoryano, loc. cit. p. 66

¹⁴¹ IFOP- *Le Monde*, cited in *News from France*, 3 March 1994, p. 4 in William Safran, op. cit. p. 65

¹⁴² Ibid.

¹⁴³ Neal Robinson, op. cit. p. 342

¹⁴⁴ Riva Kastoryano, loc. cit. p. 68

¹⁴⁵ Neal Robinson, op. cit. p. 354

guarantee religious freedom by endorsing the 1901 law but annulling the 1802 Concordat.¹⁴⁶ Such laws, however, are not relevant to the contemporary religious pluralism in France because they are weighted with the historical values of a Catholic-dominated society. These laws were passed in response to a mono-religious social situation, and in the face of religious pluralism, *laïcité* illustrates the need to maintain a parallel between legislation and social change in order to avoid heated debate such as that of the recent *affaire du voile*.

Laïcité is thus extremely dogmatic because it is both influenced by and suited to a Catholic French society. The legislation for *laïcité* was developed during the historical dominance of Catholicism in France, as is symbolised by the rhetoric of the separation between *Church* and State. However, following postcolonial immigration and the growing religious pluralism within French society, *laïcité* is increasingly less conducive to the contemporary context.

*French republican philosophy... is an inflexible blindspot that has, in the end, always put the deontological sacredness of the republican ideals ahead of a rational and pragmatic compromise.*¹⁴⁷

Effectively, *laïcité* faces a sizeable gap between the past and the present, and as long as it remains in the boundaries of Republican ideals, it is not applicable to the contemporary pluralist French society.

More specifically, the inability to adapt to the changing social situation has led to the current conflict between the national (state) and the ethnic (cultural or religious) community. These two communities “are now engaged in intense competition for the loyalty and allegiance of those living within the same geographical space.”¹⁴⁸ Muslim immigrants tend to associate themselves more with the transnational Muslim world than with the French nation. For example, the 2003 Stasi Report, commissioned by the French President Jacques Chirac, “emphasised the connection between legislation banning the veil and the increase in acts of violence in France’s *banlieues* since 2000, attributed to the second Intifada in Israel-Palestine that began in September of that year.”¹⁴⁹ Effectively, the French state is undermined by the relationship between the Muslim transnational community and its ethnic connection to events outside the French state.

In response to Islamic transnationalism, the French state created a representative body for Muslims, the Conseil Français du Culte Musulman (CFCM), under the Minister of the Interior from 2002 to 2004, Nicolas Sarkozy.¹⁵⁰ CFCM aimed to promote a Muslim voice in the French public sphere. For Sarkozy, CFCM helps the French government to raise awareness that *notre laïcité n’est pas dirigée contre les religions, mais est au contraire notre manière d’assurer la liberté de conscience et la liberté du culte [our laïcité is not directed against religions, on the contrary, it is our way of assuring freedom of conscience and freedom of religion].*¹⁵¹

However CFCM primarily represents Islam as an institution, which Jonathan Laurence places alongside agricultural federations and trade unions.¹⁵² CFCM thus fails to pay the required acknowledgement to the strength of the transnational Muslim community. Despite such initiatives for the integration of Islam into French society, the definitive conflict between public and private space has surfaced with *l’affaire du voile* in 1989 and again in 2003.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid. p. 350

¹⁴⁷ Adrian Favell, *Philosophies of Integration: Immigration and the idea of citizenship in France and Britain*, London: Macmillan Press, 1998, p. 174

¹⁴⁸ Riva Kastoryano, loc. cit. p. 63

¹⁴⁹ Ibid. p. 67

¹⁵⁰ Jonathan Laurence, ‘From the Elysée Salon to the Table of the Republic: State-Islam Relations and the Integration of Muslims in France’, *French Politics, Culture and Society*, Vol. 23, No. 1 (Spring 2005) pp. 51-55

¹⁵¹ Thibaud Collin and Philippe Verdin, *La République, Les Religions, l’Espérance*, Les Editions du Cerf, 2004, p. 10

¹⁵² Jonathan Laurence, loc. cit. p. 60

The school epitomises public space and is the point from which the headscarf debate has originated. Essentially, “the school was the cradle of *laïcité*, the place where the values of the French republic were nurtured and inculcated.”¹⁵³ Just as “in France, any religious activity in public space is a threat to society’s commitment to *laïcité* and church-state separation,”¹⁵⁴ the wearing of religious symbols in state schools is also perceived as a threat to *laïcité*. In Creil in October 1989, the case of three Muslim girls wearing headscarves whilst attending school “was widely condemned as an attack on the Republic, an affront to the dignity of women, and a threat to the secular status of the educational system.”¹⁵⁵ According to the 1905 law, the principal had the legal right to expel the girls until the headscarves were removed and his decision was further justified by the Conseil d’État ruling of 27 November of that year, whereby “those best able to interpret (challenging or disruptive) behaviour were the teachers and school administrators who knew their pupils.”¹⁵⁶ Such ambiguity by no means settled the debate and in 1994, the issue was raised again by Eugene Cheniere whose proposed bill for the banning of all ostentatious signs of religious affiliation was translated into a decree by the Minister of Education, Francois Bayrou.¹⁵⁷ Finally, the debate reached its height in 2003, when the Stasi Commission recommended a law, enforced as of October 2004, prohibiting the wearing of ostentatious religious signs in public schools.

Apart from the significance of the school as a public arena for republican values, the headscarf debate is a symptom of a much deeper social problem which can be traced to the first generation of Muslim immigrants and their alienation from French society. Joan Scott labels *l’affaire de voile* as symptomatic politics, arguing that “the banning of headscarves, offered as a solution, is in fact a symptom of the failing of French republicanism to respond to difficult and pressing issues.”¹⁵⁸ This argument is reiterated by Gilles Kepel who asserts that the deeper social problem is “the underlying failure of French (and European) economies and programs to lift up Europe’s immigrant poor.”¹⁵⁹ William Safran is very pragmatic in claiming that “religious identities are too diverse, weak and unthreatening to undermine the stability of the French political community or the principle of *laïcité* on which it is based.”¹⁶⁰ However, he disregards the fact that the situation in the French *banlieues* may give its residents enough impetus to bring the state to the brink of crisis, if the state does not reconcile the contemporary religious pluralism with a redefinition of *laïcité*. Such measures are critical because traditional *laïcité* fundamentally prevents the integration of Islam into French society, as it is value-loaded and blind to religious pluralism.

Beyond the controversial issues of pluralistic societies, transnational communities and the headscarf debate, lies the paradoxical definition of *laïcité*, which can be interpreted as either the suppression or tolerance of religious expression in its contemporary context. Tolerance effectively meant suppression for an Alsatian bishop in 1990, when he said that “Islam is tolerated as long as it is hidden.”¹⁶¹ The fine line between the two interpretations is epitomised by the debate about the 2003 Stasi Commission and the resulting law of March 2004. The ensuing ‘headscarf hysteria’ polarised opinions, whereby supporters for prohibition viewed the ban as an egalitarian tolerance of religion, while oppositionists perceived the ban as a suppression of religious freedom. The notion of an egalitarian tolerance is proven tenuous because, as Joan Scott asserts, “it was the polysemy of the veil that was the target (and) this

¹⁵³ Joan W. Scott, ‘Symptomatic Politics: The Banning of Islamic Headscarves in French Public Schools’, *French Politics, Culture and Society*, Vol. 23, No. 3 (Winter 2005) p. 106

¹⁵⁴ Derek H. Davis ‘Reacting to France’s Ban: Headscarves and other Religious Attire in American Public Schools’, *Journal of Church and State*, (Spring 2004) Vol. 46, No. 2, p. 223

¹⁵⁵ Neal Robinson, op. cit. p. 348

¹⁵⁶ Joan W. Scott, loc. cit. p. 107

¹⁵⁷ Ibid.

¹⁵⁸ Joan W. Scott, loc. cit. p. 116

¹⁵⁹ Gilles Kepel, ‘Fabric of Society; Banning Headscarves is right. But it’s only a start in bringing France’s Muslims into the social mainstream’, *Newsweek*, New York, 16 February 2004, p. 32

¹⁶⁰ William Safran, op. cit. p. 78

¹⁶¹ Tom Mashberg, ‘The New Mosque’s Minaret is Silent, But it has Much to Say to France’, *New York Times*, 29 November 1990, in William Safran, op. cit. p. 67

became clear when “discreet” signs... were permitted.”¹⁶² Scott is an historian of gender as well as a feminist theorist, who “questions the view that equality and difference are dichotomous, and suggests that equality may entail indifference to differences.”¹⁶³ According to this perspective, Scott critiques the Stasi Commission as inflexible because it perceived Islam as the ‘other’, “historically outside the original *pacte laïque* of 1905.”¹⁶⁴ She therefore affirms that the interpretation of *laïcité* as the tolerance of religion will never be fully acceptable until Islam is released from the paradigm of the ‘other’. Only then will there exist an environment for equality based on the indifference to differences.

Conclusively, the headscarf debate clearly reveals that the traditional concept of *laïcité* is value-loaded. Considering the predominance of Catholicism throughout French history, *laïcité* was designed by and suited to a mono-religious (Catholic) society. Defined by the separation between Church and State, it does not account for a religiously plural society. This is evidenced by the inconsistencies between legislation and the actual social situation, notably the difficulty in integrating Muslim immigrants into French society. This has resulted in their connection to the transnational Muslim community, as opposed to the French state, which has culminated in their segregation from mainstream French society and, indeed, their neglect. The creation of an Islamic representative body, CFCM, has not resolved the above issues, because of the paradoxical definition of *laïcité* which surfaced during *les affaires du voile*. *Laïcité* is interpreted as either the suppression or the tolerance of religious expression, which has resulted in a polarised debate about the 2004 legislative ban on the wearing of ostentatious religious symbols in public schools. The debate is intense because the school remains the fundamental representation of public space. However, such debate about the concept of *laïcité* draws attention to the need to redefine its meaning, in order to release it from its historical prejudice and lend it relevance to contemporary religious pluralism.

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¹⁶² Joan W. Scott, loc. cit. p. 119

¹⁶³ Marnie Hughes Warrington, *Fifty Key Thinkers on History*, London: Routledge, 2000, p. 281

¹⁶⁴ Joan W. Scott. loc. cit. p. 115

POLITICAL IDENTITY OF THE EUROPEANS

Eva Polonska-Kimunguyi
University of Melbourne

For half a century the creators of Europe have been trying to unite Member States under common supranational regime. Starting from sectoral co-operation in coal and steel between 6 nations in the 1950s, today's 27 Members of the European Union are working on foreign policy, security, defence and citizenship. On its way toward federation, the European Union needs one more thing: political support of its people. European consciousness, people's identification with Europe, not a nation-state, creation of European public sphere are at the heart of building the European nation. The 'nationhood beyond the nation-state is yet to emerge. What is a political identity and how have nations managed to create the popular support of their people? Does Europe need a trans-national identity to transform itself into a federation or simply to survive? These are some of the questions that this article intends to answer.

What is a political identity?

As Furio Cerrutti states:

'set of social and political values and principles that we recognize as *ours*, or in the sharing of which we feel like *us*, like a *political group or entity*.' (2003:27)

As opposed to citizenship with its rights and obligations on paper, identity is a *feeling*. *Feeling* that people have of *belonging*, *feeling* of sharing the same values. The group has to recognize itself as a group. One may be a citizen of a state but they may still *feel* that they belong somewhere else which is often the case in multicultural societies. The European Union is not only multicultural, with its people recognizing themselves as Scotch, Welsh, Basque or Catalan, but it is also multinational, where people already have their passports stating where they belong. Therefore identity - the *feeling* must go together with the citizenship to support and fulfil it.

Cerrutti also believes that this self-recognition of a certain group as a group, it is not an act. It's a process (2003:28) constantly in the making. That leaves room for its introduction, creation and enforcement. Europe may not have a political identity yet. Can identity be constructed? Spiering brings about two theories on the creation and/or existence of identity. *Essentialists* on one hand say that we are born in/into a nation so identity develops naturally or is 'somehow genetically transferred' (1996:115). That would imply that biological and physical attributes of the people born in one country (like blue eyes of Swedes and dark hair of Spaniards) decide upon where we belong.

Higson (2002:401) suggests, however, that it is inadequate to define national identity on the basis of physical features. He and other *constructivists* come to the rescue of blond Spaniards and brown-eyed Scandinavians, declaring that identity is based on perceptions therefore it is 'impossible to be born with national characteristics'. Instead they claim that identity is cultural (Higson 2002:401) and can be constructed as 'intellectual artefact' or a 'cultural construct' (Spiering 1996:115-118).

The idea of constructing the nation and its European examples were closely explored by constructivists in 20th century. In 1976 Eugene Weber analysed the making of 'Frenchness' in

his *Peasants into Frenchmen*, Eric Hobsbawm followed in 1983 with *The Invention of Tradition* and in 1988 Raphael Samuel edited three volumes of *Patriotism: the making and unmaking of British national identity*. Linda Colley continued in 1992 with *Britons: forging the nation*.

Modernists like Smith, Gellner and Anderson argue that nations are wholly modern phenomenon, although they differ over the mechanisms of nation formation. Smith defines the concept of a nation as a 'named human population sharing historical territory, common memories and myths of origin, a mass, standardized public culture, a common economy and a territorial mobility, and common legal rights and duties for all members of the collectivity'. National identity, as a concept 'both complex and highly abstract' embraces 'multiplicity of cultural identities, both now and in the past mirrored in the multiple dimensions of our conceptions of nationhood' (Smith 1997:323). These dimensions include: the territorial boundedness of separate cultural populations in their own homelands, shared myths of origin and historical memories of the population, the common bond of mass and standardized culture, a common territorial division of labour, with mobility for all members and ownership of resources by all members of the community and the possession by all members of a unified system of common legal rights and duties under common laws and institutions.

Gellner argues that nations and nationalism are products of growth-oriented industrial society (1983: 48-50). Industrialization and specialization required a large 'uniformly literate and technologically equipped workforce', which could only be supplied by the modern state. This support was also required for a compulsory and standardized education system.

The historical development of a nation was also explored by Anderson (1983) who looked at not only how modern nations emerge, but how they maintain their status as nations. He claims that if we compare the modern nation to more archaic or traditional social formation, it becomes evident that the nation is too huge an entity for all its members to ever get to know each other personally. Yet fundamental to the sense of a nation is that all the members develop a unified community of people who share interests and concerns. He argues that the way to achieving unification in a modern nation is not by military means but through cultural measures. Therefore education system, national media together with other means of cultural expression play a crucial role in enabling a nation to imagine itself as a coherent, meaningful and homogeneous community.

Transfer of information and communication as stressed by Deutch (1957, 1964) act as a uniting force. People get united when they 'make transactions' by communicating and exchanging information and knowledge. Habermas (1962) argued that in the eighteenth century world of London coffee houses and clubs provided new possibilities for free exchanges of discourse as if between equals. From such exchanges reformist, egalitarian public debate emerged, opinion forming and indirectly governance. Drawing on Habermas, Fraser (1993) points out that there never was, and never should be, just one 'public sphere' but a number of public spheres. For her, what is at stake is not just discourse exchange but how stratified such publics should be, and how closely each is tied to the institutions of decision-making.

To conclude, the debate clearly proves that it is possible to create both a nation and a national identity. Borrowing from all the 'prescriptions' we can summarize that in order to form an identity of modern people in a modern state we need:

- institutions with:
- clear agenda being able to:
- make decisions over:
- clear territory inhabited by:
- educated populations bonded by:
- common past and memories and

- standardized culture with:
- common public sphere and
- common values guarded by:
- common laws produced by:
- common institutions able to:
- communicate with the people

The European Union today

The European Union as of January 2007 is a supranational and intergovernmental union of 27 Member States. It is the world’s largest confederation of independent states. Although the first Community - of Coal and Steel was created in 1951 and the European Economic Community in 1957, the current structure of the EU was established in 1992 by Maastricht Treaty (Treaty on the European Union) which acknowledged that the existence of Single European Market: free movement of goods, capital, services and people goes beyond strictly economic co-operation. In TEU member states committed to political co-operation elaborating membership criteria for future members¹⁶⁵ and established conditions for launching the common currency - Euro. As Schengen Agreement physically lifted borders in the EU, new areas: like immigration and asylum, previously under intergovernmental foreign policy, had to be shifted into the EU’s governance as well.

Although the EU’s activities cover most areas of public policy, from economic policy to foreign affairs, defence, agriculture and trade, the extent of its powers differs greatly in those areas. Therefore Maastricht Treaty introduced the pillar structure, which allows for allocation of competences between the Members States and the EU:

I Pillar European Community (EC)	II Pillar Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)	III Pillar Police and Judicial Co-operation in Criminal Matters (PJCC)
<p>Exclusive competences (EU):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Single European Market (SEA) - Customs Union - Euro - Economic and Monetary Policy (EMU) - Agriculture (CAP) - Fisheries - Competition - Trade (internal+ external) - EU citizenship <p>Shared competences (EU + MS):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Education - Culture - Audiovisual - Trans-European Networks - Consumer protection - Healthcare - Research - Environment - Social policy - Schengen Agreement - Asylum - Immigration 	<p>Foreign Policy:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Human rights - Democracy - Foreign aid <p>Security Policy:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - European security and Defence Policy (EDSP) - EU battle groups - Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) - Peacekeeping 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Drug trafficking - Weapons smuggling - Terrorism - Trafficking in human beings - Organized crime - Bribery and fraud

¹⁶⁵ So called ‘Copenhagen Criteria’ spelt out during Copenhagen summit stated that to become an EU member a state must be: democratic, with respect for rule of law, human rights and minority rights, must have functioning open economy and the capacity to take on the obligations of *acquis communautaire* that is the Community’s law

In the first pillar the EU is most supranational and resembles a federation, with the EU having either exclusive or shared with MS competences in those areas. In its exclusive competences it is only the European Commission that has the right to initiative, whereas laws in 'shared competences' may be initiated by either the Commission or the Member States. Laws in the first pillar are passed by a so-called 'Community method' that is they require co-operation of European institutions (EU Commission, EU Parliament, Council of European Union, EU Court of Justice). In the second pillar (foreign affairs) the EU is intergovernmental acting more like an international organization whereas in the third pillar (home affairs) EU members act separately. It is believed that areas from the first pillar alone make up to 70-80% of national legislation of the Member States¹⁶⁶.

The draft European Constitution was meant to simplify and unify operations of the European Union. The Constitution proposed to abolish the pillar structure and to merge them with the EC into one single structure. Elected president would be in charge of the whole EU (not only the Commission) and vice-president would hold the foreign affairs portfolio. Through the Constitution, the entire EU would gain legal personality and a possibility to act internationally as one superstate. Those plans, however, came to a halt in May 2005 after the French and Dutch veto in the ratification process.

Why EU identity?

On the way to a federation but maybe never becoming one, do the Europeans need a political identity? If they already have multiple identities: social, religious, linguistic, regional, and national? If they do need it, why?

There are a number of reasons of why a political identity of people of Europe is needed: To answer the question - whether they need a political identity or not we must first realise whether the entire EU project is only an economic one, to serve business, production, investment and trade or is it something else that its architects wanted to achieve?

Series of political and cultural assumptions about the causes of wars and the future of European societies gave the foundation to the EU's conception of history. According to the Commission, the antithesis of peace and the major obstacle to European integration is the continuing presence of the nation-state and its allied ideology of nationalism. In his introduction of the European Commission's mass-circulation booklet 'a Citizen's Europe', Pascal Fontaine, a former assistant to Jean Monnet, asks:

'What alternative is there for the citizens of the new greater Europe, but a return to nationalism, insecurity and instability, if they opt for any course other than union and solidarity?' (1996:6)

As Konrad Adenauer, who as German Chancellor was one of the signatories of the Treaty of Rome wrote:

'I was in full agreement with the French government that the significance of the Schuman proposal was first and foremost political, not economic. This plan was to be the beginning of a federal structure of Europe'. (in Shore, 2000:16)

And Jean Monnet, the 'famous Father of Europe' declared:

'We are not forming coalitions between States but union among peoples' (in Shore, 200:16)

¹⁶⁶ interviews and communication with the EU Commission officials, July 2006

According to the Commission, the EU exists first and foremost 'to build peace'. This objective, together with the idea of creating a new kind of supranational political order in Europe, is enshrined in the founding Treaties of the (former) European Economic Community. As the preambles to the ECSC Treaty (1951) and the Treaty of Rome (1957) state, the aim is to:

'lay the foundations for an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe',

and

'to substitute for age-old rivalries the merging of their essential interests; to create, by establishing an economic community, the basis of a broader and deeper community among peoples long divided by bloody conflicts; and to lay the foundations for institutions which will give direction to a destiny henceforward shared' .

From the beginning then, these goals have been to unite the *people*, not states, sectors or businesses, which were only means to achieve another aim. These goals have also embodied supranational and federalist aim and logic, however controversial or misunderstood that might be in some EU MS. The following treaties may have removed the term 'federal'/'federalism' from their final texts (that was the case of Maastricht Treaty in 1992, when the British insisted to remove it), but the federalist vision of Europe has been implicit in its ethos and organizational structures of the EC ever since its creation. (Shore, 2000:15).

Apart from federalist intentions, another reason why having European identity would assist the integration is as Anthony Smith (1991, 1992a, 1992b) has argued that most previous pan-national movements failed to achieve their political goal of unification and that is to last largely because of deficiencies in the cultural field, that is because the people were ignored, or forgotten.

Significantly too, business leaders and market research analysts now agree that lack of 'fellow feeling' among Europeans is undermining the evolution of a single European market and damaging European competitiveness. In its annual review of consumer trends, the London-based Henley Centre for market research found out (1996:70) that 'European consumers do not feel European in a political or legal sense', and that the weakness of our collective European identity ... is both a source and a symptom of a deeper commercial malfunctioning' (1996:10). Moreover, the absence of political and social solidarity 'could well undermine Europe's efforts to remain globally competitive' (1996:23) and 'the absence of a widespread sense of European identity is not merely a disappointment for europhiles and eurofederalists but it actively corrupts the evolution of an ingredient essential to Europe's long-term competitiveness.

In short, European financial analysts and corporate strategists have added their voices to the European Commission's cry for the creation of a 'European identity', arguing that a strong integrated home market is vital to Europe's position in global markets.

Globalisation brings more reasons for the people of Europe to stick together. While talking about free movement of people, services, capital, investments, it's important to distinguish two different types of international phenomena affecting the EU: firstly *within* the EU - you could say that the EU itself is a globalisation on a mini-scale and secondly global - *outside* the EU. Both phenomena bring a number of threats like, uncontrolled or illegal flows of capital, weapons, drugs, or even environmental pollution, control of which is now not possible *within* a nation-state and *by* a single nation-state. So national politics and a nation-state are no longer able to provide full and stable protection for the citizens and consequently national governments are more and more often not in a position to require obedience and identification of their people (Cerutti 2003:30).

Globalisation does not only affect the economy but also culture in the broadest possible meaning encompassing all creative industries: film, television and broadcasting, music, education, tourism, food industries and technology related industries: computer games, creative internet content etc. It's possible due to development of technology itself and

communications. It used to be called westernisation but because Europe is not catching up with America so now it's called Americanisation.

And here, in this widely influenced by the Americans cultural field, is the space for Europe, to act as one to create common popular feeling of belonging to one European centre. It is common amongst culturalists to adhere to common European culture as opposed to American one. Some even suggest that Hollywood has not undermined European culture but in fact contributed to the awakening of European cultural consciousness (Garncarz 2002).

And ironically, when it comes to globalisation even the European far right movement, generally against the EU, gets united. It is now common to hear radical right populist leaders who support the European model of capitalism, the European welfare state and the need to use that state to protect society. There has been transition from a biological to a cultural exclusion. European radical right no longer argues that specific cultures are superior to others. Instead they claim that all cultures, European and non-European, have the right to protect their cultural identity. Intellectuals associated with movement of so-called 'racial racism' attempted to regroup a post-fascist radical right, claiming that European civilisation needed to protect and reaffirm its own cultural identity (Zaslove, 2004:75). The juxtaposition of 'European civilization' and Christianity with non-European cultures and Islam in particular, has become essential for the radical right populist politics of exclusion. They are united in a way as they refer to and want to protect, not their national, but European culture and values.

And the last reason for the creation of common European identity is legitimacy of the EU project. That simply means, that in order 'to make Europe work, we need Europeans' (Shaw 1997).

Because of this reason or another or all of them combined, European economic co-operation, which was not envisaged as economic one only, needs peoples' support and identification with the project in order to function.

Forging the collective European identity

In case of the European Union, which itself is 'artificial construct' based upon agreements between the member States, the constructivist approach seems to be the right one. Unity was and is an ultimate goal of the Community's creation and existence. It appears, however, all the factors needed by constructivist approach to form an identity, are that in case of the European Union obstacles at the same time.

When it comes to strong institutions, the EU has no government as the Commission does not have a decision-making power and can only propose laws, not pass them. Its agenda changes every six months depending on rotating presidency. The territory of the EU changes every few years making it difficult for people to identify with. None of the Treaties mentions the final end and geographic borders of EU expansion.

Europe's history, although culturally very creative one, politically it was always about wars, genocide, wars and more wars. Not a good ground for the people to feel united. But history and how it is presented and taught depends largely on historians. If there is an established aim, history may be rewritten. When it comes to tradition, which is so diverse in Europe, it can always be invented like symbols. It has been argued as well that to understand and clearly see *itself*, Europe must contrast itself against 'the other', someone that who could be identified as 'us' versus 'them'.

The institutions of the EU also need to speak with one voice and send one message to its people. But as the President of the Commission believes, this is not a problem of not enough

messages being sent (Barosso: 2004). The EU's entire Information Directorate and Publishing Office work hard to communicate Europe to its people. What is missing here is the people's engagement into the debate, Duetsch's *mutual responsiveness* (Deutsch 1964).

There are more hurdles. The EU has no past identity, it is too young to have common past: people and nations always fought against each other, not making it easier to forge a common identity. We can hardly talk about European public sphere. The EU is also a structural novelty - first of a kind. It is not like a typical nation-state with its land and borders, people and a leader or a government. The EU is a process constantly in the making. It's on the way to a federation but it will never become one. It does not have borders, nor a single government as the powers are shared between the EU and its Member States.

Because of that novelty, there is not yet terminology on EU identity. Academic and political debates tend to be centred round 'nation state' and nation-state dominates 'identity language'.

Then what do all the Member States have in common? They are inhabited by people so diversified, speaking so many different languages, coming from different cultures, with no single dominant language or culture. Dealing with many and trying to pursue one, cultural politics of the European project, has always faced a choice dilemma. As Jordan and Weedon put it (1995:4):

Whose culture shall be the official one and whose shall be subordinated? What culture shall be regarded as worthy of display and which shall be hidden? Whose history shall be remembered and whose forgotten? What images of social life shall be projected and which shall be marginalized? What voices shall be heard and which silenced? Who is representing whom and on what basis? THIS IS THE REALM OF CULTURAL POLITICS.

Nation-States' rivalry with the EU authority is not working for Europe well. NS do not want to give up their powers, sovereignty and allow their citizens to start believing in and identifying with Brussels at the cost of national identities.

Finally, there is no clear consensus on European identity. Not everyone is convinced that is needed. And if it is what kind of identity it should be.

There are serious reasons for the creation of European identity and there are serious obstacles against it. Modern theory says it is feasible. History proves it is achievable. Who and how then should make it?

The institutional construction of European identity

It's not the first time in European history that identity had to be created. Italians can serve as an example as straight after the unification of North and South parts of Italy in 1861, Massimo d'Azeglio said: 'Now that we've made Italy we must make Italians.' (in Shore 2000:18). The debate about the origins and meaning of identity inspired and convinced the European Commission to take the identity creation into its own hands.

Long before the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, with its official provisions on culture and citizenship aiming at formal creation of Europeans, the EU embarked upon various initiatives in the fields of education, youth, media and information policy to promote integration in the sphere of culture by enhancing what it saw as the European identity. The development of European policy on identity and citizenship can be divided into the following distinct stages (Kostakopoulou 2001: 41):

- 1957-72: the common market and the removal of obstacles to freedom of movement of people
- 1973-84: the conceptual paradigm shift: political union and European identity
- 1984-91: a 'people's Europe' and a 'states' Europe'
- 1992-96: citizenship of the Union and 'Otherness'
- 1997 - : strengthening the citizen dimension of the union' and security identities.

The first time when the idea of the European identity emerged on the political agenda is period between 1957-72. Although in its early years the European Community represented the organization of industrial sector communities (McCormick 1999:68), the political dimensions of the project, as mentioned before, featured in the Schuman Plan. The Treaty of Rome from 1957 was not merely an economic text, it was a stage in the process toward a political union (Kostakopoulou 2001: 41). The Community recognized in it that freedom of movement is not merely a functional prerequisite of the common market. The right to move was a 'fundamental right' of workers to improve their standard of living, which must be exercised in 'freedom and dignity'.

Workers were not seen as mere factors of economic production but as human beings. It's for this reason that the principle of non-discrimination was extended beyond the workplace to the broader social environment of the host Member State, and was advanced at the expense of national sovereignty. Because workers and their families were under European, not their national, regulation it can be said that a kind of 'European citizenship', although only for certain classes of people (workers and professionals), was born in the very first Treaty of 1957.

The most significant move from economic¹⁶⁷ to political union and the arrival of European identity on the Community's policy agenda was made in 1972 at the Paris Summit (Wiener 1998). To gain popular support, Europe was to be transformed from 'Europe of goods' into Europe of people' through more citizen-friendly and people-friendly approach (Kostakopoulou 2001: 44). In 1973 when leaders of the then 9 MS signed the Declaration on European Identity. It proclaimed, amongst other things that the nine Members shared, 'the same attitudes to life, based on determination to build a society which measures up to the needs of the individual'. The Declaration included five main features: special rights for the citizens were to be declared, reference to a common European heritage appeared, Community was about to act on the international stage¹⁶⁸ as one, a civic European identity was to become a Community law, rights were to be guaranteed to nationals of the Member States excluding non-national residents.

However, the formation of civic European identity was entrapped in Euro-nationalist themes and exclusion of third country nationals was in contradiction of European values of democracy and social justice. It was not clear, either, which special rights could be granted to citizens of the Member states as members of the Community.

The subsequent 1975 Tindemans Report on European Union recommended measures for protecting rights of Europeans through a 'concrete manifestations of the European solidarity in everyday life' (Fointaine 1996:6). In 1979 Europeans went to the first direct elections to the European Parliament. It was supposed to give a boost to the identity creation but the embarrassingly low turnout at the polls proved that the European awareness was nearly non-existent.

¹⁶⁷ Economic co-operation, as in the beginning, was to remove quantitative restrictions and customs duties, establish common external tariff and enable workers to travel freely to another Member State under the same conditions as nationals of that country

¹⁶⁸ in 1971 European Court of Justice decided that the Commissioner for Trade should represent the Community on the international stage by extension in the area of trade; also in the early 1970 the Community started talks with African countries, former colonies of MS, to finally sign a Yaounde Agreement in 1975 with EC being signatory of it as one side, the other - the group of African states.

The Solemn Declaration on European Union of 1983 invited Member States to ‘promote European awareness and to undertake joint action in various cultural areas’: particularly information, education, audio-visual policy and the arts. The Commission interpreted it as a permission to pursue cultural initiatives, not for their own sake but ‘in order to affirm the awareness of a common cultural heritage as an element in the European identity (cited in De Witte 1987:136).

The emphasis on consciousness-raising as a strategy for bridging Europe closer to the citizens and creating Europeans signalled a new departure in EU approaches to the neglected domain of culture. A visible ‘peoples’ Europe’ period followed in the mid and late 1980s. A number of cultural scholars quote Jean Monnet on that occasion, who is believed to have once said: ‘If we were to start the integration process again, we should start from culture’. Collins (1993) who traced all Monnet’s speeches admitted that he had not find that famous sentence. Whether Monnet really said that or not, from what was to follow, the Commission itself realized that it is *thorough* culture that people could be reached. Culture became a tool in achieving political aims.

These ideals were developed as policy initiatives in several areas, particularly the various education and training programs and audio-visual policy. The Green paper on Television without Frontiers of 1984, which later became a binding law in 1989, spelt out clearly the perceived link between European identity and integration:

‘information is decisive, perhaps the most decisive, factor in European unification...European unification will only be achieved if Europeans want it. Europeans will only want it if there is such thing as European identity. European identity will only develop if Europeans are adequately informed. At present, information via the mass media is controlled at national level’. (CEC 1984:2)

Information and the idea of pan-national television were thus singled out as two key agents of European consciousness. A major problem for the Commission at that time was that there was no mention of ‘culture’ in the treaties. So the Commission had no legal competence or budget for cultural programs. Technically there was no ‘EC cultural policy’, only a number of ad hoc actions based on resolutions of EU parliament and Ministers of Culture. To get round the legal problem of competence, European officials and politicians typically invoked economic reasons for achieving cultural ends. This strategy was made explicit by Delors in his first speech as Commission’s president to the European Parliament in 1985:

‘the culture industry will tomorrow be one of the biggest industries, a creator of wealth and jobs. Under the terms of the Treaty we do not have the resource to implement a cultural policy, but we are going to try to tackle it along economic lines... We have to build a powerful European culture industry that will enable us to be in control of both the medium and the content, maintaining our standards of civilization and encouraging the creative people amongst us’. (cited in Collins 1993)

So the Commission was operating a *de facto* ‘cultural policy’ a long time before the Maastricht Treaty gave it the legal right to do so.

Initiatives of that time were a European Academy of Science to highlight the achievements of European science, and Euro-lottery whose prize money would be awarded in ECU (that was before invention of euro) and announced throughout the Community, to make Europe come alive for the Europeans. The Committee also called for the formation of European sports teams, the transmission of more factual information about Community activities and their significance for European citizens, including of course historical events that led to creation of the Community itself and its achievements. School exchange programs were inaugurated, and ‘European dimension’ introduced into history lessons.

All those measures undertaken by the Committee were or are perceived now as populist (Shore 2000:46), but the Committee for the People's Europe went even further in its actions. It argued that transforming the European Community into a 'people's Europe also required a new set of symbols for communicating the principles and values upon which the Community is based, as in the Commission's view:

'symbols play a key role in consciousness raising, but there is also a need to make a European citizen aware of the different elements that go to make up his/her European identity, of our cultural unity with all its diversity of expression, and of the historical ties which link the nations of Europe' (CEC 1988:9).

In short, ordinary Europeans were seen as lacking sufficient consciousness of their European heritage and identity, and the Commission intended to correct that fact. So the various symbolic measures that the Committee proposed included the creation of the new EC emblem and flag. That flag was taken from the Council of Europe, it's dark blue and has a circle of 12 yellow stars. As the Council of Europe described it:

'Twelve stars was a symbol of perfection and plenitude, associated equally with the apostles, the sons of Jacob, the tables of the Roman legislator, the labours of Hercules, the hours of the day, the months of the year, or the signs of the Zodiac, the circular layout denoted union.' (cited in Shore 200:47)

Additionally, the twelve stars as Bainbridge and Teasdale (1995:189) noticed, were also a Christian symbol representing 'the Virgin Mary's halo'. No wonder then the Commission accepted the flag as symbol of 'European identity and European unification'. Other symbols included harmonizing European passport, driving licence, car-number plates and a European anthem, which was taken from Beethoven's 9th Symphony. European postal stamps were to be printed, EC Youth Orchestra, opera centre, European Literature Prize, European Woman of the Year Award and Jean Monnet Award to create new university courses on European Integration. The Commission also attempted to re-structure the calendar, by creating new events for celebration: European weeks, European culture months, European years dedicated to the promotion of certain themes: European year of cinema, or the environment and so on. The most significant date introduced to the calendar was 9th of May, the anniversary of the Schuman Plan, which was officially designated "Europe's Day".

The political aim behind those initiatives was very ambitious: to reconfigure the symbolic ordering of time, space, information, education and the media in order to reflect the 'European dimension' and the presence of European Community institutions.

The situation of dealing with culture on the basis of economic terms changed dramatically with the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, which substantially enlarged the EU's sphere of governance. Its innovations included European citizenship¹⁶⁹ and the inclusion of new areas like culture, education, youth, consumer protection and public health under the jurisdiction of the EU. Now the Commission has the entire Directorate-General with budget devoted to culture, including media, information, heritage, sports and the arts. So finally the Commission can intervene in those spheres by official means.

169 EU citizenship established free movement and residence within the Community, rights to vote in EU Parliamentary elections and local election in the county of residence, diplomatic protection abroad for all Europeans, non judicial means of redress (petitions to EU Parliament and complaints to the EU Ombudsman). All the rights were not offered to non-EU nationals, and they were widely criticised for not bringing anything new as the citizens of EU Member States had already enjoyed them on the basis of their national citizenship.

The phrase ‘subsidiarity’¹⁷⁰ as well as ‘unity in diversity’ appeared on the EU agenda suggesting the policy makers embraced a more pluralistic and less managerial approach the regions, nations, people and their culture. In its cultural provisions Maastricht stated that:

‘the Community shall contribute the flowering of the cultures of the MS while respecting their national and regional diversity and at the same time bringing the common cultural heritage to the fore.’ (article 128)

If we look closer at that statement we may not agree whether it brings contradiction or not, and whether it is possible to reconcile the two sides: national/regional and common - European.

New information policy took off after Maastricht as a tool to build both Europe and the Europeans as reports showed that EU integration was perceived by Europeans as a ‘concept based far more on the will of statesmen than on the will of the people’. So European identity was not ‘engrained in people’s minds’ (De Clerq 1993:2). Additional motto was invented: ‘Together for Europe To the Benefit of Us all’ with the aim of selling the EU as a ‘good product’ to the citizens with an emphasis on the beneficial effects ‘for me’. Birth certificates for newborn babies were proposed to certify that the child is a EU citizen, EU library and museum were opened. More Europeanization of school curricula followed. Commission was recommended to have a human face and be sympathetic, warm and caring. Women were to be addressed on television by the President of the Commission for the first time in history, to assure them that the Commission is a guarantor of the well-being of life of the people. New Office of Communications was established, similar to those in the US and Japan, to make sure that the Community speaks with one voice and to communicate the ‘right message’ (De Clerq 1993:48).

The result? At the press conference when the intentions were announced, journalists staged a walkout in protest and the Greek president of the Brussels international Press Association publicly accused the Commission that it ‘behaves like a military junta’ (in Shore 2000:57). What particularly annoyed journalists was the fact that the Report suggested that they and broadcasters should be primary target group of information policy, and that broadcasters should be paid for introducing European dimension to their programs like game shows and soap-operas.

Although the Commission’s intentions were widely disapproved by the press, the EU Commissioner for Information and Culture at the time refused to distance himself from it and said that he would continue using some of the proposals (in Shore 2000:56). So it was done: new education programs were established: Erasmus, Socrates, Leonardo, which are now extended to third country nationals, audiovisual policy took on European dimension, and support for cultural action and production was launched.

The creation of an array of new Euro-symbols, Europeanizing history and culture raises a question whether European and national symbol systems and identities are in fact compatible or conflicting. The Commission view was that people possess multiple identities (local, ethnic, regional, national, religious etc.) and that they tend to be complementary and segmentary, connecting different orders of ascending ‘levels’ of belonging. This idea, was supported by modern social theorists. As the Commission saw it, forging an over-arching ‘European identity’ was simply a matter of grafting a higher collective identity on to and above existing regional or national, like Russian dolls or Chinese boxes. Different levels could be ‘contained’ within a hierarchy of nesting loyalties. But then, how could the weakest or nearly non-existent form of identity contain all others?

¹⁷⁰ Subsidiarity - decision making at the lowest possible level. EU can intervene only when MS fail to regulate sectors themselves either locally, regionally or nationally.

The Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 brought a significant compromise on the issue of citizenship and political belonging: EU citizenship was to complement *not* replace national citizenship. The constructors of European identity tried to create a double sense of belonging: being British *and* being European. Non-EU nationals were excluded.¹⁷¹ From 'Europe without frontiers' a 'fortress Europe' evolved.

Conclusion: does European identity exist?

It is a fact already that the EU is not solely economic in nature. With moves to establish a common citizenship with the EU passport, the elimination of national currencies, coordination of asylum and immigration policies and the creation of a European military force, integration is beginning to appear less and less economic and more and more political. It should also be noticed that while the process itself has focused on economics, the overriding goal of European integration, from the beginning, has been to prevent war on the European continent - to reduce nationalism and overcome hostility between European societies in order to provide long-term peace. So from the start its goal was equally economic as well as political.

As of 2006 there is no single EU policy on creating European identity. The aim to produce the idea is spread throughout various areas. Whilst more unity is forged through common currency - the Euro, European Monetary Union, constitutional, foreign, economic, as well as education, cultural and media policies, diversity is sustained by consecutive enlargements, and numerous languages¹⁷². Turkey, which is supposed to join around 2014, will add another language and more religious diversity. We may argue here that constant geographical changes do not work for the EU's image in people's minds. Even if there is some form of identification with the EU of today, because of frequent enlargement, it will soon be of no use. Possibility of 80 million Turkish Muslims becoming Europeans is hard for some to imagine and let alone to accept it.

So is there a European identity?

If we look back at the elements needed to form the identity, we will see that over the years the Commission tackled them all: one by one. But somehow the European identity was not and is not embraced by the Europeans. In the EU's short history, there was only one example when political identification with Europe, and not the nation-state, took place. It was in humiliated and defeated West Germany in its after war period when national identity had lost its appeal and many wanted to forget about being German. A few enthusiastically embraced the 'European idea', a politically united Europe with no national borders. In 1959 only 7% of Germans felt proud of their political institutions and constitution. With time and economic success that followed, West Germans regained their sense of national belonging and faith in politics as the figure increased to 60% in the year 2000 (Conradt, 2005:81).

The EC/EU efforts to create European identity are full of ambiguities and incoherence. The public opinion agrees that the EU has problems with communicating its role and actions to the people. So that's why its provisions on citizenship do not always achieve their aim of creating the common popular belief. Lack of ideas and the failure to imagine European identity through anything other than *national* identity building also played a crucial role. The intellectual borrowing from the national paradigm and the transfer of practices from the domestic environments to the European level resulted in cognitive limitations and normative closure. It was believed that the new Constitution would bring more clarity as to what the EU

¹⁷¹ Although lobbied by immigrant groups, EU policy makers failed to recognize non-European immigrants as eligible for European citizenship. The only clause that was inserted in the Treaty was anti-discrimination provision.

¹⁷² All languages of the EU are equally important. Each piece of law before going the Parliament, needs to be translated into all official languages.

is, how it is governed so it would be easier to identify with it. As ratification process came to a halt, it did not work so far.

European identity remains a goal to achieve. The process of its creation started, but the making of it is moving very at a snail's pace. Identity as such does not exist at present (Pfetsch 2003:116). If the values of reason, individuality, political democracy, liberalism and secularism are the values on which to build European identity, then the institutional arrangement and political novelty of the EU today remains in the way of such an identity development. How is it possible to build identity on politically new ground under the rule of the EU, if all the people, their values and principles are older than the ruler? Paradoxically then, although it is the Commission who has been orchestrating the emergence of political loyalty amongst Europeans, it is at the same time blocking the very emergence of the identity. The identity should not be formed around the institutions, which are new, but around and upon the values, which Europeans have cherished for centuries.

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CAPACITY-BUILDING IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA: THE CHALLENGE FOR UNIVERSITIES

Dr Ron Adams
Victoria University, Melbourne

In July 2005, I was in Sarajevo with twenty Bosnian-background students on a study tour to Bosnia to coincide with the 10th anniversary commemoration of the Srebrenica genocide. From my room in the Holiday Inn I could look out of the window towards the old town, the view framed on the right by the burnt-out Bosnia-Herzegovina (hereafter referred to as Bosnia) Parliament building and on the left by the glistening Twin Towers, home to the OSCE and other key European agencies. Destroyed at the same time as Twin Towers but still not rebuilt, the blackened shell of the Parliament might be read as a metaphor for the lack of political will in Bosnia to reinstate the integrity of the state rendered into two under the Dayton Accord. In the Parliament forecourt are farmers demonstrating against the free market paradigm of bodies like the OECD and the World Bank: protesting at their lack of protection, their inability to compete with imports from neighbouring countries like Croatia and Serbia, and the impossibility of exporting goods produced in Bosnia. Since then, the farmers have been joined by students, protesting their disillusionment with the lack of opportunity and the brain drain.

The symbolism in the contrast between the burnt-out Parliament building and the rebuilt Twin Towers wasn't lost on the students, who had made the pilgrimage to Bosnia not only to grieve the dead, the destroyed and the displaced, but also to honour them by committing themselves to the processes of reconciliation and reconstruction in their homeland.

The challenge for universities committed to student-centred pedagogy, social justice and community engagement - is how do we prepare our students, and in turn their families and communities, to be able to contribute to processes like reconciliation and reconstruction in places like Bosnia-Herzegovina? How do we build their capacity not only to deal with the continuing trauma of their own fractured lives, but also to contribute to the greater good? A key aspect of the challenge is how do we prepare ourselves to take appropriate account in our institutional roles of the reality of everyday life for communities like the recently-settled Bosnian refugee community in Melbourne? How do we ensure that community engagement takes us beyond the familiar rhetoric of core graduate attributes, employment prospects and economic development, so that such timeless questions as 'What is true?', 'What is good?' and 'How ought we to live?' inform what we do and what we pass on as knowledge?

In the political and economic climate currently prevailing in universities and the societies of which they are part, such questions are rarely asked. But this doesn't mean that the questions are pointless, or ought not to be asked. I view the silence in terms of sociologist Max Weber's observation that "A thing is never irrational in itself, but only from a particular rational point of view" (Weber 1930:194). The comment is made in a footnote to *The protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism*, where Weber is addressing the enigma of how a system of production so at odds with the medieval world order could possibly have supplanted it to become the prevailing and taken for granted reality.

Years later, sociologists Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann developed Weber's aphorism in what became and remains one of the most influential text books in the sociology of knowledge, *The Social Construction of Reality*. "Reality", they observed, "is socially defined".

But the definitions are always embodied, that is, concrete individuals and groups of individuals serve as definers of reality. To understand the state of the socially constructed universe at any given time, or its change over time, one must understand the social organization that permits the definers to do their defining. Put a little crudely, it is essential to keep pushing questions about the historically available conceptualisations of reality from the abstract 'What?' to the sociologically concrete 'Says who?' (Berger and Luckmann 1967:116)

Applying this line of reasoning to the theme of this seminar entails pushing questions like "What is economic development?" or "What does it mean to be part of the EU?" from the abstract 'What?' to the sociologically concrete 'Says who?'

Given that any body of knowledge exists within a particular social system, to begin to answer the 'Says who?' question requires an understanding of the particular social systems that frame the various definitions of 'economic development' and the various meanings of 'Europe' and 'European Union'. (Which is not to suggest that particular social systems are autonomous or disconnected from other social systems; but merely that socially distributed bodies of knowledge have their own relevance structures, situated within differentiated institutional settings.)

Understanding the social distribution of knowledge is important for an institution like Victoria University, which seeks to partner with the Bosnian community in capacity-building within the diaspora and within Bosnia itself. This is because the 'Bosnian community' is not an undifferentiated amorphous body speaking with the one voice, but comprises a diverse range of voices expressing distinct and at times contradictory and mutually exclusive viewpoints, experiences and aspirations.

The University's involvement with the community reflects a number of factors which have come together over the past 3-4 years. Their intersection has not been accidental or coincidental - but neither has it been the result of a carefully planned strategy. The intersecting elements include:

- A university mission "to transform the lives of individuals and develop the capacities of industry and communities [which includes a significant recently-settled Bosnian community] within the western Melbourne region and beyond through the power of vocational and higher education".
- In meeting this mission, picking up the so-called 'Malta model' of one of our predecessor institutions whereby how we address local community needs encompasses global outreach, such as serving as a conduit for maintaining connections with homeland institutions such as, in the case of the Bosnian community, the University of Sarajevo.
- Research interests of a number of staff in 'diaspora studies'.
- Pedagogical commitment to working with Bosnian background students on the basis of their particular interests and needs, including the impact of their recent traumatic history.
- The maintenance of a University 'Europe desk' with the brief to explore innovative links with Europe and with local communities of European provenance. This was previously the role of the University's Europe-Australia Institute, which had established with 'The Balkans in the global space: Meeting the economic, social and cultural challenges of adjustment and development' conference, jointly run with University of Ioannina and University of Tirana in 2000, a conference model including both local diaspora community partners and international university partners.
- The active support of leading community members who share the University's social justice agenda and who were able to harness their institutional connections to support University initiatives.

- The personal commitment and support of two successive regimes of vice-chancellors and senior officers to such initiatives.

Outcomes of the intersection of these elements include:

- Two conferences - 'Development and cohesion in South Eastern Europe: Strategies and policies in a fragmented region', in Sarajevo in 2003, and 'The countries of South East Europe on the path to EU membership: Opportunities for Australia, in Melbourne in 2004 - involving the University of Sarajevo and other partners in Bosnia together with local Bosnian community partners.
- Successful inauguration of the student exchange agreement with the University of Sarajevo in 2005-6.
- Involvement in the formation of Bosnian Student Association in Melbourne in 2004 and in Sydney in 2006.
- Use of University facilities and financial support for:
 - Bosnian community forum and cultural night with a celebration of Bosnian song, dance poetry and political commentary as a precursor to the formation of a Bosnian Students Association
 - Seminars and other events organised by the Society for Prevention of Genocide
 - Community commemoration of the 10th anniversary of Srebrenica
 - Meetings of the Student Association and availability of senior staff to provide guidance and advice
 - Seminars and presentations by visitors from the Bosnian Embassy in Canberra, and from Bosnia.
- A Study Tour by Bosnian background Australian university students of Austria-Bosnia in July 2005
- Involvement in the formation and maintenance of the European Diaspora Research Network
- Financial support for production of issue 2 of *Local-Global* journal devoted to Bosnia.

In all of these initiatives, Victoria University has avoided becoming involved in the factionalism that often besets ethnic community organisation in Australia. We work with a range of community organisations. I have my own views and preferences on which Bosnian community organisations do in fact work for the community (rather than the personal advancement of individuals), but the University has demonstrated that it is prepared to work, in an open and transparent way, with any group that can help us achieve our mission and strategic goals.

To date, this has included working with

- Council of Bosnian Herzegovinian Organizations in Australia
- Australian-Bosnian Islamic Centre Deer Park
- Srebrenica - Society for Prevention of Genocide Inc.
- Bosnian Women's Group
- Australian-Bosnian Student Association Victoria
- Bosnian Community Radio 3ZZZ
- Bosnian Embassy in Canberra.

I am not claiming that Victoria University has been totally successful in avoiding being used at times to further the interests of one particular group; but in partnering with different groups it have been careful not to be used as the mouthpiece of this or that group.

It's not always easy. As a university - in contrast to many other universities which tend to see community engagement according to a more familiar (and manageable) transactional model of delivering services - Victoria University has actively adopted a transformational model of

community engagement with the expectation that the university as much as the community will be transformed. According to this model, partnership is reciprocal and continually negotiated according to where the university is coming from and where the community is coming from. In the case of the Bosnian community, this includes the reality of the recent past associated with genocide and ethnic cleansing, mass deportation and displacement (Cigar 1995).

The reality is ever-present, never far from the surface of daily life. It is brought home to me every time I go into the house of any number of Bosnian friends in Melbourne who resettled in Australia as refugees, who face on a daily basis the grim reality of getting on with life without a husband or father, a cousin or brother. It confronted me on the television screen recently when the Australian Broadcasting Corporation screened a documentary on the fate of the women who had been systematically raped by Serb forces as part of their genocidal ethnic cleansing.

It was brought home to me when I visited the Bosnian café Saraj near our St Albans campus in the western suburbs of Melbourne and was introduced by my colleague and friend Hariz Halilovich to a young man in his late teens with a distinctive scar across his face. Hariz introduced 'Damir' (not his real name) as one of the best Bosnian soccer players in Australia. He was shy, but very polite and insisted on buying us drinks, which we promised to accept next time. Hariz, who at one stage was the young man's counsellor, told me the story about his scar. At the age of four, when the war broke out in Bosnia, Damir was forced to abandon his home village with his parents and seek shelter in a Bosniak enclave in eastern Bosnia. Before he turned five he had lost his mother when the room in which they were hiding received a direct mortar hit from the Serb military besieging the enclave. His mother used the only thing she had, her body, to protect her boy. Those who ran to assist found a decapitated woman with a traumatised child under her body. His father, devastated by his loss, managed to evacuate his wounded son with a UN convoy to Tuzla, where Damir's grandmother lived as a refugee. Soon after, the boy's father was also killed. His grandmother looked after him for a year but then she died and Damir was put in an orphanage, where he spent the next five years until, in 1998, his grownup half-brother, who lived as a refugee in Western Europe, included Damir in his application for resettlement in Australia.

In Melbourne, Damir did well playing soccer for local Bosnian clubs but had great difficulty adapting to the Australian school system and engaging in class activities. He preferred not to talk and would always keep one hand on his face, hiding the scar, and eventually he left school in favour of the anonymity that a construction site can offer to unskilled labourers. He was finally given the chance to have plastic surgery to remove the scar but on reflection he decided against the operation, preferring to wear the scar which served to remind him not only of the trauma and loss but also of the mother's love that had saved his life. By the time I met him, the scar was part of his identity as a person, a special person - someone whose mother was prepared to lay down her own life that her child might survive. Today on Saturdays he stars on soccer fields across the western suburbs of Melbourne, dreaming of one day playing with his compatriot Salihamidzic at Munich-Bayern, or at Real Madrid or Manchester United.

This, the European football league, is the only Europe that exists for Damir.

A few weeks after being introduced by Hariz to Damir at the café Saraj, Hariz and I were able to introduce Selmir, a Bosnian student studying for his BA in multimedia at the nearby St Albans campus, to this little bit of Bosnia in suburban Melbourne. Selmir had been brought to Australia early in 1997 by Moira Kelly from the Children First Foundation for an operation on his leg. He'd spent five months recovering from the surgery before returning to Bosnia, where he struggled to stay at school and cope with rehabilitation, when Moira stepped in again with an offer for him to return to Australia and commence school in the Victorian country town of Hamilton. It was the beginning of the 1999 school year and, for Selmir, the

beginning of a new direction in his life. Courtesy of scholarships Moira had secured for him, he completed five years of high school before commencing a TAFE course at VU. Vice-Chancellor Harman had responded to Moira's request for support for Selmir and another Children First sponsored student with offers of two full scholarships. At the successful completion of their TAFE diplomas, the scholarships were extended to enable Selmir and his Albanian mate Ervis to complete their full degrees.

The story of how Selmir got to this point is best told in his own words.

I was born in the historic town of Mostar, divided by the great river of Neretva. Before the war broke out in Bosnia I lived in a village about 10 km north, which was the front line between Bosniaks and Serbs when war broke out. My first encounter with the war was in first grade. My father had picked me up from school, when the Serb forces started to invade the outer suburbs of Mostar. We were stopped at gunpoint at a checkpoint just above our village, where hundreds of Serb forces were lining up for inspection. I was standing about 300 meters away, when a Croat missile landed in the middle of a couple of hundred men. It was a scene that no child should have to experience. I turned my head and ran away and never looked back. After that we had to find refuge in Mostar with relatives because our village now constituted the front line.

It lasted five long years, four years of which I spent in Mostar, very close to the front line, where snipers never missed. My aunt was wounded twice by a sniper. First when she went to fetch water, and second when the Bosnian army brought a tank next to our house, which made it way too dangerous there, so we moved. I was running parallel to my aunt and I felt a bullet fly past my head, finding its mark in my aunt. Many of my relatives were wounded or killed during the war, the price we had to pay for someone else's mistakes. But when I look back, I get to thinking that we did relatively well given what happened in the UN protected area of Srebrenica where thousands were killed - fathers, mothers, children, families, the whole town wiped.

To ask someone in Bosnia how they feel about the war and all the killing is, I think, a pointless exercise, because people lost all emotion during the war, lost all that they believed in. All they loved disappeared in thin air. It's impossible for me to say how I or my family felt or feel about the war. It's impossible to describe, after living like a rat in the basement for four years and losing so many things dear to you. I still feel angry.

In my case the peace process of Bosnia was equally sad. As much as I looked forward to getting back to school and playing with the kids again, for our family the war started all over again with the peace. It was a stinking hot afternoon, 5th June 1996. The word was out that we could return to our property just outside Mostar. It was a public announcement that it was safe. It wasn't so safe in our case. My father, brother, grandfather and myself headed out on that day of promise to return to what we owned. But the promise was a lie: we ran over a tank landmine. My father died not long after the impact, my grandfather who was nearly seventy had a broken leg in four places, and my brother ended up with a fractured jaw and badly smashed teeth. There was I, looking at the stronghold of our family spread on the ground. I thought I was OK for a minute, until I tried to stand up and I kept falling down. It wasn't until then that I realized that I had half of my leg ripped off. To this day I thank God and my brother who ran ten kilometres down a rugged mountain to get help.

My grandfather and my brother were taken to Mostar Base Hospital. I ended up in the hospital in Sarajevo, which was a bit of luck because at the time there was an Austrian plastics surgeon working there. I'm thankful that the plastic surgery was performed by

him because I doubt if my leg would look as good as it does if our doctors had operated on it. Doctors I later saw were amazed on how well the surgery was done and how well the grafts were placed. I spent the next three months in the hospital recovering. Four months after the hospital my leg kept on getting infected so I was constantly in and out of hospital. In the meantime my brother and grandfather were released from the hospital and were on their way to recovery. The most painful process I had to go through during this time was when I found out that on my father's death certificate it was said that he died a natural death. This buried me alive - the lengths that people will go to cover something like this up.

For me it was only the start of a long painful process of recovery and at the same time grieving for the loss of my father. It was heart breaking for my mother. She was a lost soul who could not believe that something like this could have happened to our family.

By this time I had lost every inch of hope. But the tables turned and I was given the opportunity of a lifetime when Moira Kelly, who was working in the refugee camps in Capljina, south east of Mostar, asked if I wanted to go to Australia for extensive surgery on my badly damaged left leg. I spent five months in Australia in 1997 recovering from the surgery at Cabrini Hospital in Melbourne. I returned to Bosnia in mid 1997 and continued my rehabilitation in Fojnica, 100 kilometres northwest of Mostar. As I struggled to stay at school and continue with my rehab, I got an even better offer from Moira Kelly: I was asked to come to Australia and start my high school life in the town of Hamilton in western Victoria.

The year 1999 was the start of the new life for me, with new prospects and new boundaries to be crossed. It was an opportunity for me to start a new life and set up the direction for my life to come as well as help my long-time struggling family back in Bosnia.

After five years of high school I came to another obstacle. I knew that without further studies I would not be able to get a job at home. But my long term guardian Moira Kelly persuaded the Vice-Chancellor at Victoria University to provide a scholarship which enabled me to study for a TAFE diploma. On my successful completion Professor Harman offered a full scholarship to complete the degree course, and this year (2006) I am enrolled in the Bachelor of Arts Multimedia at St Albans Campus, which I hope to finish at the end of 2007.

By completing this course and finding a job I will be able to help and protect my family financially, as I do at the moment with remittances from the small wage I receive working in a casual job. I owe a lot to my family, especially to my brother who saved my life. I feel that it's my duty to provide them with better quality of life for the years to come. In the same way, I owe a lot to Australia and team from Victoria University, which I would like to pay back one day by helping them in their projects to help my country.

I know that Bosnia has recovered enormously thanks to the international community and their commitment help the people in Bosnia. But one of the sickening scenes for me every time I go back is the unemployment and the near poverty that so many people still endure. For example, my brother - the one to whom I owe my life - works at a carwash for 15 KM (\$13) a day. He has no minimum working conditions and the business he works for is not even registered. Each night he comes home, separates some of his 15 KM for the family, put enough aside to fill his car with petrol, and save anything left over. You don't have to be a mathematician to work out what might be left over. The cornerstone of Bosnia's future is the young generation - and they seem

to have been neglected by the Bosnian government. But I see a bright future shining for Bosnia. With the European Union in sight, all that's left to be done is to straighten out the government and stop these burglars of Bosnia. But I have to say that I feel a bit cheated by the EU, who seem to be taking their time in dealing with the burglars who are holding back Bosnia's development.

Closer to home, it's great to see how much the international community as represented by Victoria University, for example, cares about Bosnia's future and what happens to the young generation. I think a lot of good will come from VU's involvement in Bosnia's rebuilding through working with the local Bosnian community, who identify now with Australia but who are also committed to rebuilding their homeland. Working locally in this way is also working internationally. For my part, I welcome the prospect of being involved.

Accommodating Selmir's particular circumstances and meeting Damir on his terms at the Saraj café are concrete examples of a transformational model of community engagement in action. Ultimately the engagement, like any meaningful engagement, is person to person and reciprocal: just as Damir and Selmir become part of the University networks, so too people like me become part of their community networks. What we are seeing here is an enhancement not only of the community's social capital, but also of the social capital of the University!

The July 2005 Study Tour to Austria-Bosnia is another example of enhancing social capital, of building individual and institutional capacity. Organised by Victoria University in partnership with the Council of Bosnian Herzegovinian Organizations in Australia, the Study Tour was timed to coincide with the commemoration of the 10th anniversary of the Srebrenica genocide, which to varying degrees had affected all of the Bosnian-Australian university students taking part and which continues to shape the reality of life for many.

Attending the commemoration service at Potocari on 11 July was the principal raison d'être of the Study Tour. We left Sarajevo in buses before sunrise and headed in a convoy towards Srebrenica. By the time we'd got to Potocari, the buses had slowed to a snail's pace, the hundreds of blue-uniformed Republika Srpska (RS) police seemingly intent on disrupting rather than facilitating the passage of vehicles. The concentration of buses at Potocari brought to mind the events of ten years before, when 30-40,000 Bosniaks were massed at the UN safe haven at the old battery factory at Potocari after Srebrenica had been overrun by the Serbs. As is now documented, the Serbs conspired with the Dutch UN forces to send in hundreds of buses to transport women, children and old people out of the area as part of the genocidal plan to kill all Bosniak males of childbearing age. As is also documented, this extended to children as young as 11 or 12 and old men. Women were systematically raped as part of the plan of ethnic cleansing combined with humiliation (Nuhanovic 2007).

Included in our Study Tour party were students for whom the contingents of buses and RS police at Potocari rekindled memories of the traumatic experiences of ten years before when they had been bussed out of Srebrenica with their mothers ten years before, sharpened the pain of still raw wounds.

Before we'd left for Europe, I'd asked each of the students - many of whom hailed from Srebrenica - to reflect on the significance of Srebrenica and of their attending the 10th anniversary commemoration, to prepare them for what they would confront. Half a dozen of their reflections are included in the **Sarajevo: Pathways to Reconciliation** issue of *Local-Global* journal (Adams 2006: 142-152).

Admir's is typical. A final year Engineering student at Victoria University, he reflected on how 14 April 1992 was the last day he was to see his birthplace.

Srebrenica is the place where I spent most of my childhood. It brings the most beautiful memories, of times when I was together with my family ... on birthdays, BBQs, holidays and all the other times we spent together. It brings memories from my friends and school friends as we went to school together, played together different sports, went on sports competitions and so on. I can clearly say that [the] best time of my life I spent in Srebrenica.... Unfortunately, since 1992 everything has changed. After that came the problems and the worries about all the family members, especially about my father. At the beginning of the war we were unclear about my father for more than two months - if he was alive or dead. Since the tragedy in July 1995 my whole life changed. Most of my family is either dead or missing since July 1995.... In July that year, I had experienced happiness and sadness at the same time, when we found out that my uncle had safely escaped this massacre, but no news about my father, nor two of my cousins, my grandfather and many relatives. Another reason to participate in the study tour is to give blood for identification of the missing persons, and hopefully I will be able to find out what happened with my father. To assure that this will never happen again we need to serve justice and get the people responsible for mass killings before trial - and try to find out how strong their hatred was, if they were able to do all those horrific killings.

To summarise it, I can say that [the] name Srebrenica brings the most beautiful feelings to me and on the other hand the most horrible feelings. I always ask myself two questions:

'Why did those people do all those horrible things?

How is a man able to commit mass killings?'

I'll share with you one other reflection: that of Saidin, a Victoria University performing arts student who was to stay on in Sarajevo as the University's first exchange student with the University of Sarajevo. The day before writing the following comments Saidin had viewed the now familiar video footage of Serb paramilitary soldiers executing six Bosnian Muslim men, one of whom - the man in the pale blue shirt - he recognised as his father, missing since 1995].

In [the] last 24 hours, a lot has changed with my view of Srebrenica Massacre and my whole perception of it....

After seeing that horrible footage I hardly can feel my legs, I avoid driving because I can't focus on anything but that one familiar image from that footage.

I am a man, I've been since '95 [when he was only thirteen], I've started enjoying my life but I didn't want to see that footage....

There is a lot of anger there, disgust and somehow desire to live even more fully; to go to the gym with more passion, to act with more passion, to write, improve, do.

I want to work hard, try to get my film off the ground, do as many things as I can to satisfy my desire to live a meaningful life.

Sometimes though, as I do now, I want to cry ... I've gotten over that man in the blue shirt whose silhouette I kind of recognised in the footage, but man ... Hey, it is hard to believe ... you know ... That man held my hand, liked to have a beer or two on the holidays, he believed in people more than he did in God, took me hunting ... What can I tell you.

Who could believe, he seemed so powerless, broken, lonely ... My dad, man.

I loved that guy. Endlessly as you do ... and I was even on my spiritual journey of forgiving them, but then I saw that....

Every one of the students' stories is powerful and poignant. Each is testimony to continuing pain and bewilderment. They all demand to be listened to and respected.

The really sobering thought is that each of the tens of thousands of Bosnians assembling along with the students at the cemetery at Potocari has their own story, like our students. Within Australia there is pressure - often unconscious - to 'get on with life', to spare others the ordeal of sharing in your pain and grief by repressing memories. The Victorian Foundation for Survivors of Torture, for whom Hariz used to work and whose biggest client group until recently was Bosnian, deals on a daily basis with the consequences of such repression; and much of its work is directed to encouraging people to disclose and share their grief. The cemetery at Potocari, and the other monuments, events and exhibitions in Bosnia materialises the shared grief and provides a collective framework to encourage the recognition of pain in others and the realisation that you are not alone. In the absence of such a framework in Australia, Victoria University played an important role in providing a shared space for the community to gather and to mourn. Similarly, the Study Tour and the pilgrimage to Potocari in a mutually-supportive environment provided a space for the students to share their memories, and to use them as a stepping-off point for reflection and positive forms of action.

The academic program in Bosnia included high level briefings from a range of Ministries, the Bosnian Immigrant Council and the Honorary Australian Consul. To gain an insight into the re-emergence of a rich and vibrant social and cultural life in Bosnia, students had guided tours of the Bosniak Institute, Memorial Centre and the Comedy Theatre. Other visits included the 'Tunnel', the sights of Sarajevo and a day excursion to Mostar. Vince Gamberale, Country Director of CHF International¹⁷³ in Bosnia, arranged for the students also to visit successful Bosnian companies, to instil a sense of optimism for the future and to inform the students on some of the country's successful economic-social development strategies.

Before they travelled to Bosnia, all of the students participated in the annual conference of the European Access Network in Vienna. The Conference theme was the impact of fees on higher education access of disadvantaged and under-represented groups, and six of the students gave presentations - on the impact of fees and of paid work on Bosnian students in Australia - before an international audience of leading educators and policy makers. Like other elements of the Study Tour, this was an opportunity for students to develop at their own pace and in their own way the University's core graduate attributes:

- Is an effective problem solver in a range of new and challenging settings
- Can locate, evaluate, manage and use a diverse range of information
- Can communicate effectively as an aspiring professional and as a world citizen
- Can work autonomously and collaboratively in a range of settings and engagements
- Can work effectively in socially and culturally diverse settings.

Obviously the development would have been more direct and accelerated for the 6 students who gave conference presentations - but even for the other 16 participation in the conference was a key learning experience in terms of networking and demystifying an academic conference. Similarly, an extensive briefing by the Australian Ambassador and senior staff at the Vienna embassy followed by a reception at the Ambassador's residence served to demystify the operation of Australia's diplomats, and in this way better equipped all the students as Australian and global citizens.

¹⁷³ Community Habitat Finance (CHF) International <http://www.chfinternational.org/>

What I have been talking about is one side of capacity-building - a side with which institutions like universities feel familiar and comfortable. As far as I know, all Australian universities talk in terms of Core Graduate Attributes, and there would be little difficulty in persuading colleagues as to the efficacy of a Study Tour when it is expressed in these terms.

What they also need to be persuaded to is the proposition that our role is not only to prepare our students for a meaningful career, but also to develop in them - and in ourselves - the capacity to recognise and experience the responsibilities of global citizenship. The challenge for universities is to go beyond the familiar commitment to core graduate attributes and employment prospects to ensure that such timeless questions as 'What is true?', 'What is good?' and 'How ought we to live?' inform what we do and what we pass on as knowledge.

From my involvement with Bosnian Australian students, I am buoyed by the indications that many are already asking these questions - along with the more predictable questions about how their studies are preparing them for the workplace. A few days after seeing the tape in which he recognised his father being tortured and killed, Saidin reflected on leaving Bosnia in 1998:

You leave everything: your land, your history, people with the same genes as you ... your blood relatives. You leave everything that you used to be and go in search of something you had been missing before. It's usually the peace of silence that lasts longer than the one in between two bombshell explosions....

Then with time, in that newly found peaceful silence, you start to think of all those people you left behind, all the memories, days and nights. You start to think of your childhood home and the boys and the girls you went to primary school with. You start to think of how those boys would eventually become very good friends of yours and those girls would become beautiful women.... You start to imagine what would your life there be, if you had the time to grow up and live in your home town and on the land of your ancestors ...

What comes out in Saidin's reflection is the interdependence of memory (of all those childhood friends you'd left behind) and imagination (of what your life might have been, if only ...). The interdependence isn't fixed, but context-specific - in his case the context of seeing his father on the tape after a decade of uncertainty. The implicit reflexivity in Saidin's words - his awareness that the context affects what it is he remembers, what it is he recalls - draws our attention to the choices we make as we confront our reconstructions of the past.

Students like Saidin - and Admir and Damir and Selmir - remind us that it does not have to be a choice between the rebuilt Twin Towers and the EU as we know it on the one hand and the burnt out Parliament building and alienated farmers on the other. It really is a matter of being prepared to push the questions around economic development and what it means to be part of the EU from the abstract 'What?' to the sociologically concrete 'Says who?'

In places like Bosnia, the relations of material production are still different from those prevailing in other parts of Europe. The kinds of material relationships giving expression to 'Europe' or 'European Union' - such as the patterns of conduct that distinguish how politics or business is conducted - in places like Germany, Sweden or Austria, have not yet been universalized and internalized in places like Bosnia to the point where alternatives are unimaginable. The institutional arrangements which went by the name 'Yugoslavia' - and which for many years were co-extensive with objective reality - are still a recent memory in the minds of many, and are yet to be replaced by an equally compelling set of post-communist institutional arrangements claiming universal allegiance as 'reality'.

At this liminal moment, it may be that in Bosnia - where 'Europe' is not known and experienced in the same taken-for-granted way that it is in, say, Brussels - it is possible for 'Europe' to come to mean something altogether different, and perhaps better!

In *The Café Europa*, Slavenka Drakulić (1996:12) declares, 'Europe'

is something distant, something to be attained, to be deserved. It is also something expensive and fine: good clothes, the certain look and smell of its people. Europe is plenitude: food, cars, light, everything - a kind of festival of colours, diversity, opulence, beauty. It offers choice: from shampoo to political parties. It represents freedom of expression. It is a promised land, a new Utopia, a lollipop. And through television, that Europe is right there, in your apartment, often in colours much too bright to be real.

'Europe' is also

the opposite of what we have, and what we want to get rid of - it is the absence of communism, of fear and deprivation.

Drakulić asks if anyone today is able to say where Europe and all it stands for begins, and where it ends? Does the new (post-communist) reality call for a broader definition than that which has prevailed in Brussels, or Berlin, or here in Graz?

Europe, she concludes, "is what we - countries, peoples, individuals - make of it for ourselves" (Drakulić 1996:13).

This is another one of the challenges for universities. Arthur Koestler wrote that "creativity is the defeat of habit by originality". Encouraging students to question, and if necessary overturn, habits of mind is surely a university responsibility and obligation. That doesn't mean rushing to replace one habit of mind with another: it would be ludicrous romanticism to imagine that the farmers protesting on the forecourt of the burnt out Parliament in Sarajevo are at the cutting edge of a bold new paradigm of 'Europe'. But even from the point of view of the Brussels paradigm of Europe, the risk of not taking sufficient note of the different ways in which 'Europe' is comprehended and experienced in places like Bosnia - not being sensitive to other 'particular rational points of view', not pushing questions from the abstract 'What?' to the sociologically concrete 'Says who?' - is that accession into the European Union might beget opposition and resistance and ultimately undermine Europe's authority, not just in Bosnia but universally.

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STUDENT ESSAY:

WHAT IS THE LEGACY OF 'GAULLISM' IN CONTEMPORARY FRENCH POLITICS?

Alexandra Lamb
Trinity College, Melbourne

'Is Chirac the new de Gaulle?' asked a CNN reporter two months after his 1995 presidential election victory. To which French political writer Jarreau commented that it was just like the Americans to simplify everything...¹⁷⁴

Chirac's charisma and impudence certainly contributed to the connection to the great wartime general and founder of the Fifth Republic, and his proud views on France's independence and integrity certainly paralleled those of de Gaulle. The terms 'neo-Gaullism' and now 'Euro-Gaullism' have found their way into the current lingo of political commentary and many ask whether there is more than a lingering trace of this same brand of political style that thrust France into the world's proverbial face in the 1960s.

France's individuality, manifested through what is commonly seen as vehement anti-Americanism or conceited patriotism, is part of the dynamic persona of the two leaders which de Gaulle's and Chirac's regime share. This typical 'Gaullist' attitude of leaders is what many feel guides France's sometime problematic participation in international affairs, most notably its taking the lead of the anti-globalization movement in the late 1990s and its opposition to the United States' agenda in the Middle East.¹⁷⁵

It is common to hear France berated for its arrogance and Gaullism attacked specifically as the root of this distinctly French problem. However, as this essay shall continue to argue, the nature of French politics is very different today than it was in de Gaulle's time and much of this criticism is simplistic or unfounded. Furthermore, the question of what remains of Gaullism and what it means to French foreign policy has become an issue of particular concern today, at a time when Europe is facing the challenge of exploring and establishing its own identity¹⁷⁶. There is anxiety, particularly in the United States that Gaullism is metastasising in Europe and this may pose a challenge to the comfortably established unipolar system.¹⁷⁷ This essay shall further explore the growing concern around the notion of 'Euro-Gaullism.'

Gaullism is a political creed based on the thoughts and actions of Charles de Gaulle. When the general took the reigns of the floundering Fourth Republic during the Algerian crisis, he gave France a new sense of strength and importance. He redefined the country according to his 'certain idea of France', instilling in it a new sense of identity and a revitalised pride. De Gaulle underlined two fundamental notions of Gaullism: Grandeur and Unity. Grandeur naturally accompanies military and economic strength, while unity depends on a strong State and reconciled society. He advanced this through a historical conception of the nation in order to unite and thereby reinvigorate and strengthen the country. He called for a collective effort to create this strong State so that France may once again become a great power¹⁷⁸.

¹⁷⁴ Patrick Jarreau, *La France de Chirac*, Paris: Flammarion, 1995, p. 189

¹⁷⁵ Sophie Meunier, 'Anti-Americanisms in France' in *French Politics, Culture and Society* (Summer 2005): p126(16)

¹⁷⁶ Richard Bernstein, 'Behind the Gallic bark, more rhetoric than bite' in *International Herald Tribune*, April 2, 2004

¹⁷⁷ Borut Grgic, 'Agog over Gaullism: Obsession with France skews U.S. priorities' in *International Herald Tribune*, August 27, 2003

¹⁷⁸ Pierre Brechon, *Le Discours Politique en France*, Paris: La documentation française, 1994, p. 40

Some note a fading of the Gaullist legacy, referring to the economic changes in the 1980s, a marked 'rightisation'¹⁷⁹ that pushed the Gaullist Party (then the UDR) from a 'dirigiste' to a more market-oriented economy¹⁸⁰. Gaullism did not however embody a particular economic policy. De Gaulle did hope to find a 'Third Way'¹⁸¹ between the US and the USSR, but this was primarily a means to distinguish France through political identity. Gaullism is a breed of nationalism.

Similarly, some assess the legacy of Gaullism through the development of France's political tradition. Certainly the record-breaking duration of constitution of the Fifth Republic, outlasting the twelve-year average of every other of the fifteen formal constitutions since 1789¹⁸², is a worthy indicator of de Gaulle's legacy. Despite the widespread belief that the Gaullist Party would not outlive its dynamic leader, it has remained the largest party since¹⁸³ (though in different disguises). While political stability may be awarded to de Gaulle's reshaping of the French parliamentary system, his style was more original than his doctrine¹⁸⁴. France had had a good share of dynamic and authoritarian leaders. De Gaulle's glorious return to politics in 1958 has even been referred to as 'Bonapartism.'¹⁸⁵

The shape of the new Republic was only slightly altered from those of the Third and Fourth Republics. The President was granted more power. He could appoint the Prime Minister, which is not unusual in French or other European parliamentary systems. The only controversial expansion of his power was article 16 of the constitution which enabled him to have a free hand in emergency situations - but only after the parliament agreed to the situation¹⁸⁶. More distinctive was De Gaulle's characteristic use of widespread support among the population to push his political mandate. This way of mobilising support was institutionalised into the political system. De Gaulle's 1962 referendum amended the constitution to enable the president to be directly elected by the populace¹⁸⁷.

There is very little to compare between de Gaulle's political mandate and that of Chirac. While De Gaulle is still revered by many today as a national hero, Chirac has not enjoyed the same support. He has served a lengthy term but his recent election victory was nothing more than the outcome of disunity and blunders that saw Jean-Marie le Pen, leader of far-right *Front National* emerge as the opposition running against him in the second round. Similarly, when Chirac put a referendum to the French people on a European Constitution, the cataclysmic 'non' was as much a device to punish Chirac as it was a rebuke to the legitimacy of the European Union¹⁸⁸.

Much of what gave rise to Gaullism then, and has re-arisen now, is the complex problem France faces of uniting its rich tradition with contemporary change. De Gaulle asked whether France could modernise 'without ceasing to be French.'¹⁸⁹ France needed, he said 'to marry her century.'¹⁹⁰

¹⁷⁹ Brechon, p. 40

¹⁸⁰ Peter Fysh, 'Gaullism today' in *Parliamentary Affairs*, Vol 46.n3 (July 1993): pp399(16)

¹⁸¹ Philip Williams and Martin Harrison, *Politics and Society in de Gaulle's Republic*, New York, Anchor Books, 1973, p. 351

¹⁸² John Ambler, *The Government and Politics of France*, Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1971, p. 1

¹⁸³ John Blondel, *Contemporary France: Politics, Society and Institutions*, Suffolk, Great Britain, Menthuen, 1974, p. 32

¹⁸⁴ Jean Touchard, *Le Gaullisme 1940-1969*, Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1973, p. 313

¹⁸⁵ David R. Cameron and Richard I. Hofferbert, 'Continuity and Change in Gaullism: The General's Legacy' in *American Journal of Political Science* Vol. 17, No. 1 (Feb., 1973), pp. 77-98

¹⁸⁶ Blondel, *Contemporary France*, p. 47

¹⁸⁷ David R. Cameron and Richard I. Hofferbert in *American Journal of Political Science* Vol. 17, No. 1 (Feb., 1973), pp. 77-98

¹⁸⁸ Patrice de Beer, 'France's post-referendum trauma' in *Open Democracy*, May 31, 2005

http://www.opendemocracy.net/democracy-europe/constitution/no_vote_2557.jsp

¹⁸⁹ Williams and Harrison, *Politics and Society in de Gaulle's Republic*, p. 3

¹⁹⁰ *Ibid.*

Compared to most other European countries, France underwent the most profound social and economic transformation in the 1950s and 1960s¹⁹¹. A rapid demographic change, 'national rabbitism'¹⁹², propelled the long-time stagnant population and the booming babies were later to grow into French history's notorious youth¹⁹³. Urbanisation and industrialisation saw old, rural, localised, and sectarian France rapidly transform into a 'modern' mass economy¹⁹⁴. In the volatile climate of rapid social and economical change and political instability, many continue to praise de Gaulle's firm leadership for giving a somewhat fragile France strength and unity.

Chirac's regime faces a similar challenge of wedding tradition to change. Gaullism has emerged as a response to globalisation, which is often equated with Americanisation¹⁹⁵. De Gaulle was notoriously anti-American. There was a visible national bitterness over the loss of Great Power Status¹⁹⁶. He admonished France as being endowed by its glorious history to lead, even if it meant accepting an 'incandescent solitude on the world stage'¹⁹⁷. Furthermore, through the spread of American culture the French saw a real anxiety over the threat to their own uniquely French way of life¹⁹⁸.

Much of this reflects, then and now, a certain nostalgia provoking a resistance to change. Only recently in what was very reminiscent of de Gaulle's promulgation of *la francophonie*, Chirac stormed out on French banker Seilliere for addressing the congregation at the European Union's employer's organization in English¹⁹⁹. Apart from being humourous, Chirac's frustration is a shared one, and a real fear that one's cultural identity, of which national language is possibly the most significant aspect, is being overrun by the powerful momentum of globalization. Just as in the 1950s' anti-coca cola campaign, MacDonald's and fast food is seen as an insult, and potentially a threat, to French cuisine²⁰⁰. Sheep herder Bove Jose has been placed in the annals of history for his dismantling of a Macdonald's restaurant in protest²⁰¹. These complaints are not unique to France however, but just as present in Belgian, Dutch and Austrian politicians, some of who have successfully mobilized support²⁰².

More Gaullist perhaps is Chirac's vow to create, not more independence, but a 'better independence', ensuring that France does not drown in an anonymous western identity, dominated by the US²⁰³. A solid example of this can be found in Chirac's proposal for a European Rapid Reaction Force, launched during the French presidency of the European Union in 2000 - a proposal seen by virtually all commentators as exemplifying a French foreign policy agenda aimed at making Europe more independent of the United States²⁰⁴.

While France is frequently reproached for its opposition to America and seemingly distasteful regard of American way of life, it is statistically no more anti-American than any other European country. While anti-Americanism 'skyrocketed' after the 2002 US led invasion of Iraq, according to a survey by Richard Kuisel, in the 1980s 44% more French people than Germans or Brits declared themselves pro-American. France supported the US in the Gulf War of 1991 which pointed to an 'apex of pro-Americanism' in France. France supported the US in

¹⁹¹ Ambler, *The Government and Politics of France*, p. 4

¹⁹² Williams and Harrison, *Politics and Society in de Gaulle's Republic*, p. 9

¹⁹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁹⁴ Blondel, *Contemporary France*, p. 8

¹⁹⁵ Meunier, 'Anti-Americanisms in France'

¹⁹⁶ Meunier, 'Anti-Americanisms in France'

¹⁹⁷ Bernstein, 'Behind the Gallic bark, more rhetoric than bite'

¹⁹⁸ Meunier, 'Anti-Americanisms in France'

¹⁹⁹ Paul Kennedy, 'When Chirac postures, we shouldn't laugh' in *International Herald Tribune*, 13 April, 2006

²⁰⁰ Meunier, 'Anti-Americanisms in France'

²⁰¹ *Ibid.*

²⁰² *Ibid.*

²⁰³ Jarreau, *La France de Chirac*, p. 190

²⁰⁴ John Hulsman, 'A Defence Plan in US Interests' *Heritage Foundation research*, December 20, 2000 <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Europe/EM707.cfm>

the Gulf War of 1991 which pointed to an 'apex of pro-Americanism' in France. It is unfair to target France as an anti-American nation for simply voicing what may be reasoned criticism²⁰⁵.

The French have a reputation for being vociferously opinionated. While attracting much attention when it rejected the EU constitution, it was not of a different opinion to the Netherlands, and quite likely Great Britain among others. Similarly, while more attention has been paid to France for its disapproval of Turkey joining the EU, it is certainly not the only EU country to feel that way.

Some view that because de Gaulle advanced the notion that France should lead and assert its importance on the world stage, France is more likely than any other European nation to be in a competitive relationship with a leading country, i.e. the United States²⁰⁶. France has been loud in its opposition to the US led invasion of Iraq, indeed prompting the Americans to retaliate by renaming French-fries and French-toast and pouring French wine out onto the streets. Opposition to the US' handling of Iraq is hardly a rogue critique concentrated in France, indeed most of the world would fall into that camp. The French have not been any more adamantly opposed to the campaign than many other Europeans. Simply by virtue of the country's out-dated seat on the Security Council, France could use its veto power to make its opinion heard particularly loudly.

Something of a 'neurotic obsession' with Gaullism is impeding the US' understanding of Europe, according to journalist Borut Grgic²⁰⁷. There seems to be an emerging fear in the United States that this virulent strain of nationalism is finding new momentum in the polarization of the debate surrounding US foreign policy, especially the war in Iraq. There is a fear that this 'French spell' may metastasize in Europe, posing a potential challenge to the unipolar world system, especially the typically Gaullist will to opposition. It is important to note however that de Gaulle and Chirac both supported the US in crucial issues. De Gaulle sided with the US on the Berlin Blockade and the Cuban missile crisis, and Chirac was behind the US in the first Gulf War, in NATO's campaign in Kosovo, and in Afghanistan²⁰⁸.

Journalist Richard Bernstein wrote that this issue has particular cogency today, when Chirac's patriotic rhetoric on France's 'special' role in the world makes him appear as a sort of 'better looking reincarnation of de Gaulle himself.' Furthermore, as Europe tries to explore and establish its own identity, this particular breed of nationalism is raising interest.²⁰⁹ 'Euro-Gaullism' is on one side a reasoned criticism of America's foreign policy, and on the other a desire to build a European identity. Similar to Chirac and de Gaulle, there is a common desire in Europe to defend her rich historical traditions against the onslaught of homogenisation and to define itself as distinctly different from the US within a generically labelled western identity.

Gaullism has had an unfair reputation and has often been misunderstood, or taken to be a stronger force than it really is. Chirac's policy is so removed from that of de Gaulle that there is little left to compare in the two Gaullist parties of the UDR and UMP. Chirac's efforts towards strengthening European integration, giving authority to international organisations such as the UN and greater participation in NATO show a different political trend than that of de Gaulle.²¹⁰ It has come packaged in a lot of rhetoric about its 'eminent and exceptional destiny' and the 'genius of the nation'²¹¹ that has allowed it to be seen as convoluted and more than a bit ridiculous in a peculiarly French sort of way.

²⁰⁵ Meunier, 'Anti-Americanisms in France'

²⁰⁶ Bernstein, 'Behind the Gallic bark, more rhetoric than bite'

²⁰⁷ Grgic, 'Agog over Gaullism'

²⁰⁸ Bernstein, 'Behind the Gallic bark, more rhetoric than bite'

²⁰⁹ Bernstein, 'Behind the Gallic bark, more rhetoric than bite'

²¹⁰ Bernstein, 'Behind the Gallic bark, more rhetoric than bite'

²¹¹ Touchard, *Le Gaullisme*, p. 295

Chirac is visible now for a strength derived in part from the growing economic and political strength of the European Union, and a personality that articulates a view shared by many Europeans beyond France. Had it not been for suspicion elsewhere in Europe about residual Gaullism, he might have achieved a lot more.

What is sometimes scathingly labeled as Gaullism is not much more than France's urge to create a Europe that is a counterweight to American dominance in the international arena. Gaullism was fundamentally about reestablishing a distinct French identity, a pride in being French and a common national unity, lending to France a sense of purpose and meaning. It meant emphasizing all that the French might believe about themselves, their ancestors the Gauls, cheese, the superiority of French wine and the desirability of having many sorts of cheese. This often meant asserting its opposition and rejecting being dominated by others. Gaullism is faint. It is a French breed of nationalism, but no more potent than that of the US or many other countries. Gaullism is 'more a rhetorical pose than a political reality' or as the French commentator Alain Duhamel described it, 'it is not a doctrine or a policy, but a sensibility²¹².'

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²¹² Grgic, 'Agog over Gaullism'

STUDENT ESSAY:
TURKEY'S ACCESSION TO THE EUROPEAN UNION

Edward John Tarrant
Macquarie University Sydney

Today, Europe's treatment of Turkey is a sensitive subject. The success or failure of Turkish efforts to gain entry into the European Union is viewed by many as an embodiment of the rising tension between East and West. The eyes of the world are watching and how Europe chooses to handle Turkey's accession plans for membership may well affect perceptions of Europe worldwide. Turkey's candidature has generated heated debate and controversy since Turkey first requested entry in 1987. There are compelling arguments on both sides and considering the sensitivity of the issue and Turkey's culture, size, geographical position and history with Europe, it is not surprising that debate on Turkey's entry into the EU has generated such widespread contention. The political aims of the EU's integration process, its political and geographical limitations and the very nature of the Union have been challenged. In drawing attention to the very nature and objectives of the European Union, Turkey's candidature has unveiled the emergence of an "*ethical-cultural nationalism*"²¹³ within Europe. This has been evidenced in public opinion polls indicating strong opposition to Turkey's accession plans within the existing EU member states. The EU must eventually make the difficult decision to either: accept Turkey as a member and defy the majority of European citizens, or reject Turkey's bid for membership and be subject to world-wide criticism and contempt.

Turkey's bid for membership:

European Union Membership promises Turkey a multitude of benefits. As well as offering significant economic benefits, membership holds considerable psychological benefits for Turkey. The unfortunate geographical location of Turkey places it directly in between Europe and the Middle East. Turkey is not only in between the East and the West based on its geographical location, but also in terms of the country's government structure and culture. It is for this reason that Turkey has been faced with such a major identity crisis in recent history. Is Turkey a part of Europe or a part of the Middle-East? It stands as the only democratic Muslim nation in the world and comprises a mix of European and Eastern cultures. If Turkey was to gain Membership to the European Union, it would not just be a step towards greater democracy and prosperity in Turkey, but a step towards a clearer identity and greater feeling of acceptance and belonging. Turkey is well aware of these benefits of membership, but though the country has made its intention to join the EU abundantly clear, in its intense lobbying since first applying for entry on 14 April 1987, it has yet to make any real progress towards achieving this goal.

In spite of the widespread changes that Turkey has made in an effort to satisfy the membership criteria, set out in the EU Constitution and at the European Council Summit of Copenhagen in June 1993, it has not found gaining European Union membership to be an easy task. Article I-58 '*Conditions of eligibility and procedure for accession to the Union*'²¹⁴ refers

²¹³ José Ignacio Torreblanca, "EUROPE'S REASONS AND TURKEY'S ACCESSION", February 7 2005, <http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/analisis/679.asp> Viewed on 21 April 2006.

²¹⁴ European Communities, 1995-2006, "EUROPEAN CONSTITUTION", PART I, TITLE IX - UNION MEMBERSHIP, Article I-58 Conditions of eligibility and procedure for accession to the Union, *Europa - A Constitution for Europe*, http://europa.eu/constitution/en/part13_en.htm Viewed on 23 March 2006.

to Article I-2 'respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities'²¹⁵ as the main criteria for membership. Turkey's membership ambitions became clear with the developed a *National Programme of Turkey*²¹⁶ in March 2001. The program set out a comprehensive strategy on what steps the Turkish government planned to take in order to satisfy the EU membership criteria²¹⁷. Though developing the program was a step in the right direction for Turkey's accession, there was still a long road ahead for the implementation of the program.

Turkey's first major step towards compliance came in September 2001 when the Turkish parliament adopted over 30 amendments to the constitution in the areas of rights for detainees, protection of privacy, freedom of movement²¹⁸, freedom of thought and expression²¹⁹ and the right to a fair trial. One area of change that was of particular significance related to male and female equality²²⁰. Article 41²²¹ added to the old phrase "*The family is the foundation of Turkish society*", "*and is based on the equality of the spouses*". Article 66²²² now contains the same criteria for a Turkish mother and a Turkish father to pass citizenship²²³. The amendments were passed into law in February 2002 with changes to Turkey's Criminal Code and Code of Criminal Procedure, the Anti-Terror Law, and the Law on State Security Courts. In March further laws were enacted which dealt with torture, political parties and the use of languages other than Turkish in the press. Though it might appear from these sweeping changes that the Turkish government was genuine in pursuing the objectives established in the National Programme of Turkey, the haste with which the draft was drawn up and passed is probably more of a reflection on the urgency the government was feeling to demonstrate progress before the December 2002 European Union summit; when Turkey hoped a date to begin membership negotiations with the EU would be decided on.

²¹⁵ European Communities, 1995-2006, "EUROPEAN CONSTITUTION", PART I, TITLE I - DEFINITION AND OBJECTIVES OF THE UNION, Article I-2 The Union's values, *Europa - A Constitution for Europe*, http://europa.eu/constitution/en/ptoc2_en.htm#a3 Viewed on 23 March 2006.

²¹⁶ Government of Turkey, "National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis", http://ec.europa.eu/comm/enlargement/turkey/pdf/npaa_full.pdf, Viewed on 25 March 2006.

²¹⁷ The overriding objective of the program was that: "Turkey will accede to all relevant international conventions and take the necessary measures for their effective implementation in order to ensure alignment with the universal norms manifest in the EU acquis and with practices in EU Member States, particularly in the areas of democracy and human rights".

²¹⁸ (under an amended Article 23, citizens may no longer be prevented from leaving the country on the basis of national economic considerations)

²¹⁹ Article 26 initially read that "no language prohibited by law shall be used in the expression and dissemination of thought. Any written or printed documents, phonograph records, magnetic or video tapes, and other means of expression used in contravention of this provision shall be seized." This clause, which previously allowed officials to ban the use of the Kurdish language in public, has now been expunged.

²²⁰ Though in March 2005 the Turkish police violently disrupted a demonstration celebrating International Women's Day.

²²¹ "THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY" CHAPTER THREE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC RIGHTS AND DUTIES, 1. Protection of the Family, ARTICLE 41. (As amended on October 17, 2001), *Directorate General of Press and Information*, <http://www.byegm.gov.tr/mevzuat/anayasa/anayasa-ing.htm> Viewed on 26 March 2006.

²²² "THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY" CHAPTER FOUR POLITICAL RIGHTS AND DUTIES I. Turkish Citizenship, ARTICLE 66 (As amended on October 17, 2001), *Directorate General of Press and Information*, <http://www.byegm.gov.tr/mevzuat/anayasa/anayasa-ing.htm> Viewed on 26 March 2006.

²²³ rights for detainees (Art. 19), protection of privacy, domicile and secrecy of communication (Arts. 20 and 21, and Article 22 respectively), freedom of movement (under an amended Article 23, citizens may no longer be prevented from leaving the country on the basis of national economic considerations), freedom of thought and expression (fifth preamble and Article 26), association (Art. 33), demonstration (Art. 34), the right to a fair trial (Art. 36), and the right to exclude illegally obtained evidence (38). Article 38 also provides that no one may be incarcerated for solely on the grounds of civil liability in contract.

Article 41, reflective of changes contained in the Civil Code as discussed below, adds to the well worn phrase "The family is the foundation of Turkish society", "and is based on the equality of the spouses". Similarly Article 66 allows citizenship to be passed equally by a Turkish mother and a Turkish father (previously children with foreign fathers were subject in their quest for Turkish citizenship to different laws).

The Turkish Parliament passed further reforms on August 2, 2002 when it abolished the death penalty and lifted previous restrictions on the teaching and broadcasting of minority languages; particularly the Kurdish language. However, Human Rights Watch cautioned that “*permission is, in both cases, hedged with qualifications that could be used to block effective implementation*”²²⁴. The new reforms also failed to protect Turkey's longest-serving political prisoners including Leyla Zana, Hatip Dicle, Orhan Dogan, and Selim Sadak who were all former Kurdish parliamentary deputies. Their unfair trial was condemned by the European Court of Human Rights. This omission was clearly more than an oversight. It appears that Turkey was passing these reforms simply because they were necessary for EU membership; rather than because Turkey had genuinely changed for the better and had suddenly decided to embrace such values as protection of privacy, freedom of thought and expression and male and female equality.

On November 5, 2003, the European Commission published the 2003 Strategy Paper “*Continuing Enlargement*”²²⁵ and its Regular Report on Turkey's progress towards accession. The report was based on a series of political, economic and legal criteria. The overall assessment of Turkey was critical about its performance on human rights, democracy, civil rights and the protection of minorities and particularly about the Cyprus issue: “*The absence of a settlement could become a serious obstacle to Turkey's EU aspirations*”²²⁶. The report also mentioned that “*in 2003 some 21,870 Turks submitted asylum claims in the EU, of which 2,127 were accepted*”²²⁷. This infers that the Turkish government was still persecuting over two thousand of its own citizens per year; which violates the Copenhagen criteria and Article I-2 of the “*Conditions for eligibility*”²²⁸ set out in the EU Constitution.

With pressure mounting and the EU decision on whether or not to open accession negotiations with Turkey fast approaching, Turkey finally signed an agreement on January 2004 banning the death penalty in *all* circumstances. Elizabeth Andersen, Executive Director of Human Rights Watch's Europe and Central Asia division, remarked that “*Abolition of the death penalty is truly significant. Turkey has struck an important blow for the global effort to abolish the death penalty*”²²⁹. By October the Commission had issued a progress report which praised the democratic reforms undertaken since 1999. It also noted how much reforms had accelerated over the past two years, but it did not provide any assurance on whether or not Turkey had met the Copenhagen entry criteria. The report seemed to satisfy the European Council which decided to open accession negotiations with Turkey on 17 December. Of its 30 members, 29 said that Turkey had fulfilled the criteria sufficiently to proceed²³⁰.

²²⁴ Elizabeth Andersen, Executive Director of Human Rights Watch's Europe and Central Asia division, “Turkey's Bold Reforms Fail Imprisoned Legislators - Death penalty, language restrictions abolished; Kurdish parliamentarians still jailed”, *Human Rights Watch* (New York, August 7, 2002), <http://www.hrw.org/press/2002/08/turkey080702.htm> Viewed on 1 April 2006.

²²⁵ “CONTINUING ENLARGEMENT - Strategy Paper and Report of the European Commission on the progress towards accession by Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey”, *European Union*, http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report_2003/pdf/strategy_paper2003_full_en.pdf Viewed on 3 April.

²²⁶ “CONTINUING ENLARGEMENT - Strategy Paper and Report of the European Commission on the progress towards accession by Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey”, *European Union*, http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report_2003/pdf/strategy_paper2003_full_en.pdf Viewed on 3 April.

²²⁷ Frits Bolkestein, “What's wrong with Turkey?” *The Taipei Times*, Monday December 12 2005, <http://www.taipetimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2005/12/12/2003284111> Viewed on April 7 2006

²²⁸ European Communities, 1995-2006, “EUROPEAN CONSTITUTION”, PART I, TITLE IX - UNION MEMBERSHIP, Article I-58 Conditions of eligibility and procedure for accession to the Union, *Europa - A Constitution for Europe*, http://europa.eu/constitution/en/part13_en.htm Viewed on 23 March 2006.

²²⁹ Elizabeth Andersen, Executive Director of Human Rights Watch's Europe and Central Asia division, “Turkey's Bold Reforms Fail Imprisoned Legislators - Death penalty, language restrictions abolished; Kurdish parliamentarians still jailed”, *Human Rights Watch* (New York, August 7, 2002), <http://www.hrw.org/press/2002/08/turkey080702.htm> Viewed on 1 April 2006.

²³⁰ Frits Bolkestein, former member of the European Commission (1999-2004) and former Dutch Minister of Defence, was the only commission member of thirty to conclude that Turkey had not fulfilled the criteria sufficiently to proceed when the commission voted late in 2004.

Is Turkey ready for EU membership?

Accession talks symbolically opened with Turkey on 3 October 2005 after the EU foreign ministers had collectively agreed on a “*negotiating framework*”²³¹, laying the ground rules for the conduct of the EU-Turkey accession negotiations, thus paving the way for the commencement of negotiations. This progress came as a surprise to many. Frits Bolkestein, former member of the European Commission (1999-2004) and former Dutch Minister of Defence, was particularly disappointed with the decision to step up accession negotiations; especially considering events that took place leading up to the decision. In March 2005, the police violently disrupted a demonstration celebrating International Women’s Day. In May, the largest teachers’ union was banned for promoting the education of Turkey’s 14 million Kurds in their own language. It would seem that the EU foreign ministers were either unaware of these events or did not see them as significant to the decision.

As serious as these events were, it was Turkey’s appalling treatment of Orhan Pamuk amid the EU foreign ministers decision that deserved far greater consideration. Pamuk, one of Turkey’s most famous writers, had made derogatory statements concerning the lack of open and frank discussion in Turkey about the Turkish genocide of one and a half million Armenians in 1915 and 1916; “*Thirty thousand Kurds and a million Armenians were killed in these lands and nobody but me dares to talk about it*”²³². He made the comments during an interview in February 2005 with the Swiss publication *Das Magazin*. In June of the same year, Turkey introduced [Article 301](#) which stated: “*A person who explicitly insults being a Turk, the Republic or Turkish Grand National Assembly, shall be imposed to a penalty of imprisonment for a term of six months to three years*”²³³. The article was introduced as part of a new penal code which appeared to directly target people like Pamuk. He was consequently charged with violating the new law for the statements he had made four months earlier. The charges seriously undermined Turkey’s case for entry into the [European Union](#) and on 30 November the [European Parliament](#) announced that it would send a delegation of five MEPs to observe the trial. The Pamuk case was later described by EU Enlargement Commissioner [Olli Rehn](#) as a “*litmus test*”²³⁴ of Turkey’s commitment to the EU’s membership criteria.

International outcry against the charges ensued and by 1 December Amnesty International had released a statement calling for Article 301 to be repealed and for Pamuk and six other people awaiting trial under the act to be freed. With pressure on the Turkish Justice Ministry mounting, on January 22 of 2006 the Ministry rejected the prosecution on a technicality. Though the dropping of charges was welcomed by EU enlargement commissioner [Olli Rehn](#), who commented that “*This is obviously good news for Mr Pamuk, but it’s also good news for freedom of expression in Turkey*”²³⁵, some EU representatives expressed disappointment that the justice ministry had rejected the prosecution on a technicality rather than on principle. One Ankara-based EU diplomat said, “*It is good the case has apparently been*

²³¹ “NEGOTIATING FRAMEWORK - Principles governing the negotiations”, Luxembourg, 3 October 2005, http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/turkey/pdf/st20002_en05_TR_framedoc.pdf Viewed on 5 April 2006.

²³² Larry Siems, “Publisher, Writer Face Trial in Turkey”, *PEN American Center, September 2, 2005* <http://www.pen.org/page.php/prmID/1017> Viewed on April 11 2006

²³³ Larry Siems, “Publisher, Writer Face Trial in Turkey”, *PEN American Center, September 2, 2005* <http://www.pen.org/page.php/prmID/1017> Viewed on April 11 2006

²³⁴ Mark Bentley, “Turkey’s EU Entry Gets ‘Litmus Test’ as Trial of Writer Begins”, *Bloomberg L.P.*, December 16 2005, <http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=10000085&sid=aMydZcirvwYU&refer=europe> Viewed on April 11 2006

²³⁵ PEN American Center also denounced the charges against Pamuk, stating: “*PEN finds it extraordinary that a state that has ratified both the United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the European Convention on Human Rights, both of which see freedom of expression as central, should have a Penal Code that includes a clause that is so clearly contrary to these very same principles*”. “EU’S CONDITIONAL WELCOME ON DROPPED TURKISH NOVELIST PROSECUTION”, Enlargement Newsletter, *January 27 2006*, http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/docs/newsletter/latest_weekly_27012006.htm Viewed on April 12 2006.

*dropped, but the justice ministry never took a clear position or gave any sign of trying to defend Pamuk*²³⁶.

It is significant that the announcement from Pamuk's lawyer that the charges against him had been dropped occurred in a week when the EU was scheduled to begin a review of the Turkish justice system. It is also significant that the actions of the Turkish government appear to bear no relation to the feelings and views of the general public. Many Turks were devastated that the charges were dropped. They objected to Pamuk concentrating his criticism against *"Turkey and Turks"*²³⁷, and for not being equally critical of other governments. When his trial was initially suspended, the BIA (*Independent Communication Network* in Turkish) reported that as Pamuk was being driven away, nationalist protesters outside the courtroom booed and attacked his car.

Bolkestein concluded his comments on Pamuk's case with: *"Turkey's effort to fine and imprison those who do not toe the official line convinces me that I was correct to oppose opening negotiations on the country's European Union membership"*²³⁸. Bolkestein offers an interesting insight into some of the arguments against Turkey's entry into the Union. He believes *"intolerance goes right to the top of the Turkish government"*²³⁹ and uses Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül's cancellation of a press conference in Copenhagen as an example. Apparently the cancellation resulted from the Danes refusal to evict a Kurdish journalist that the Foreign Minister spotted in the audience.

Opposition to Turkey's accession plans:

European leaders are still concerned with Turkey's human rights record and are calling on the Turkish government to resolve its disputes with Greece and put an end to conflict with Kurdish rebels before it can be seriously considered for membership. But many Turks point to European prejudice against Muslims as the real reason behind Turkey's lack of progress towards accession and there are concerns that Turkey *"is being snubbed by Europe"*²⁴⁰. Baran Tuncer, an economist and former World Bank official, argues that it is European ambivalence toward Turkey and their prejudice against Muslims that is precluding membership; rather than there being any legitimate practical reason for Turkey's exclusion: *"The subtext is fear of what we represent religiously and culturally. People here are beginning to resent this attitude quite strongly, and anti-Western politicians are exploiting the resentment and fueling it"*²⁴¹. Gail Schoettler, a former U.S. ambassador, points to *"an undercurrent of humiliation at Europe's treatment of Turkey's bid for EU membership, as if the Turks aren't good enough"*²⁴².

Though Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan claimed to be as committed to European Union membership as any of his predecessors, some of his actions suggest otherwise. In December of 1996, Erbakan was invited to a European Union summit meeting in Dublin but refused the invitation on the basis that the union had insulted Turkey by inviting him to a dinner which was scheduled after the meeting's official end; when not all heads of government

²³⁶ "EU'S CONDITIONAL WELCOME ON DROPPED TURKISH NOVELIST PROSECUTION", Enlargement Newsletter, *January 27 2006*, http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/docs/newsletter/latest_weekly_27012006.htm Viewed on April 12 2006.

²³⁷ Ayşe Özgün, "Orhan Pamuk vs. Michael Moore", *Turkish Daily News*, Friday February 25 2005, <http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=6698> Viewed on April 12 2006.

²³⁸ Frits Bolkestein, "What's wrong with Turkey?" *The Taipei Times*, Monday December 12 2005, <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2005/12/12/2003284111> Viewed on April 7 2006

²³⁹ Frits Bolkestein, "What's wrong with Turkey?" *The Taipei Times*, Monday December 12 2005, <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2005/12/12/2003284111> Viewed on April 7 2006

²⁴⁰ STEPHEN KINZER, "Turkey Finds European Union Door Slow to Open," *New York Times*, February 23 1997, <http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/euturk.htm>, Viewed on April 3 2006

²⁴¹ STEPHEN KINZER, "Turkey Finds European Union Door Slow to Open," *New York Times*, February 23 1997, <http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/euturk.htm>, Viewed on April 3 2006

²⁴² Gail Schoettler, "Politics of nationalism", *Denver Post*, 12 Jun 2005 <http://www.peyamner.com/article.php?id=12225&lang=english> Viewed on April 2 2006.

would be present. Many Turks applauded Erdogan's gesture, but European leaders saw the move as an indication that Turkey was not serious about joining the union. Though Erdogan's actions may have resulted from poor judgment or an inability to press Turkey's case effectively, rather than from a genuine lack of interest in gaining membership, his actions did not help Turkish relations with Europe and certainly did not help Turkey in its quest for membership.

Europe's already dim view of Turkey's case for membership was exacerbated by further evidence that Erdogan's government had no idea about the basic rules of diplomacy. This became clear when Turkey, a NATO member, threatened to veto NATO expansion unless the EU treated them better. Trying to muscle its way into the EU by blackmailing Europe was undoubtedly the wrong approach and did nothing for Turkey's case for membership and cast further doubts on the merits of its inclusion.

The diplomat leading the Turkish bid for EU membership, Onur Oymen, secretary general of the Foreign Ministry, acknowledges that he faces "an uphill battle", but he warns "It would be a very great mistake to make the E.U. a religious or cultural entity...We do not want a cultural or religious iron curtain to replace the political iron curtain that we fought for 50 years to remove". It is interesting that Oymen refers to the EU as a potential "Cultural Entity". Indeed, it appears that an "ethical-cultural nationalism at European level"²⁴³ is emerging as Europe is being forced to define itself. Frits Bolkestein proposes some events in history that continue to define Europeans and separate them from the rest of the world: "Christianity, feudalism, the Renaissance, the Enlightenment, democracy, and industrialisation have made us what we Europeans are, but they have not made Turks who they are"²⁴⁴. Bolkestein is not alone in his reservations about Turkey's candidature. Anthony Browne, a *Times* of London correspondent, noted on July 19 2005 that "the first official opinion poll on the issue indicated that a large majority of Europeans are opposed and a senior Austrian minister called for entry talks to be shelved"²⁴⁵. Abid Mustafa, a political analyst who specialises in Muslim affairs, believes European Nationalism "has been reawakened by the forces of globalization" and that this nationalism "threatens to destroy the very soul of the union"²⁴⁶.

It appears that Christianity is the driving force behind this resurgence in European nationalism. Hans van Mierlo, foreign minister of the Netherlands, commented that "There is a problem of a large Muslim state" and questioned: "Do we want that in Europe? It is an unspoken question"²⁴⁷. If these comments are any indication of European public opinion, it would seem that Europeans consider themselves foremost as Christians. In Germany, Christian Democrat leader Angela Merkel is clearly opposed to Turkey's bid for membership: "Inviting Turkey to become a candidate for European Union membership was a mistake". She appeals to Europe's strong Christian sentiments by suggesting we "Try opening a Christian church in Istanbul"²⁴⁸; referring to Turkey's history of burning down Christian churches and delaying building approval for such structures. Perhaps Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, former French President, was on to something when he described the EU as a "Christian club"²⁴⁹ to *Le Monde* newspaper.

²⁴³ José Ignacio Torreblanca, "EUROPE'S REASONS AND TURKEY'S ACCESSION", February 7 2005, <http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/analysis/679.asp> Viewed on 21 April 2006.

²⁴⁴ Frits Bolkestein, "What's wrong with Turkey?" *The Taipei Times*, Monday December 12 2005, <http://www.taipetimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2005/12/12/2003284111> Viewed on April 7 2006

²⁴⁵ Munir Umrani, "Poll: Most Europeans Don't Want Turkey In The EU", *The Diplomatic Times Review*, July 19 2005, http://www.thediplomatictimes.info/archives/european_union/index.html Viewed on April 17 2006.

²⁴⁶ Abid Mustafa, EU crisis reveals important lessons for Muslims, *Al-Jazeera*, July 9, 2005, <http://www.aljazeera.com/Opinion%20editorials/2005%20Opinion%20editorials/July/9o/EU%20crisis%20reveals%20important%20lessons%20for%20Muslims%20By%20Abid%20Mustafa.htm> Viewed on April 20 2006.

²⁴⁷ "HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/HELSINKI", Unknown Author, <http://www.greekhelsinki.gr/english/reports/hrw-helsinki-turkey97.html> Viewed on March 24.

²⁴⁸ Ryan Burns, "Europe's Muslim Future", *The Globe*, October 2005, <http://www.gwias.com/globe/archive/000072.html> Viewed on 23 April 2006.

²⁴⁹ Skopiestelos, "Valéry Giscard d'Estaing: Turkey is not a European country", *Aegean Times*, <http://www.aegeantimes.net/index.php?name=News&file=article&sid=854> Viewed on April 14 2006.

Clearly, religion is not the only thing separating Turkey from Europe, the history between Europe and Turkey dates back hundreds of years to an era when Europe was still worried the Ottomans might expand the Sultan's empire into France and Germany. The height of the tension occurred when Ottoman armies nearly took Vienna in 1683. Clearly European ambivalence toward Turkey is nothing new. Turkey's supporters believe "*Turks aren't good enough*"²⁵⁰ for the Europeans. Yet there is air of arrogance on both sides. Yilidrim Akturk, an American-trained economist and a member of Parliament, reminds us that Turkey enjoyed "*600 years as masters of the Ottoman Empire,*" and hinted at a possible reason for Turkey's apparent difficulty in co-operating with the Europeans: "*We don't believe in bending over, even if it's to pick up a big check. We want to preserve our pride*"²⁵¹.

Aside from all of the emotional arguments against Turkey's accession, there are some overriding practical considerations. There is a widely held belief that enlargement would cause disparity and make the EU more difficult to control. Many Europeans believe that Turkey's population is too big and its economy too weak for the EU to support. Turkey has a population of 68 million, which would make it the second largest population in the EU, but one of the poorest economies. Many fear that masses of Turkey's population will migrate northwest to find economic opportunities. In spite of these concerns, there is no solid evidence to suggest that Turkey's accession would cause significant economic hardship to the EU; let alone its economic ruin. There has been some evidence put forward suggesting that the EU would gain significant economic benefits from Turkey's accession; but these assertions are also yet to be proven. Therefore, arguing for or against Turkey's accession on an economic basis is a somewhat futile exercise.

A problem for Europe:

Even though polls show that the majority of people within the European Union member states are opposed to Turkey's accession, the European Union cannot simply reject Turkey's accession plans. The problem for the EU is that membership eligibility is currently based on the prospective member state's geographical location residing within European boundaries and the extent to which the core values of the EU²⁵² are upheld by that prospective member state. Opposition from the European people is generally centred on Turkey's culture, religion and history with Europe. These factors are not relevant to Turkey's legitimate legal entitlement to seek membership subject to the same criteria as any other prospective member.

Like many commentators, José Ignacio Torreblanca believes that the only way to legally reject Turkey's bid for membership is "*to remove the 'Union is open to all European States' from Article I-2*" of the constitution; which would lead to "*resentment throughout the world*"²⁵³ for the EU and everything it stands for. Such measures would clearly violate the founding principles of the EU and lead to world wide contempt for Europe. Such measures are completely unnecessary. Since the EU claims to be a democratic body, perhaps it should consider letting the people of the existing EU member states decide on whether or not they want Turkey to join. In order for this to happen the EU would have to change the membership criteria to make all future prospective candidates subject to referendum in all existing member states.

²⁵⁰ Gail Schoettler, "Politics of nationalism", Denver Post, 12 Jun 2005

<http://www.peyamner.com/article.php?id=12225&lang=english> Viewed on April 2 2006.

²⁵¹ STEPHEN KINZER, "Turkey Finds European Union Door Slow to Open," *New York Times*, February 23 1997, <http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/euturk.htm>, Viewed on April 3 2006

²⁵² Outlined in EU Constitution and at the European Council Summit of Copenhagen.

²⁵³ José Ignacio Torreblanca, "EUROPE'S REASONS AND TURKEY'S ACCESSION", February 7 2005, <http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/analisis/679.asp> Viewed on 21 April 2006.

Conclusions:

Though the path to membership for Turkey might seem to be nearing fruition, Turkey's entry to the European Union, if it happens, will not come until 2014 at the earliest. The negotiating framework places a huge number of obligations on Turkey: "to modernise its judiciary, reform its public sector, curb corruption and streamline its administrative procedures"²⁵⁴; all of which will be subject to intensive EU monitoring. There are over 100,000 pages of EU laws and regulations that Turkey needs to implement. Even if Turkey achieves all of this, the negotiation agreement does not entail any irrevocable commitment or specific date for accession and the negotiations can be suspended at any time if human-rights violations are "serious and persistent"²⁵⁵.

While potential membership for Turkey has been delayed, it will only be a matter of time before Turkey satisfies the membership criteria and the EU will be forced to decide on Turkey's accession. Under current conditions, Turkey cannot be denied membership forever. If the EU does not find Turkey's inclusion to be mutually beneficial, then it should take steps to prevent Turkey's accession. One way the EU could prevent Turkey from joining is by making all future prospective candidates subject to referendum in all existing member states. As well as achieving the desired outcome, the move would lessen the burden on the member state representatives to decide on such a sensitive issue. The path to membership would also become a more democratic process. If the criteria do not change and Turkey fulfils all of the existing criteria, then the EU will have little choice, but to accept Turkey as a member.

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HARNESSING THE POWER OF DIASPORAS: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE MACEDONIAN DIASPORA IN AUSTRALIA AND GLOBALLY

Ordan Andreevski
Melbourne University

Diasporas will be as big as the issues that worry them and the steps they take now to shape a preferred future.

Abstract

The positive and significant relationship between diasporas and development has been recognized by the World Bank, by the European Commission, by nation states like Australia, Ireland, Israel and Singapore, by prominent think tanks and academic researchers like the European Diaspora Research Network. Most recently, the Republic of Macedonia has announced the development of a National Strategy for the Diaspora under the auspices of its Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the Australian Macedonian Diaspora has developed a concept paper for the establishment of a Global Institute for Macedonian Advancement.

In keeping with the theme of the conference, this discussion paper explores strategies for harnessing the power of the Macedonian diaspora in Australia and globally to contribute to European integration and to help migrate the endangered Macedonian nation and the Macedonian State to a sustainable future. The paper examines the various dimensions of power associated with the Macedonian diaspora and how this under-utilized and under-researched resource might be used for positive social, economic and political advancement and integration of Macedonia in the European Union and in global civilisational improvement projects. The paper also explores the pressing challenges and opportunities facing the Macedonian diaspora in its mission to play a more active role as a change agent and builder of social capital in its host country and its former homeland and beyond.

Part 1: Brief History of Macedonian Diaspora in the 20th Century

Macedonian emigration in the 20th Century is a product of economic, political and social crisis in the homeland and a response to the opportunities for a better life in new lands such as Australia. At the beginning of the 20th Century, Macedonia and its people found themselves under the crushing rule of the Ottoman Empire whose occupation of the Balkans dates back to late 14th century. The rebellion against Ottoman occupation and the creation of the first short-lived Republic in the Balkans in 1903 known as 'Krushevska Republika' resulted in brutal reprisals by the Ottomans and marked the start of new waves of emigration to Europe, the Americas and Australia.

Decisive battles in the First World War were fought on Macedonian soil especially the 'Thessalonki Front' which resulted in substantial losses of life and property which again forced people to leave their ancestral lands.

The Great Depression in the 1930's and the Second World War also played a key role in out migration. Similarly, the Civil War in Greece from 1946-1949 and the open borders under Tito's Yugoslavia provided a fertile ground for emigration to the West.

In the late 1960's and early 1970's Western European countries like Germany, Austria and France and countries like Canada and Australia had friendly immigration policies for recruiting skilled workers and their families.

Australia has therefore attracted waves of Macedonian immigrants throughout the 20th century leading to the build-up of substantial Macedonian communities in Melbourne, Sydney, Wollongong, Perth and other industrial centres.

Similarly, waves of Macedonian emigrants have settled all over Western Europe, the Mediterranean, in Israel and the Americas including the USA, Argentina, Brazil and Chile. It is important to note that constant out-migration is not sustainable and it is having a detrimental impact on Macedonia's current and future development.

To date no one knows exactly how many Macedonians left Macedonia in the 20th Century and how the diaspora has expanded and adjusted to their new host societies. This is an important research topic which needs to be addressed in the future. Important lessons can be learned from the attempts by the Irish to document, gauge, map and engage its diaspora.

Part 2: The Power of European Diasporas in Australia

European and other diasporas in Australia have made a major contribution to the economic and cultural development of this young nation.

A useful framework for understanding and measuring the power of European diasporas in Australia to contribute to European integration, to act as agents of change and to contribute to civilisational improvement projects is the Matrix Model as used by the *Australian Financial Review Magazine* Power Panel (October 2001). This annual Survey seeks to assess who's got power in Australia, who's lost power and who's waiting in the wings.

Matrix Model for Mapping and Measuring the Power of Diasporas

Diaspora X	Overt power	Covert power	Cultural power
Politics			
Business			
Financial			
International affairs			
Media			
Public Administration			
NGOs/Civil Society			
Education/Research			
Arts			
Other			

First, power is segmented into Overt, Covert and Cultural dimensions.

- **Overt power** is the type, which is gained and maintained as a consequence of position or wealth. Power is vested with the position not the person.
- **Covert power** refers to the ability to exert behind the scenes influence by virtue of association or work with people who have overt power.
- **Cultural power** refers to people who have the ability to shape or influence discourse, community self-perceptions and set agendas.

These are not formal conceptual definitions of power.

Second, power is analysed in the context of politics, business, financial services, international affairs, media, public administration, NGO's, education and the Arts.

By using the Matrix Model and more refined instruments, researchers and community leaders can start producing Diaspora Power Profiles and Diaspora Social and Political Network Analysis (Lin,1999) to begin assessing the extent to which European Diasporas in Australia are positioned to contribute to European Integration and other transnational projects.

In the case of the Macedonian Diaspora in Australia, the various dimensions of power associated with this community have yet to be rigorously researched from a quantitative and qualitative perspective. This could be a good PhD Research topic.

It is difficult to obtain funding from the ARC for PhD Diaspora Research Projects given that 'diasporas' at present are not classified as part of the national research priorities.

Part 3: Strategies for Harnessing the Power of the Macedonian Diaspora in Australia and Globally

In my view, diasporas in Australia and Australia's diaspora in the world should be declared a '**national strategic asset**' over and above the current policies of Multiculturalism at Federal and State level.

Similarly, the Republic of Macedonia should formally recognize the strategic, economic and social capital of its diaspora and develop its Diaspora Strategy with a budget commensurate with the task and explore meaningful ways for engaging with diaspora.

Funding should be made available so that this under-utilized and under-researched resource can be used for positive social, economic and political advancement of Australia and closer relations with the European Union and involvement in global civilisational improvement projects such as poverty elimination, development, debate on climate change, refugee flows etc. Similarly, funding should be made available by the Republic of Macedonia and the diaspora itself for joint strategic projects.

Efforts must be made to identify and engage with leaders of stakeholder groups who are interested and capable of making a difference to the debate and status of Diasporas in Australia and globally. The issue of diasporas needs to be on the 'radar screen' of key stakeholders. Interest in Diasporas can be sustained by developing and implementing a Stakeholder Relations and Communication Plan that brings together scholars and research students with leaders from politics, business, philanthropists, public officials and the media to share their perspectives on diaspora related issues.

The potential contribution of European Diasporas in Australia to European integration cannot be positively exploited without Strategy and Action Plans backed up by budgets and partnerships.

Research: It is first necessary for European Diaspora Research Network and others such as this to communicate the Diaspora Value Proposition to funding bodies, policy makers and the media based on facts. The use of an evidence based approach to the management of diaspora issues and policies can greatly facilitate the Diaspora research agenda.

It is necessary to secure funding for Diaspora Professorships and for PhD students to devote their energies to building up profiles of the community using official census and other data that is available. The establishment of a *Diaspora Research Foundation* may be worth

exploring as a means of collecting and directing research efforts and resources to the most pressing issues that can make a positive difference to closing the gap between where we are at and where we want to be.

Community Capacity Building: It is necessary to build the capacity of the diasporas to plan and execute Community Development and Sustainability Strategies and Strategies for Migrating from ethno-centricity to regional (European) and World-centricity.

Funding opportunities that are available from the Victorian Government for Community Capacity Building have yet to be accessed by the Australian Macedonian community. Communities that have taken the time and effort to develop Strategic Plans which articulate their mission and key priorities have a better chance of being effective than those who are less organized. No community plans to fail but a few fail to plan. Fortunately there are many excellent examples of Strategic and Operational Plans that can be modified to the needs of communities.

Macedonia's accession into the EU can be facilitated by the diaspora who have the linguistic, cultural, political and social connection and skills.

Integration into the EU is a key strategic priority for the Republic of Macedonia and its diaspora. It is with some regret that the Minister for Euro-Integration in Macedonia and the diaspora failed to establish programs and mechanisms that enable the two to work together on this important strategic project.

This is where the idea of establishing a world-centric diaspora driven think tank comes into play. The Global Institute for Macedonian Advancement is about harnessing the power of the diaspora in Australia and around the world to act as an agent for sustainability, advocacy and innovation in consciousness. The work of the United Macedonian Diaspora organization and others like it in North America provide a platform for cooperation between Macedonians in Australia and those in America.

The need for Benchmarking and Innovation

I am inspired by the work of the Italian and the Jewish community in Australia especially its emerging young leaders who are successfully taking over many of the functions performed by the older generations. In particular, I would like to mention Assoc. Prof. Danny Ben-Moshe who has been an inspiration by working not just with his own community but also helping other communities in Australia to start planning and moving forward.

Benchmarking studies provide a key opportunity for communities and diasporas to measure their performance against other diasporas in Australia and globally. They allow diaspora organizations to identify areas of their operations that need to be improved and can highlight strengths and weaknesses that need to be addressed to facilitate growth and sustainability.

Using the internet to connect the diasporas

The internet has been a blessing for NGOs, civil society groups and community groups to exchange knowledge, to communicate, to fundraise, to build coalitions and to campaign for their causes. There are many excellent websites which can serve as models for diasporas to use and adapt to their needs. The Australian diaspora in the USA and in the UK is using the internet for this purpose successfully (see Southern Cross Group) as are others (see Unione Italiane Nel Mondo).

Government - Diaspora Partnerships

Building partnerships between Government and Diasporas is critical to harnessing the power of both parties. The challenge for the Australian Macedonian diaspora is to build meaningful partnerships with Australian Government departments on a local, state, national and international scale.

Similarly, the Macedonian diaspora needs to work on building relations with the Government of Macedonia and the European Commission.

The diaspora needs to feel that its contribution is required and important. Inviting the Macedonian diaspora from around the world to comment on Macedonia's Strategy for Euro-Integration and to contribute to the shaping of the National Diaspora Strategy are essential steps for building bridges between the two sides.

University and Diaspora Partnerships

Universities and their research networks can play a critical role in facilitating the development and contribution of European and other diasporas to national and international development issues. The importance of this partnership can not be overlooked as communities need the guidance and assistance of professional researchers to help them shape strategies for full engagement with the host society and their former homelands. In this context, I would like to congratulate Victoria University for its on-going interest in the Balkans and to all Universities who support the work of the Contemporary European Studies Association.

Think tanks are another partner that diasporas can engage with in the search for solutions to pressing issues facing societies. The Centre for Social Innovation at Stanford University regularly publishes research which can be of value to diasporas. Diaspora organizations must try to bring themselves up to speed with what has been researched and use published research findings to improve the quality of their decision-making and advocacy capabilities.

Diasporas can also learn the craft of how to influence public policy from think-tanks like the Brookings Institute, based in Washington D.C.

Diasporas and NGOs/Civil Society

The influence of NGOs and civil society organizations on public and corporate policies has grown substantially in the last decade.

In particular, I would like to mention the important role played by the Soros Foundation in Central and South Eastern Europe and similar bodies who have invested resources in many important empowerment and transformational change projects.

Diasporas should take advantage of the opportunities for collaboration with NGOs and civil society groups in their quest to initiate reforms and improve the quality of life in their former homelands.

Diasporas and the Progressive Corporate Sector

Diasporas can take advantage of the growing trend and popularity of Corporate Social Responsibility, Good Governance, Corporate Citizenship, Corporate Philanthropy and Business Ethics. Publications like *Ethical Corporation* can help Diasporas identify which Corporations they can work with for mutual advantage.

With a carefully constructed value proposition and good public affairs, diasporas can develop alliances with enlightened corporations and work on collaborative projects (Black and Hohnen, 2006)

Similarly, diasporas can start analyzing which corporate leaders can be attracted to community development causes. For example, the former President of Motorola and now CEO of Nortel Communications is of Macedonian origin and has worked with a President of the Republic of Macedonia on projects aimed at connecting the nation state with the global investment community.

Diasporas and the Media

European diasporas in Australia can advance their agenda and communicate their message by understanding how to nurture relations with the media locally and in Europe.

Given that politicians and policy makers are sensitive and responsive to what is being reported in the media, ideas and contributions can be made to the discourse surrounding the role of the diaspora and other issues.

Mastering the art of Media Relations and writing effective Editorial and Opinion pieces is becoming an essential skill for all community leaders.

Diasporas and Fundraising

Without diverse revenue streams and a deep pool of financial resources to draw upon, the future of diaspora organisations is not sustainable and their potential will remain underutilized. The decentralized model that currently exists in Australian Macedonian organisations lacks focus and is ineffective for addressing the critical challenges of our time.

Lessons can be learned from diasporas who have invested strategically into real estate and other business and social ventures in support of their agenda.

Funds can be raised from internal community sources by setting up charitable foundations and not-for profit social ventures such as Community Banks in association with say the Bendigo Bank.

Funds can also be accessed from external sources such a local, state and federal government in Australia, from various foundations in Europe, from the EC, the USA and other sources.

The challenge for Diaspora organisations is to position themselves as credible, professional and reputable entities capable of managing funds and budgets in a transparent and accountable way. Good governance and ethics must be the backbone of all diaspora organisations.

Jerr Boschee's latest book, *Migrating from Innovation to Entrepreneurship: How Non profits are Moving Towards Sustainability and Self-sufficiency* will be of interest to diaspora organisations. It shows how some of the most successful social innovators in the world are moving away from a dependency model of financing that relies almost entirely on charitable contributions and public sector subsidies towards sustainability and self-sufficiency.

Financial sustainability can be attained through a combination of philanthropy, subsidies and earned revenue whereas self-sufficiency can be achieved through earned revenue alone.

Diasporas and Ethical Influence

Diaspora organisation can be more effective if they learn to apply the science of Ethical Influence or Social Psychology to work in favor of community development (Cialdini, 2003). Influence is the rapidly expanding field of psychological inquiry devoted to discovering the principles that determine beliefs, create attitudes and move people from agreement to

action. In other words, influence examines the process that causes humans and communities to change.

Mastering the art of ethical influence can build commitment among key stakeholders to your cause. It is a way of persuading stakeholders to give more of their time and connections and to boost fundraising effectiveness.

Learning from Giants like Mahatma Gandhi

If we want change we must become the change to which we aspire.

Part 4: Challenges and opportunities facing the Australian Macedonian diaspora in its mission to play a more active and constructive role in its host country and its former homeland and the beyond.

Standing still is not an option: We must embrace change, practice Strategic Foresight and become Social Innovators and Social Entrepreneurs!

The current status quo of limited engagement or disengagement with stakeholders in Australia and in Europe is not in the interest of community sustainability and its reputation.

The Australian Macedonians need to reconnect with one another, with stakeholders in Australia and globally.

Unlocking the diaspora's potential to affect social change by assisting humanity and integration in Australia and globally is the name of the game.

Under the new Social Innovation and Entrepreneurship Model, the diaspora needs leaders and organisations to become:

Ambitious: prepared to tackle major social, economic and environmental issues;

Mission Driven: generating social capital and social value for the benefit of humanity.

Strategic: focus on opportunities to improve systems, create solutions and invent new approaches that create social capital and a preferred future.

Resourceful: exceptionally skilled at mustering and mobilizing human, financial and political resources.

Results oriented: producing measurable results that transform existing realities, open pathways for the marginalized and unlock the community's potential to effect social change.

It is incumbent upon the younger generations to again build social capital, to create sustainable community organisations and to take the lead in the creation of a collectively caring and innovative community. I would recommend to anyone interested in social capital to read Robert Putman's *Bowling Alone: The collapse and revival of American community*. Also see Durlauf and Fanfchamps (2004) for a survey of research on social capital.

The Macedonian diaspora in Australia should work on its image with a view to becoming trendy, progressive and pro-active. We must stop blaming others for our problems and accept responsibility for shaping the future. We must put our money where our mouth is and also look for external funding options.

The community leaders should convene a *Future Directions Forum* and develop a clear Vision and Mission for the community followed by a Strategic and Operational Plan. The key strategic challenges and issues facing the diaspora in Australia should be identified, debated and isolated for action.

In particular, a Theory of Change (see www.theoryofchange.org) or Roadmap needs to be developed which identifies the preconditions, pathways and interventions necessary for the diaspora to initiate and sustain positive change.

Serious, comprehensive and innovative reform is needed if the Australian Macedonian diaspora wants to be relevant and influential locally, in Macedonia and in the Europe Union.

The Government of Macedonia must also get serious about its diaspora and work with it in the development and implementation of meaningful engagement. Employing one public servant to handle all Diaspora Policy Affairs is not sufficient and sends the wrong signal to us. Like the Italian and Croatian diasporas who now have voting rights and representation in their respective Parliaments, so too should the Macedonian diaspora be given the right to vote and decide on strategic issues.

Re-appointing a Minister for Diaspora Affairs would also be a step in the right direction.

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INDIVISIBLE PARTNERS OR ENDURING COMBATANTS? DIVISIONS AND TRIUMPHS IN THE EU-AUSTRALIAN RELATIONSHIP

Luke Raffin
University of Melbourne

Since it was formed in the aftermath of the Second World War, the European Union has shared a roller coaster ride with Australia through the vicissitudes of their relationship. In light of the volatility of their engagement, are the EU and Australia really divided by a 'trans-hemispheric rift', a 'gulf of misunderstanding' (Murray 2005: 6-7), or are these simply superficial quarrels that inevitably emerge from an intimate relationship? This article will juxtapose the divisions that undermine the EU-Australian relationship with the factors that strengthen the partnership. First, it will observe that Australia and the EU are separated by their inequality. After examining the divisive role of the Common Agricultural Policy ('CAP') (Murray 2002a: 162), the article will contend that Australia's preoccupation with European protectionism has inhibited the broadening of the scope of their engagement. The bilateral lens through which the Howard Government prefers to view Europe has hindered the advancement of relations with the EU through a regionalist paradigm. Furthermore, Canberra's close relationship with the United States, global environmental policy and the failure to secure a Framework Agreement demonstrates the contemporary variation between Australia and the EU.

Despite these weighty differences, this article maintains that the factors uniting Australia and the EU ultimately prevail. The CAP's ability to undermine the relationship is lessening. Beyond agriculture, Australia and the EU have forged a lengthy record of trade cooperation. Social, political and cultural integration is evolving, diversifying and intensifying. Australia's increasing involvement in Asia not only begins to surmount the obstacle of exclusion from regional citizenship but also enhances Australia's capacity to engage with Europe. Ultimately, the intrinsic bonds uniting the EU and Australia outweigh the divisions in their relationship. Like most partnerships, conflict can be frequent, but there is much more that unites Australia and the EU than divides them.

The Divisions of Inequality

On a fundamental level, Australia and Europe are divided by their differing political and economic and influence. As Murray accurately observes, the EU-Australia relationship is 'an asymmetrical one'. As a 'middle power', Australia is 'low on the hierarchy of states' (Murray et. al. 2002: 395; Cooper et. al 1993; Coleman and Underhill 1998: 9). Its resilient but medium-sized economy, limited military capacity and moderate political power relegates Australia down the list of the EU's priorities (Murray 2002b: 69; Piening 1997: 163). Furthermore, Australia's wealth, location and comparative stability have not catapulted it into the realm of geopolitical problems that attract the interest of Brussels and its active external policy (Ludlow 2001).

Conversely, the EU is a global power. Differentiating itself in an age of American unipolarity, the 'metrosexual' EU has been acclaimed as the era's 'soft power' (Murray 2005; Khanna 2004; Rifkin 2004; Padoa-Schioppa 2004; Ginsberg 1999: 432). Additionally, the economic and political might of the EU is unambiguously clear (Krauthammer 1991: 17). In 1999, the European market was worth more than A\$13 trillion (Mazzocchi 2003: 34). The EU is the world's largest trader, representing more than 20% of international trade (Murray 1997:

230). The importance of such a considerable economic union is undeniable: the EU has been Australia's primary economic partner for the past ten years (Goldsworthy 1997: 29). EU investment provides an estimated 350 000 jobs in Australia (Lamy 2002a: 1). Furthermore, the EU is Australia's chief investor, providing 33% of total foreign investment in Australia (McDougall 1998: 108). The EU is the second major investment location for Australian funds invested overseas (Mazzocchi 2003: 34-5; Kenyon et. al. 2005: 56; DFAT 2003a, 2003b).

Politically, the EU exercises vast power through its bilateral and multilateral engagement. In addition to holding two permanent seats in the United Nations Security Council (Cienski 2004: 8), Europe's relevance is exemplified by its capacity to formulate often popular positions on global challenges. From the 2003 Iraq War and the *Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change*²⁵⁶ to the *Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court*²⁵⁷ and the *Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty*, the success of the EU's strategies has varied but its ability to articulate widespread international opinion has not. Europe's invaluable contribution to the war on terror has never been more important. But the pace of the EU's advancement must not blur a recognition of its weaknesses. The US-led invasion of Iraq polarised the continent, temporarily suspending the progress of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (Layne 2004: 48). The recent failure of the Constitution (Bildt 2005: 17), the seemingly problematic interaction of a common monetary policy with varied domestic economic conditions and the contentious question of Turkish membership have obstructed the EU's advancement (Atkins 2005: 8). These agitations are pertinent, but they dwarf in comparison with the powerful prospect of the EU's future.

CAP: CONSTANT AGRICULTURAL PROBLEM?

The CAP represents the most persistent catalyst for conflict in the EU-Australia relationship. Since the *Treaty Establishing the European Community* articulated the fundamental tenets of the policy,²⁵⁸ enshrining protectionism in the *acquis communautaire*, agriculture has remained the 'defining issue' of the relationship (Lamy 2002a: 2, 5; Benvenuti 1998: 58; Davison 1991: 40). Through its internal price controls and barriers to agricultural imports, the CAP has severely constrained Australian access to European markets (Burnett 1983: 111). Furthermore, the CAP's pricing structures have generated 'obscene levels of overproduction', depressing global markets and prices and exacerbating Australia's trade performance outside Europe (Dinan 1999: 341; Miller 1983: 164).

Australia's interests have 'collided with those of the [EU] precisely where it is most protectionist' (Richardson 1992: 212). Australia has the second-lowest levels of agricultural support and protection in the industrialised world (OECD 2002: 11). Australia's reliance on the United Kingdom as a principal export destination for agricultural produce renders it vulnerable to the adverse effects of European protectionism. In stark contrast, the EU finances the highest level of trade-distorting farm support in the world. Stemming from a commitment to post-War reconstruction, the CAP has dominated the EU's internal activities and its external relations because it is 'basic to its unity and fundamental objectives' (Tracy 1989: 349). Australia advocates free trade to maximise its exporting potential while the EU settles for incremental agricultural reform (Bell 1997: 204). However, Australia's preoccupation with the CAP cannot obfuscate reality: the EU is the world's principal importer of agricultural produce and is Australia's second largest market for primary produce exports. The top six importing Member States annually consume almost \$3 billion of Australian agricultural produce (Sharpston 2002: 29).

²⁵⁶ Opened for signature 16 March 1998, 37 ILM 22.

²⁵⁷ Opened for signature 17 July 1998, 37 ILM 999 (1998) (entered into force 1 July 2002).

²⁵⁸ Opened for signature on 25 March 1957, 298 UNTS 11 (entered into force 1 January 1958).

A Point of (Un)Diplomatic Difference

Irrespective of the merits of its position, the prosecution of Australia's opposition to the CAP has often enlarged the gulf between the EU and Australia. Sympathetic to a powerful domestic agricultural lobby (Burnett 1983: 2), the Fraser Government triggered the CAP's divisive influence on the relationship. Critics assert that the 'extremely aggressive tactics and style of the Government's diplomacy' rendered the Fraser years 'simply counterproductive' (Burnett 1983: 221; Benvenuti 1999: 181). Whilst the Fraser Government's attachment of 'a disproportionate importance to the agricultural question' was understandable because of its predominance in the Australian economy (Benvenuti 1999: 182-3), the diplomatic handling of the disagreement 'merely impaired the already unsatisfactory relations with the EEC' (Renouf 1983: 330).

Signalling an unprecedented activism in international economic diplomacy (Kenyon et. al. 2005: 60), the more conciliatory approach of the Hawke and Keating governments furnished limited but encouraging success. Through the *Andriessen Agreement*, the EU indicated some willingness to submit its contentious policy to the rigour of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade negotiations (Murray 2005: 22). Additionally, Australia assumed leadership of the Cairns Group – a coalition of agricultural exporting nations that became a coordinated liberalising force in multilateral trade for a (Capling 2002: 153-70; Gallagher 1988: 2; Groom 1989: 3). The dialogue that emerged from this period led to a considerable broadening of relations between the EU and Australia (Elijah et. al. 2000).

Despite this progress, the CAP continues to strain the relationship. Since serving as Special EC Trade Minister in the Fraser Government at a time when Australia began to recognise the severity of the CAP's implications, John Howard has been 'unswerving in his attacks on EU protectionism' (Burnett 1983: 112-3; Howard 2003: 10-11; Murray 2005: 6). According to the Prime Minister,

I have spent a large part of my political life denigrating, quite rightly, with some passion, the rotten anti-Australian policies of the EU that have done such immense damage to the agricultural industries of Australia and represent one of the high water marks of world trading hypocrisy (Kelly 1998: 13).

Recently, the EU and Australia have clashed over the EU's push for multilateral protection of geographical indications beyond the provisions on wine in the *TRIPS Agreement* (Vaile 2003: 2); the EU's campaign to gain greater WTO recognition of the 'precautionary principle'; the EU's Everything But Arms program (Lamy 2002a: 4); Canberra's endorsement of Uruguayan Carlos Perez del Castillo to become the next Director-General of the WTO (Murphy 2005: 6); the EU's sugar policies (European Commission 2005a: 3); the imposition of wheat subsidies (Sutherland 2005: 21); and the application of Australia's quarantine regime to the EU (European Commission 2003a: 1). The ongoing battles in the field of agriculture continue to inflict scars on the EU-Australia relationship.

Although the motivations of Australia's unrelenting opposition to the CAP are understandable, its often confrontational disposition has hamstrung the broader development of meaningful EU-Australia relations. Rather than dismissing Europe as a protectionist and domineering 'fortress' (Murray 2005: 8; Doody 2003), concentrating on the opportunities that the EU presents could yield momentous benefits. The EU represents an unrivalled economic bloc with 475 million consumers, distinguished by 'transparency and porous borders in economic transactions' (Murray 2005: 69). As Kenyon and Kunkel maintain, '[j]ust as Australia works to ensure that its trade relations with the US and Japan are not dominated by differences over agriculture, a similar approach could best serve its multilateral trade relationship with the EU' (Kenyon et. al. 2005: 67). The balance of the relationship must revert away from reluctant indifference toward embracing Europe.

SEEING THE SAME WORLD, BUT DIFFERENTLY

As agricultural bickering persists, Australia and the EU also diverge in their varying views of the world. Although a cohesive EU increasingly acts internationally through a regionalist paradigm, the Prime Minister is intent on viewing Europe as 25 separate nation states. Howard, who has visited Brussels only once and Britain ten times as Prime Minister, is reluctant to embrace a unilateral Europe (Taylor 2003a: 30). Howard maintains that 'it is a mistake to see relations with all the countries of the European Union simply in the context of the European Union' (Barker 2002a: 62). Instead, he favours bilateral engagement with the individual member states of the EU (Barker 2002a: 62). From Howard's perspective, multilateralism is worthwhile only if it brings 'concrete gains' to Australia, but not if it is simply part of the 'big picture' ideology (McDougall 1998: 142). Importantly, a subtle yet ominous divergence in perspective between the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister, Alexander Downer, has been detected (Barker 2002a: 62). In 2002, Downer acknowledged that 'we need to see Europe through a new prism, not just through the United Kingdom and traditional bilateral relationships' (Barker 2002: 62). But Downer's view has been eclipsed by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade's White Paper, *Advancing the National Interest*, which concludes that '[b]ilateral relations are the bedrock of Australia's European engagement' (DFAT 2003c: 99).

Whilst state-to-state engagement is an invaluable instrument in the prosecution of Australia's foreign policy, a failure to grasp the political reality of an increasingly unified EU will continue to restrict Australia's future in Europe (Murray 2005: 168). Through the European Commission, the EU increasingly acts unilaterally across a spectrum of policy areas (Murray 2005: 53; McCormick 2005: 113). This is evidenced in Australia's economic engagement with western Europe, which is conducted 'as much, if not more, with the European Union as with individual countries themselves' (Evans et. al. 1995: 309). The freedom of member states is constrained by the supremacy of the Commission and EU legislation (Murray 2005: 62; Standoltz et. al 1998). Currently, Australia's engagement with Europe portrays an inadequate understanding of the EU, its integration process and its external affairs (Murray 2005: 69). This is partly manifest in the Howard Government's focus on the UK (Howard 1997), shared by key business and political stakeholders (Murray 2003), which has diminished the relevance of the rest of the EU for Australia (Murray 2005: 31; Murray 2002a: 162). Groom denounces the 'collective amnesia concerning Europe in otherwise well-informed circles in Australia' as

a debilitating disease ... It creates a lethargy where there is opportunity. It is blind to potential difficulties. It squanders a still-important reservoir of good will. Above all, it is a denial of identity. No group can be free until it recognises and comes to term with its past, whether it likes it or not (Groom 1989: 13).

As long as the Australian political and business community clings to an outdated view of Europe, the relationship will fail to realise its full potential.

THE RISE OF THE TRANS-PACIFIC ALLIANCE

The Howard Government's relationship with the United States, irreconcilable disagreement with the EU over global environmental policy and the failure of the *Framework Agreement* constitute some of the contemporary limitations in the relationship. A juxtaposition of the relations between the United States and Australia with those between Canberra and

Brussels highlights the tensions undermining the EU-Australia relationship (DFAT 1994: 95). Howard repeatedly boasts that the US-Australian 'relationship has never been stronger or closer' (Howard 2003: 6; Howard 2004: 7). The Coalition vigorously supported the US-led invasion of Iraq, which represented the nadir of transatlantic relations. As the world grappled with the horrific attacks on the World Trade Center on September 11, the Prime Minister resolutely declared Australia's commitment to the war on terror (Dodson 2001: 2). Significantly, the Prime Minister recently endorsed President Bush's campaign to democratically transform the Middle East (Howard 2005: 4). However, the EU has advocated a more nuanced approach. The Free Trade Agreement has intensified the integration of the American and Australian economies (Walker 2004: 1), but trade disputes over steel tariffs and soft loans to airlines have fuelled transatlantic tensions (Afilalo 2002: 749). In stark contrast to his vehement denigration of the CAP, the Prime Minister has been subdued in response to the protectionist aspects of the Bush administration's agricultural policy (Davis 2002: 1; Parkinson 2002: 11). Whilst the Government is not entirely uncritical in its attitude to Washington,²⁵⁹ divisions between the EU and Australia are amplified by the warmth of trans-Pacific relations.

AN UNCOOPERATIVE ENVIRONMENT

The EU and Australia are disunited over international environmental policy. Despite its 'formidable' commitment to the environment (Longo 1997: 127), Australia has opposed numerous global environmental initiatives that the EU has advocated (Lenschow 2004: 156). Largely motivated by the fear that ratification would adversely impact the economy, employment and investment (Papadikis 2002: 4; Oxley 2002: 11), Australia has consistently opposed the *Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change*.²⁶⁰ According to Murray, this rejection 'is a type of Cold War between the EU and Australia' (Murray 2005: 156). Beyond *Kyoto*, the EU and Australia have collided over the *Basel Convention on Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal*²⁶¹ and the *Cartagena Biosafety Protocol to the Biodiversity Convention*.²⁶²

THE DEATH OF A FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT

The gulf between the EU and Australia over issues like the environment is emphasised by the absence of a comprehensive Framework Agreement. The insertion of a human rights clause posed such an insurmountable obstacle for the Howard Government that efforts to secure an agreement were abandoned in 1997 (Murray 2002b: 66). The refusal to accept the clause, which appears in the EU's agreements with Cambodia, India and South Korea (Ward 2002: 179), downgraded the expression of the relationship to the *Joint Declaration on Relations between the European Union and Australia*. Although the Framework Agreement's failure has been partially 'counterbalanced by serious attempts on both sides to give flesh to the Joint Declaration' (Murray 2005: 148), the shortcomings of the *Joint Declaration* serve to illuminate the opportunities that were lost. According to Ward, the *Joint Declaration* 'is as rhetorical as it is succinct' (Ward 2002: 188). Funding of joint projects between the EU and Australia is more problematic (Murray 2005: 148). The *Joint Declaration* failed to establish any bodies to oversee its implementation and does not regulate the frequency and nature of

²⁵⁹ Recently, the Coalition defied US efforts to dissuade the European Union from lifting its 15-year arms embargo on China, which Washington fears will transform the balance of power in the Taiwan Strait. According to Sheridan, this was 'the most serious strategic disagreement between Washington and Canberra in recent years': Greg Sheridan, 'PM Defies Bush over China Arms', in *The Australian*, Sydney, 12 February 2005, p. 1.

²⁶⁰ Opened for signature 16 March 1998, 37 ILM 22.

²⁶¹ Opened for signature 22 March 1989, 1673 UNTS 57 (entered into force 5 May 1992).

²⁶² Opened for signature 29 January 2000, 5 ILM 39.

ministerial consultations. Above all, a Framework Agreement could have laid the foundation for healing divisions in the EU-Australian relationship.

What About the Good News? The Diminishing Relevance of CAP

Despite the sources of division destabilising the relationship, the declining relevance of the CAP, the broadening of economic, political and social cooperation, the strengthening of regionalist interaction in Asia and the fundamental connection that forms cornerstone of the relationship ultimately unite the EU and Australia. Importantly, the CAP's capacity to bisect the EU and Australia is mitigated by its declining significance. As it becomes increasingly unsustainable for the EU to maintain its budgetary commitment to an industry of lessening importance to its economy, the CAP continues to drift further away from 'market-distorting subsidies and export refunds to a system of direct aid for farmers' (Patten 2001: 4). The EU has already embarked on three phases of CAP reform: the mostly unsuccessful MacSharry reforms in 1992 (Sharpston 2002: 35; Kenyon 2002a: 6-7; Ackrill 2000: 87), the 1999 Berlin amendments (Sharpston 2002: 36), and the recent commitment to total decoupling, separating subsidies from production (Lamy 2002a: 5). But it has not been enough.

Today, CAP reform continues to be driven by tightening budgetary margins and external pressures exerted in the contest of multilateral trade negotiation (Kenyon 2002a: 8). The CAP as a percentage of the EU's GDP has declined to 0.33% over the ten years from 1993-2003 (Murray 2005: 104). Arguably, CAP reform will continue to lower subsidies and de-link income supports from production, while funding is tailored to support specific environmental and regional development objectives (Kenyon 2002a: 8). The pursuit of global competitiveness will drag the EU's agricultural policy out of the protectionist age. Although the WTO negotiations collapsed in Cancun, the EU exhibited signs that it was willing to accept steeper tariff and subsidy reductions (Davis 2003: 1). Additionally, the enlargement of the European Union has intensified the need for serious reform. The incorporation of predominantly agrarian, poorer economies into the EU will further strain the CAP's viability, neutralising the greatest obstacle on the path to enhanced EU-Australia cooperation.

WHISTLING THE SAME TRADE TUNE

Despite the conflict caused by the CAP, there is substantial agreement between Australia and the EU within the trade dialogue. Throughout the Uruguay and Doha rounds, the common ground between Australia and the EU has been steadily expanding (Kenyon et. al. 2005: 61). As Vaile recognises, 'we agree on far more issues than we disagree on' (Vaile 2002: 4). Former European Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy concurs, insisting that 'on the vast majority of trade issues, the EU and Australia *do* share a common WTO vision' (Lamy 2002b: 2). In particular, Australia and the EU share an aspiration to liberalise trade in industrial products and services, especially in the financial, telecommunications, audiovisual, professional and transport industries (Kenyon 2002a: 15). Together, they seek the dismantlement of tariff barriers around the world, especially in Asia, and they seek to strengthen WTO rules governing dispute settlement (Kenyon 2002a: 15; Kenyon 2002b; DFAT 1996: iii).

Widespread evidence of that cooperation is emerging. In 1994, the *Agreement between Australia and the European Community on Trade in Wine* was signed.²⁶³ The EU is a lucrative destination for Australian wine, absorbing 40% of Australian exports in 1993 (Murray 2003: 231). In 1999, the *Mutual Recognition Agreement on Conformity Assessment* was signed,²⁶⁴ which reduces technical barriers to trade by allowing conformity assessment to be undertaken in the

²⁶³ Opened for signature 26 January 1994 (entered into force 1 May 1994).

²⁶⁴ Agreement on Mutual Recognition in Relation to Conformity Assessment, Certification and Markings, opened for signature 24 June 1998, ATS 1999 (entered into force 1 January 1999).

exporting country (European Commission 1998: 1). Furthermore, the EU and Australia have struck agreement in diverse areas including mutton, lamb and goat meat,²⁶⁵ aviation and the transfer of nuclear materials (European Commission 2005b: 1; Murray 2005: 69). As part of their development agenda, Canberra and Brussels have committed to implementing and promoting policies to grant duty-free and quota-free market access for least-developed countries, to assist these countries with access to affordable medicines, and to deliver technical assistance and capacity-building activities (Europa 2003). Clearly, the CAP has not completely silenced a productive trade dialogue.

Looking Beyond Trade

Cooperation between the EU and Australia beyond trade is augmenting and diversifying. In 1994, the *Agreement Relating to Scientific and Technical Cooperation* was signed, which promotes collaboration in 'bio-technology, medical and health research, marine science, the environment, and information and communication technologies' (Murray 1997: 240). Educational collaboration and exchange have been prioritised (Murray 2002a: 171). For example, the EU-Australia Pilot Cooperation Programme in Higher Education was established to facilitate institutional cooperation at postgraduate level (European Commission 2002: 1; European Commission 2004: 1). Furthermore, the EU and Australia are increasingly united by their evolving security dialogue (European Commission 2003b: 1). According to Romano Prodi, former President of the European Commission, '[w]e want to work closely with Australia on fostering democracy and human rights in the Pacific region' (Prodi 2002: 1). Murray has also observed 'shared visions regarding the need to confront challenges that go well beyond national boundaries, such as terrorism, and common concerns with both advancing and managing globalisation' (Murray 2005: 1). The periphery of the relationship's vision is broadening: Canberra and Brussels have cooperated on rural and regional policy (European Union 2005: 1), drugs in sport (European Commission 2000: 1), transport, development aid cooperation in the Pacific, and migration and asylum (Europa 2003). The historical obsession with the CAP is retreating as a new horizon for EU-Australian engagement arises.

Seeking Engagement Through Regionalism: Australia, Europe and Asia

In an era of 'competing regional capitalisms' (Coleman and Underhill 1998: 3), Australia has been divided from the EU because of its exclusion from regional architecture. The EU is a 'powerful regional bloc' that increasingly engages in inter-regional dialogue with other groups of nation states (Richards and Kirkpatrick 1999: 684). However, the regionalisation of engagement has long frustrated Australia because it is not part of an 'enhanced sovereignty arrangement' (Higgott 1998: 52). Australia is 'outside the loop of regionalism and institutionalised agreements' (Murray 2002b: 67, 71). Consequently, Australia suffers from insufficient opportunities to broaden the mechanisms for engagement with the EU (Murray 2002a: 155).

However, Australia can overcome this integration deficit by intensifying its presence and participation in the Asia-Pacific. Although the country has long grappled with its identity, disoriented in its transitional phase between Europe and Asia (Higgott and Nossal 1997: 169; Murray 2002a: 156; Huntington 1993: 22; Brett 1996: 187; Abbott 1991: 28; Milner 1996; Fitzgerald 1997), the contemporary project of regional integration undertaken by successive Australian governments is beginning to yield success. Initially, the Hawke and Keating governments enthusiastically propounded Australia's economic and security engagement with

²⁶⁵ *Voluntary Restraint Agreement on Mutton, Lamb and Goat Meat*, opened for signature 14 November 1980, ATS 1980 (entered into force 20 October 1980).

the Asia-Pacific (Milner and Quilty 1996). Canberra was instrumental in the establishment of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum ('APEC') in 1989. However, its broader effectiveness is contested, given its 'confinement to economic issues, to the exclusion of cultural and other imperatives' (Ward 2002: 178-9). Confident that Australia's destiny lay within the Asia-Pacific, the then Prime Minister Paul Keating promoted the compatibility of Asian and Australian values (Viviani 1997: 164; Evans and Grant 1995: 31; Sheridan 1995). His Government argued that its liberal pursuit of lower tariffs and deregulated financial markets would facilitate the expansion of links with the dynamic economies of East Asia (Bell 1988; Catley 1996; Maddox 1989; Singleton 1990; Garnaut 1989). In addition, Labor's emphasis on the importance of Australia's security within the region led to the establishment of the Association of South-East Asian Nations ('ASEAN') regional forum (Evans 1989); inaugural joint military exercises between Indonesian and Australian troops and the signing of a security agreement between Jakarta and Canberra in 1995 (Evans 1994: 3; Mack 1993). Economic, political and security links were proliferating. Australia was beginning to find its feet in the Asia-Pacific.

Consolidating Asian Engagement

Although its attitude to the Asia-Pacific has often been unpredictable, the Howard Government has arguably strengthened Australia's role and reputation in the region. Initially, the Prime Minister appeared resistant to enhanced Asian engagement. In 1988, Howard criticised the extent of Asian immigration in Australia (Masanauskas 1991: 13). He was occasionally hostile to the Keating Government's regional focus (Baker 1996: 9), and alienated many in Asia by failing to promptly condemn Pauline Hanson's vitriolic tirades (McDougall 1998: 141). Beyond the rhetoric, Australia's diplomatic and military role in East Timor's quest for independence strained relations with Jakarta (MacIntyre 1999: 34; Crouch 1999: 16; Downer 2005: 8; Downer 2001: 337-8). Recently, Indonesia's handling of Jemaah Islamiah in the wake of the Bali Bombings has dominated Australia's sensitive relations with its largest and nearest neighbour (The Economist 2005: 33).

However, the importance of Asia has motivated the Howard Government to explore and seize emerging opportunities in the region. Today, the Prime Minister boasts his Government's achievements, declaring that '[n]o Australian political party has a monopoly on engagement with Asia' (Howard 2004: 9). Hailing the Coalition's policies of 'active engagement with Asia', *Advancing the National Interest* announced that '[t]he countries of Asia have always mattered to Australia. Close engagement with them is an abiding priority in Australian external policy' (DFAT 2003c: 72). The Government has mostly practised what it has preached. Canberra generously supported Thailand, South Korea and Indonesia in the wake of the Asian economic crisis (Milner 1996: 178). The Government donated \$1 billion to the relief effort following the devastating tsunami in 2004 (Davis 2005: 1). The Jakarta and Bali bombings have prompted Australia and Indonesia to enhance counter-terrorism cooperation (Downer 2005: 8). In the trade sphere, the Government secured free trade agreements with Singapore and Thailand (Colebatch 2001: 2). Formal negotiations have opened with Malaysia (Uren 2004: 21), while agreements with Indonesia, Japan and China are being investigated (Davis and Sutherland 2005: 26; Taylor 2005: 1; Lewis 2005a: 1; Grattan and McDonald 2005: 1).

Most importantly, the Howard Government has won Australia membership of a cornerstone of the Asian regional architecture. Australia's invitation to the inaugural East Asia Summit in Kuala Lumpur in December 2005 presents an opportunity to overcome the persistent challenge posed by Australia's exclusion from regional fora. Although Howard had originally dismissed the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation as a 'Cold War relic' (Lewis 2005b: 1), Australia eventually signed (Kerin 2005: 2). The Summit has been widely hailed as the 'launching pad for what might emerge in the future as a major new constellation of global power politics' (Parkinson 2005: 13), the region's 'most exclusive and potentially powerful club' (Dupont 2005: 15). According to Callick, the Summit could 'eventually rival the European Union and APEC as a regional body' (Callick 2005: 2), it could 'become one of the most influential economic and trade power blocs of the 21st century with a free-trade agreement among member nations – including Australia – possible within 20 years' (Kerin 2005: 6). Australia's elevation renders the

prospect of full ASEAN membership more realistic. The question is no longer whether Australia should engage with Europe, but what the limits of that engagement are.

Befriending the Awakening Tiger...

Despite initial differences, Europe's increasing engagement with Asia emphasises the importance of Australian membership of the region's multilateral architecture. After overcoming the conditionalities that hampered its relations with Asia in the wake of the Cold War (Bretherton and Volger 1999: 131), the EU became 'seized with the importance of Asia' and vigorously engaged with the Association of South East Asian Nations ('ASEAN') (Bretherton and Volger 1999: 131). In 1994, under the German Presidency, the EU embarked on the 'New Asia Strategy' (Commission of European Communities 1995; Machetzki 1994; European Commission 1994), which advocated 'an increased emphasis on political dialogue, a new focus on economic cooperation and on enhancing mutual understanding, as well as for a continuation of development cooperation' (MacDonald 2002: 148). Europe's presence in Asia is partly motivated by the region's size and its rapidly growing economies (Dent 1999: 383). Asia is a larger regional trading partner for the EU than the North American Free Trade Agreement ('NAFTA') (McDonald 2002: 147). In 1996, East Asia took 8.2% of EU exports and provided 10.6% of EU imports (McDougall 1998: 117). Above all, Asian and European engagement is the logical consequence of the emerging significance and power of the two regions. Together, Europe and Asia represent two of the three poles of the geopolitical order (Soesastro 2002: 143).

The extent of EU-Asian integration illustrates the importance of further Australian involvement in the region. Although ASEAN and APEC have been less successful avenues for EU-Asian cooperation (Soesastro 2002: 143), the Asia-Europe Meeting ('ASEM') has been a particularly productive engine for advancing the relationship. Established in 1996, ASEM facilitates dialogue on political, security and economic issues between the EU and the ASEAN countries and Japan, China and South Korea (Gilson 2004: 185). ASEM aims to 'realize and develop a concerted relationship in shaping the international order' (Soesastro 2002: 184). Its achievements are emblematic of the advancement of EU-Asian relations. The ASEM Trust Fund provides technical advice and training on financial sector and social policy reform. The Asia-Europe Environmental Technology Centre promotes cooperative research among environment scientists in the two regions.

Furthermore, the ASEM Business Forum promotes frequent dialogue between European and Asian investors. European Business Information centres have been established in many Asian cities, and the European Investment Bank has been active in supporting a number of aid programs in ASEM states, including the financing of natural gas projects in Thailand and Indonesia. Several Asian states benefit from the EU's Generalised System of Preferences, which provides a favourable importation regime for goods originating in developing states (Ward 2002: 183-4). Additionally, ASEM has pursued an early relaunch of a new round of multilateral trade negotiations to liberalise trade and investment between countries in Asia and Europe (Soesastro 2002: 143). Indicative of a broadening of relations, an Asia-Exchange Foundation (ASEF) has been created in Singapore to develop cultural interconnections.

Despite the widespread evidence of cooperation, recent examples of European indifference to Asia have highlighted the need for renewed engagement between the regions. The EU was inadequately represented at the ASEAN-EU foreign ministers meeting in Vientiane in December 2000 and the ASEM foreign ministers' meeting in Madrid in June 2002. At the fifth meeting of ASEM finance ministers in 2003, only one European foreign minister was present (Callick 2003: 12). Importantly, Europe recently invoked the historically divisive values discourse in response to Burma's membership of Asian-European institutions. However, periodic lulls in the advancement of the relationship are unlikely to arrest its advancement.

BUILDING THE BRIDGE FROM EUROPE TO ASIA

Not only can Australia enhance its relationship with the EU by becoming part of Asia's regional architecture, but it can overcome divisions in the relationship by facilitating Europe's relations with the wider region. This is reinforced by intermittent appearance of abeyance in the Asian-EU relationship. Whilst Australia's European identity may inhibit its fulsome Asian integration, it may also present Australia as an attractive investment destination for European businesses seeking to explore the Asia-Pacific region. Australia is a key trading partner and often plays a pivotal role in regional politics (Murray 2002a: 171). The Federal Government recognises this opportunity. According to *Advancing the National Interest*, the 'Australian Government is using its regular high-level contact, and the unique and valued perspective we offer, to encourage the European Union to remain productively engaged with East Asia' (DFAT 2003c: 105). This strategy appears to be yielding success. The EU recognises Australia's role and knowledge of the Asia-Pacific (Murray 2005: 213). In particular, the EU has benefited from Australia's interpretation of human rights and security issues (Patten 2001). Australia can continue to play a pivotal stepping stone as the EU continues its journey into the Asia-Pacific.

The Ties that Bind

In addition to the declining influence of CAP, the emerging and broadening manifestation of cooperation and the prospect of enhanced engagement through the Asia-Pacific region, Australia and the EU are ultimately united by their common bonds (Forwood 1989: 12; Davison 1991: 40). Australia's cultural identity, political norms and social values are immersed in its predominantly European heritage (Miller 1983). Although Australia 'has developed distinctive cultural symbols, economic structures and strong elements of a national identity, the heritage and influence of Europe is pervasive' (National Europe Centre 2005). As members of 'the West', Australia and Europe share similar values and conceptions of history (Murray 2002b: 66). Fundamentally, there is a common commitment to freedom, democracy, and human rights (Harvey 2001: 312). As Lamy proclaimed,

Australia and the EU are committed to free and fair societies built upon the rule of law established by democratic institutions. We seek peace and security and increased regional integration through dialogue and common cause and an accountable multilateral framework (Lamy 2002a: 1).

Furthermore, the composition of Australia's population reflects its European origins: nearly 90% of Australians have European ancestry. Almost 19 000 Europeans migrate annually to Australia. More than one million Europeans visit Australia every year, while more than 700 000 Australians travel to Europe annually (DFAT 2003c: 99; Jupp 1991: 128; Hugo 2003: 25). Despite the political and economic tensions that can frustrate the friendship, Australia and the EU are closely bound by their historical, cultural and social union.

A Solid Foundation, Despite the Cracks

In contemporary foreign relations, geopolitical alliances operate in an unpredictable climate. National interests often collide, fuelling political and economic disputes. But such divisions must run deep before they can destroy a relationship. This article has detailed the major sources of division in the EU-Australia relationship. It has argued that Australia and the EU are disunited by their differing political and economic strength. This inequality has been accentuated by the divisive function of the CAP. Additionally, the Howard Government's emphasis on bilateralism does not conform to the regionalist prism through which the EU

increasingly views the world. Recent diplomatic divergence, manifest in disagreement of global environmental policy and reflected in the failure of the Framework Agreement, is highlighted by the Howard Government's relationship with the United States. From one perspective, the relationship appears to be dominated by disagreement, ideological incompatibility and an indifference to caring.

However, there is a 'new, quiet transformation taking place' in EU-Australian relations (Murray 2005: 248). The focus in Canberra and Brussels has begun to shift from divergence to unity, from conflict to cooperation. The CAP's relevance is being neutralised by the rise of anti-protectionism. Trade cooperation is diversifying and evolving. Broader political and social integration is accelerating. The EU-Australia relationship can be further fortified by Australia's increasingly engagement with the Asia-Pacific, with which the EU is strengthening its connection. Australia can continue to facilitate Europe's interaction with the wider region. Ultimately, Australia and the EU are bound by deep historical, cultural and social connections which have forged a broadly common view of the world. Tremors arising from the historical and contemporary differences between Australia and the EU reverberate, but they will not destroy the foundation of the alliance.

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BOOK REVIEW

**Katharine Sarikakis (ed) *Media and Cultural Policy in the European Union (2007)*
24 European Studies. Rodopi, Amsterdam and New York**

This is my first encounter with *European Studies* “an interdisciplinary series in European Culture, History and Politics” published by the Amsterdam based Rodopi. A hard bound 250 pages, it is the size of a book, a collection of essays, in this case eleven, two by the editor. Media and cultural policy is a large and diverse field and the essays range from analyses of EU law and policy as it affects the media and cultural industries through construction of identity through cultural policy to cultural tourism. The contributors are scholars from Britain, Belgium, and Germany.

The particular issues addressed are: state aid versus liberalization in the film sector, cultural diversity and subsidiarity in the regulation of cultural tourism, a comparison of social cohesion, media and cultural policy in the EU and Canada, EU communications liberalization and public service broadcasting, the enlargement of the “European Audiovisual Space”, media concentration and pluralism in the EU in several aspects, the construction of European identity and citizenship through cultural policy, and the review of the Television Without Frontiers Directive.

Although not within my primary field of expertise, I found all essays both readable and scholarly. As we grapple with some similar issues in Australia, we can only envy the diversity of European cultural production and marvel at how the continent that produced Shakespeare, Voltaire, Mozart and Michelangelo can also produce the Eurovision Song Contest.

This volume would be valuable reading for anyone interested in media and culture and the regulatory and policy frameworks that make their flourishing possible.

Matt Harvey



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